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THE CONCEPT STANDARD

A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF WHAT MEN HAVE CONCEIVED
AS CONSTITUTING OR DETERMINING LIFE VALUES.
CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
DIFFERENT THEORIES TOGETHER
WITH GENERAL EDUCATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS

BY

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University

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FOREWORD

The present study is one that attempts to investigate what has constituted in certain eras of the world's history the standard by which all values were conceived or measured. That consciously or unconsciously such an ultimate point of reference or guiding principle has determined values in the past seems the only interpretation possible of our social inheritance to-day. It is wholly in accord with the main thesis of this study, to realize that the significance of the control was not always grasped by those whose destinies were being determined by it. It is also in accord to suggest that progress was surer, more direct, when there was a consciousness of the presence and nature of the control. The standard ethically conceived and realized as functioning in the life of a people has proved its worth by its greater power and by its tendency toward survival. It is in this last thought that there may be a warrant for this present essay. A social consciousness awakened as at present to the necessity of reflection may find help in any survey of its past experience.

Contrary to ordinary procedure, greater time has been given to those periods that have been lightly passed over by current thought as having nothing worth while for modern needs. The survey of the past has shown that it seems impossible for an age to entertain more than one dominant idea at a given time. All delays in the progress of thought have seemed to result from the isolation of some one phase of a more inclusive whole. Necessary consideration of means to an end has frequently resulted in regarding the means as an end. While the attention is focused on the part rather than on the *part as related to the whole*, things are viewed out of proportion. It is some of these parts of the history of philosophy that are out of focus in the present direction of attention, that have received more attention in the present study than may seem justified. Toleration is asked for what may appear as digressions, and also some consideration of their import.

Part of the work has been done while attending lectures on philosophy under Dr. John Angus MacVannel and Dr. John Dewey of Columbia University. The thesis was suggested and continued for several months under the guidance of Dr. MacVannel. There may be found traces in this essay of the influence of the theories of both these scholars.

ANNE M. NICHOLSON.

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“ According to the established popular usage which the philosopher considers should be our guide in the naming of things, they are called *wise* who put things in their right order, and control them well. Now in all things that are to be controlled and put in order to an end, the measure of control and order must be taken from an end in view, and the proper end is something good. Those arts that lord it over others are called master-building, or masterful arts, and the master builders who practice them arrogate to themselves the name of wise men. . . . But because these persons deal with the ends in view of certain particular things, without attaining to the general end of all things, they are called wise in this or that particular thing, as it is said ‘As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation’ (I Cor. III, 10) ; while the name wise is reserved for him alone who deals with the last end of the universe, which is also the first beginning of the order of the universe. Hence according to the philosopher, it is proper to the wise man to consider the highest causes.

“ Now the last end of everything is that which is extended by the prime author, or mover thereof. The prime author and mover of the universe is intelligence. Therefore the last end of the universe must be the good of the intelligence, and that is truth.

“ ‘ For this was I born and unto this I came into the world, to give testimony to the truth.’ ”¹ (John XVIII, 37.)

¹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *God and His Creatures*. Extracts from Chap. I and Chap. II.

THE CONCEPT STANDARD

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORIES AND PRINCIPLES

It was intended to give an introductory chapter discussing the logical situation in which the standard emerges and functions. This involved a description of the logical procedure typical of all kinds of judgment. This in turn necessitated establishing crucial points in the theory against the contentions of conflicting systems of logic. This last effort forced the conviction that the different theories meet the crux at different junctures. One theory would be so much simpler than another, so much more convincing at some point, that it commanded assent; but pursued consistently the apparent simple procedure met its crux at a later point. Thus the seemingly simple task assumed proportions beyond the limits of the present dissertation because of both its technicality and length. But the study has been useful in revealing certain crucial points, in establishing in the attempt certain rather well defined conclusions, and in defining certain fundamental categories. It is evident that the standard functions in every judgment of even the most rudimentary form;¹ also that all conduct is the product of judgment viewed in its most comprehensive sense. Hence every act is the product of a judgment in which a standard has functioned.

An analysis of so-called scientific judgments, ethical or moral judgments, economic judgments, and aesthetic judgments proved to the writer that all judgments in their last analysis are moral judgments: that the so-called other types are secondary, functioning within the former;² that judgment in any field involves the tacit assumption of social verifiability as a matter of course;³ that the standard is the essence of control varying only in the aspect or method of control.

¹ Pillsbury, *Psychological Theories of Judgment*. *Psychological Bulletin*, August 15, 1907.

² Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*.

³ Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*. Chapter by Stuart, *Valuation as a logical process*, Page 323.

If *experiences are human experiences they are reflective*. An analysis of reflective situations reveals conduct as the "co-ordinating or bringing to a unity of aim and interest the different elements of a complex situation." It represents the reaction out of a situation when present facts are *significant* to past and future. *The impulse becomes idealized*. This "reaction of induced experiences with the inducing impulse is the psychological basis of moral conduct."⁴ The moral value of an act lies in the control of the natural impulse. Moral discipline consists in learning *how* to control. The *idea* becomes the intelligence that controls, the tool of a free agent. The so-called motive is the mediated impulse.

The original impulse completely transformed is habit: the two sides, mediate and immediate, have lost their separate existence. These habits put at our immediate disposal the results of past experience,—at once economizing energy and freeing the agent for higher activities. Freedom *for* is more prophetic of progress than freedom *from*. The standard is the agent's capital of ideas that is drawn on by the "energetic" self. Every ultimate type of judgment presents a dramatic situation where the plot is evolving, employing as a means to the solution, as a working method, knowledge of a proved kind. This proved knowledge is expressed as judgments of the factual kind. In the process you cannot shear off deduction from induction. Upon the student seeking knowledge of this process of control, it is incumbent to know how and where the inductive process is guided by deductive considerations. This is the technique of modern science. Something of the depth and significance of a study of the concept of standard is revealed in the last statement. The ground of challenge for all truth lies here. Realizing the difficulty of the problem, it is still in keeping to state that the attempt to study it is justified by the fact that that which gives man the maximum of control, is the knowledge of the process of control.

The difference in the activities of different persons or of the same person in different circumstances is one of varying degrees of control present in the determining process. The onlooker speaks of the character of the person whose actions he observes. The enlightened say, "We have no right to judge the act of

⁴ Dewey, Syllabus on Ethics. Page 10.

another because we cannot look into his heart and see the motive that prompted it," the charitable say, "We can forgive the doer but not the deed," and the wise say, "Judge not lest ye be judged." And the meaning of all these expressions becomes manifest if we reflect upon the nature of the situation that precedes the act. We realize that because acts proceed from character, "they are not a mere series of separate things, one after another, but form the whole conduct." Character we think of as a way of acting, while conduct is the executed way. Character is the individual's potentiality for action and includes all the tendencies which taken together constitute his power of action whether impulsive, habitual, or reflective. Knowing the character and the circumstances conditioning the activity, we can predict the act. A "person of character" is one whose technique of control of his impulses makes him master of the situation—in other words, responsible to the demands society has a right to make on him. He must have the power of appreciation, which means he must have the means of measuring values in the situation in which he is called to act. These principles of measuring values are part of his technique of control—a fundamental part: a correct application of these to the existing conditions is another part. When we presume to say that we know a person's character, we imply that we know his principles of estimating value and his ability to apply them to ordinary conditions. Given certain conditions, we presume to count on the impulse stimulated by these, and from former similar experiences we can count on the outcome of the interplay of this particular impulse, with impulses induced thereby, and can predict the overt act of the individual. The induced experiences we call reason, and because *these induced experiences measure value we call them the standard*. These induced impulses—ideas, we say—become the law, the controlling power of the immediate impulse. They are real in that they make themselves felt by checking and determining in what *form*, and under what conditions, the impulse may be satisfied. They determine and measure the value of the impulse; they say to it: you are not what you are alone, or in yourself, but your value is what it is in relation to us.⁵ Thus the impulse striving for expression, the induced impulses each with its own momentum

⁵ Dewey, Syllabus. Page 26.

or impulsive quality, struggling also for expression, form a situation, the *whole process of which is one of discovering and applying the standard*—a process of estimating value which emerges finally in the overt act.

The overt act in the degree of its significance as true or false as verified by the criterion, becomes a reference for new situations, thereby increasing the worth of the *ideal*. The vagueness so often associated with the word *ideal* is due to the fact that the initial impulse in instances is too weak to act properly to the summoned impulses, which therefore become fleeting fancies, vague schemes, "castles in the air," so often associated with the popular use of idealist, or dreamer. When the initial impulse is strong, the summons is *strong*, and if there be abundant experience to respond, the interaction is vigorous, and a defined project emerges as a significant act. We may conceive of the ideas summoned by the initial impulse, each bringing with it the residua of the emotional content of the original experience, the whole forming a cumulative emotional content which absorbs that of the initial impulse and finally gives to the project the momentum necessary to convert it into the overt act.

It seems perfectly evident that impulsive acts are characteristic of certain temperaments which seem racial in their origin. Accompanying a quick response to objective stimuli, there is a sweep of emotion attendant upon the initial impulse that carries all before it and expresses itself in almost immediate action. With such natures there is apparently a potentiality of high degree. What is necessary is an idea of tremendous content to check the onrushing original impulse, thereby giving time to marshal other ideas with their accompanying emotional content presumably of high power, to determine and define the project for action. This controlling idea must be a *standard* adequate both to check the impulse and to direct its intellectual harnessing in order that the act expressing the process should be worthy of the endowment of such natures.

The reflective situations seem the mediating influence by which actions are raised to successively higher levels. Actions range from the impulsive outburst of the child to the deliberate highly controlled expression of the scientist, diplomat, or philosopher. *And each product of human activity bears the stamp of the human soul, conceive the soul as we may.* The alternative conclusion

would make mankind either the hypnotized subject of mighty chance, or a cosmically predetermined organism. The tiniest bit of humanity in the midst of its helplessness teaches the absurdity of either of these last conclusions. Each successive thrust of the infant's hand is the expression of the *import* of the former thrust. Each movement of the head reports the meaning that directs the next. To detect the presence of this living control is to identify it with that which makes us a human being.

All records of human experience testify to its recognition. The difference in civilization has been in the mode of interpreting it.

CHAPTER II

THE STANDARD IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES FROM THE GENETIC POINT OF VIEW

The concept of evolution as applied to morality has given rise to vigorous theories concerning the genesis of custom standards. The entire discussion forces the question: Has the actual course of human evolution on the whole been from lower to higher, and if so is this movement based on something permanent in the nature of things, or in the forces that move the human mind?¹

Opposing the view that the origin of moral conceptions lies in the individual's own conscience, these theorists argue that before there is self-reproach or remorse, there must be ideals of right and wrong derived from group approval or disapproval of certain acts. Savages think in herds. "Society is the school in which men learn to distinguish between right and wrong. The head master is custom and the lessons are the same for all. The first moral judgments were pronounced by public opinion: public indignation and public approval are the prototypes of the moral emotions."² To account for developed conscience found in savage tribes, remoteness of origin of the inherited body of custom is assigned as cause. This inherited body of custom composes the standards of conduct. No *one* standard is given any place in this theory.

Folkways are unconscious, spontaneous, unco-ordinated mass-phenomena, currents of similarity, concurrence and mutual contribution.³ In the folkways, whatever is, is right. The degree of rightness depends on the relative importance of interests. The morality of the group is the sum of taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which right is defined. Morals are not intuitive: they are historical, institutional, and empirical. These folkways are not creations of human purpose and will, but are like the products of natural forces accidentally set in motion. They are

¹ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1906.

² Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, 1906.

³ Sumner, *Folkways*, 1907.

subject to "a strain of consistency with each other, because they all answer their several purposes with less friction and antagonism when they coöperate and support each other."

The strain of consistency finds expression in institutions. Through suggestion and suggestibility, mass-phenomena result. Suggestion has no rationale in its method of selection and control: an eclipse has changed the entire course of progress.

"Men in groups are under life conditions: they have needs which are similar under the state of life conditions: the relation of the needs to the conditions are interests under the head of hunger, love, vanity, fear: efforts of numbers to satisfy interests at the same time produce mass-phenomena, which are folkways by virtue of uniformity, repetition, and wide concurrence. The folkways are attended by pleasure or pain according as they are well fitted for the purpose. Pain forces reflection and observation of some relation between acts and welfare. At this point the prevailing world philosophy, beginning with goblinism, suggests explanations and inferences that become entangled with judgments of expediency. *However, the folkways take on a philosophy of right living and a life policy of welfare.*⁴ Then they become mores, and they may be developed by inferences from the philosophy or the rules in the endeavor to satisfy needs without pain. Hence they undergo improvement and are made consistent with each other."⁵

"The real process is not one of deduction from any great principle. It is one of minute efforts to live well under existing conditions." The philosophy of welfare is purely economic: democracy is the result of an economic demand for men, when earth is underpopulated: humanitarianism is a willingness to adopt ideas and institutions making competition of life easy and kindly, only when men cease to crowd on one another. All manifestations of what other philosophies regard as man's higher nature, according to this theory have an economic origin and are treated as distorted hindrances to man's rational progress. The element of luck or chance was conceived as over and above man's manipulation, and hence ascribed to superhuman agencies. These were appeased by sacrifices. These delusions became poetical and fanciful in nature. The sacrifices were attended by

⁴ Italics ours.

⁵ Folkways. Page 34.

rites. This ritual is thus seen to have its origin in conditions of welfare. In this ritual, according to this theory is the beginning of religion. In time the "authority of religion and that of custom coalesced into one *indivisible obligation*. *This individual obligation was the custom standard sanctioned by religious rites*. Men became dazzled by the fancy and poetry of ritualistic phenomena—by the bubbles they themselves had blown and continually leaped to catch."

Elaboration of these ideas but confirms the fact that the *interpretation* of primitive phenomena is not revealed in studying the origins but is unconsciously imposed by the observer of these facts. The popular expediency standard dominant in an economic or industrial age, such as the nineteenth century has been, is used as the interpretation of these studies of origins. The significance of these is not discovered in the process, but in the original hypothesis in the mind of him who studies.

One of these theorists⁶ says: "We see the man-who-can-do-things elevated to a social hero whose success overrides all other considerations. Where that code is adopted it calls for arbitrary definitions, false conventions, and untruthful character." The concluding paragraph in the same author's work shows the presence of a higher standard in the writer: "The antagonism between a virtue policy and a success policy is a constant ethical problem. The Renaissance in Italy shows that although moral traditions may be narrow and mistaken, any morality is better than moral anarchy. Moral traditions are guides which no one can afford to neglect. They are in the *mores* and they are lost in every great revolution of the *mores*. Then the men are morally lost. Their natures, desires, and means become false, and even the notion of crime is arbitrary and untrue. If all try the policy of dishonesty, the result will be the firmest conviction that honesty is the best policy. The *mores* aim always to arrive at correct notions of virtue. In so far as they reach correct results, the virtue policy proves to be the only success policy."

A more conservative view and a more philosophic and more highly organized theory⁷ considers the field of inquiry to include quasi-instinctive judgment based on the unthinking acceptance of tradition and the profoundest theory of the thinker seeking a

⁶ Sumner.

⁷ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*.

rational basis of conduct and an intelligible formula to express the end of life. Between the two extremes is recognized a play of forces remodelling custom and substituting deliberately accepted principle. The conception of the good becomes the prime inquiry and "the business of comparative ethics is to determine the generic character and principal specific variations of this conception as actually held by men at different places at different times. Studies in ethical evolution reveal variations and diversity of moral judgment but finally surprise the student with a more *far-reaching uniformity*." In line with this thought and partly accounting for it, is the tremendous bearing of purely economic changes upon ethical conceptions. This is just dawning upon an awakened social consciousness.

In line with this finding of a far-reaching uniformity, this theory recognizes the growth of will over desire. "By desire we are to understand impulse informed by the anticipation of an event; by will, a reaction of character to *ends* in which relatively stable and permanent satisfaction is found. Its authority over desire, we call self-control, but it is rather control by self as a whole of one or other of the impulses which conflict with its permanent tendency."⁸ It is only when this relatively stable and balanced adoption of permanent ends or abiding principles is psychologically possible that the inculcation of general rules could have any meaning."⁹

This theory recognizes an intrinsic difference in apparently similar institutions, due to the ethical development of one and the unconscious growth of the other. This difference is quite sure to emerge in subsequent history. The higher value of ethically conceived and developed institutions depends on the firmness with which they are held, owing to the fact of their being the product of man's constant endeavor. Their formation contains the means of their defense. Such ethical standards react upon social organization, the result of which reaction forms a large part of world history. On the other hand mere favor of circumstances rather than any moral quality accounts for the presence of the custom-made institution. The term morality qualified by primitive is rather grudgingly applied to mere custom-standards. "The powers of magic have no moral purpose and the spirits of animism are neither moral nor immoral." They are guided by the law of

⁸ This suggests T. H. Green after Aristotle.

⁹ Ibid. Page 14.

retaliation. It is only with the recognition of moral obligation to protect life, to guard property, to redress wrong that the element of morality really enters. In tracing ethical development the emergence of the spiritual ideal of religion is reached. This ideal is described as furnishing a standard that left no room for previously recognized virtues of enmity. The materialistic Deity disappears: God is spiritual and rules by love. The notion of retribution is suppressed.

The best interpretation¹⁰ of these seems to be in line with these conclusions. There is no such thing as private rights in primitive morality. These emerge in Greek times and legally only in Roman law. The first control was that of *old men*. Respect for law first emerges as respect for the representatives of social order. Custom was projected in old men and women, priests and gods as representing permanent interests over and against the tendency to vary in the individual. This tendency to vary, genetically speaking, is the origin of the moral situation. What lies behind the so-called sympathetic resentment is the conflict between the approval of the clan, and the immediate strong desire. The differentia of the ethical situation is a certain discrepancy between certain tendencies of individuals left to themselves, and the expectation and acquirement of the individual with reference to the customs of the tribe and clan as such.

Certain fundamental categories are recognized as the common element in primitive and present situations. Value, control, and standard are probably the most fundamental. These were recognized by the group as a group and are hence objective. A type of good or value was generally accepted. *This common good was the standard which regulated all conduct.* Common goals were enforced on the individuals as his ends. Tribal emblems, symbols, insignia, implements, rites, and cults existed for the individual exemplification of customs of the tribe. The respect for the aged as the embodiment of these customs grew through these rites to the ancestor worship so universal in primitive peoples. Taboos are probably the outcome of the group enforcement of custom upon some individual's tendency to express an individual end. *The whole line of effort was to direct the attention of the individual to the tribal goods.*

¹⁰ Dewey, Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy. Unpublished, 1908.

The reconciliation between social duty and personal right has been the desideratum in all stages of human development. Primitive morality must possess the two elements, though not so highly developed. There must be value appropriated by individuals as well as a sense of social order through which these rights are secured.

Certain definite limitations of primitive morality which tended to give wrong direction to subsequent development may be summed up under four heads: (1) limited area of moral ideas; (2) the basis of moral responsibility was wrongly conceived in the quasi-religious belief in the animistic and magical rites by which group interests were conserved; (3) the identification of morals with custom, and of breach of morals with breach of custom, tending to the ignoring of the *central position occupied by character* in the moulding of conduct; (4) accidental acts were not differentiated from voluntary acts.

Latent in these theories is a recognition of a *permanent tendency* in the individual, which is one way of implying the telic of a guiding principle or standard.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE STANDARD AND ITS MODE OF FUNCTIONING FROM FIRST HISTORIC EXPRESSION TO MODERN TIMES

From the studies of primitive peoples, among which studies might be mentioned those of Westermarck, Hobhouse, Sumner, Spencer, Andrew Lang, and from the researches of historic peoples by such men as Wundt, Waitz, Ladd, and Jowett, the statement is forced that religion and morality have developed simultaneously, that man is essentially a religious being. Theories have been advanced as to the genesis of this feeling, but all theories start with the fact as found *existing*. Several of these have been met in the chapter on the Genesis of Custom Standards. The point is this: all concede the fact that no society has been found without so-called rites that are expressions of belief in a Power that controls in variously-conceived manner and degree the destinies of man. Man's relation to this power forms his religion; this religion is a sanction for codes of behavior which are expressions of the morality of the race.

These elements, religion and morality, having developed simultaneously, were not differentiated until the uncritical acceptance of traditional morality had been rudely shaken by the disintegration of social forces. This breakdown of moral sanctions has inevitably brought about a crucial criticism directed to the discovery of a standard that would hold the dissolving elements together. The classic instance of this condition is in the breakdown of the traditional Greek theory of the moral sanctions, of the divine basis of virtue, and the authoritative supremacy of the law. In such epochs there is a strong skeptical movement of speculative thought which gathers into a philosophy the symptoms of disease in the society affected, and exhibits the cause to be the inadequacy of existent standards as principles of control.

The common inheritance of moral ideas, the habits of a people, become the objects of thought and of critical analysis in the situation. The skeptic asks whence comes this common inheritance

or stock of moral ideas. Their beginning is obscure. In the history of the people or race, these moral ideas have been slowly evolved "by religion, by poetry, by law, having their foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some degree of truth and justice in a social state."¹

The negative movement of thought is not, as some suppose, the cause of the breakdown of established customs and standards, but is a reflex of tendencies² actively at work in the social organism. The claim may be true that such skeptical philosophy often hastens the dissolution it attempts to stay. By further invalidating the mode of control which had operated successfully in previous ages without offering an adequate substitute, the progress of dissolution may be accelerated.

Two alternatives for this acceleration of disruption are the revivifying of the old standard, or the substitution of a new principle of control. The most striking instance of the first, a standard constantly gaining in meaning and power at each vicissitude of the Jewish people, is found in the Old Testament. Scripture is full of testimony to the successive re-emergence of the standard through disaster. "When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a barbarous people, Judea was made his sanctuary, Israel his dominion." "He will be mindful forever of his covenant." "All his commandments are faithful, confirmed forever and ever, made in truth and equity." "He hath commanded his covenant forever."

SECTION I

THE EARLIEST TIMES

Judea

The core of Judean ethics is the conception of Conscience, or Moral Consciousness. Conscience implies the possibility of resistance to the Divine will. This possibility postulates the individual soul, and thus confers upon it an independent value, a dignity, we might say, that can never be conceived under a theory

¹ See theories of origin given in Chap. II in the present volume.

² See argument that in a dynamic society, changes are rapid, readjustment necessarily rapid, that men grow careless of always measuring the force, of estimating values, that standards are discredited. Ross, *Social Psychology*.

that treats the human spirit as merely a transient mode of the Universal Spirit. "Wherever the conscience is regarded as revealing a supreme authority, there complete Pantheism becomes impossible, and individual spirits become of quite infinite significance and worth. Looking for the relation between man and God at the very point where the two most certainly meet; viz., in the sense of Duty, the Hebrew saw in wilful wrong-doing something far deeper than vice; he saw *sin* there, and sin meant the estrangement between God and the Individual soul."³

"Him whom to love is to obey and keep His great command." This identification of his will with that of the One God was still a possibility for *man*. The conception of One God imparted and not gained by thought, left to human reason alone, was broken up "into many measurables"—polytheism. Then to the Hebrew did God announce himself as the "God of their Fathers." To this rude people the conception must be the *Mightiest* of all. "As yet God could give to His people no other religion, no other law than one through obedience to which they might hope to be happy or through disobedience to which they must fear to be unhappy. For as yet their regard went no further than this earth."⁴ The Old Testament becomes a history of this early people's struggle to maintain the standard as revealed in external command, and of the rewards and punishments which Jēhovah addressed to the senses. Thus Revelation became to the race, what some conceive Education to be to the child. "Moses was sent to the Israelite people *of that time*, and his commission was perfectly adapted to the knowledge, capacities, yearnings of the then existent Israelitish people."⁵ The Divine essence of this Revelation is manifest to succeeding generations in that it contained *nothing that procrastinated the progress of the people to whom it was given*. Much that developing reason was capable of apprehending was implicit in its nature. When contact with other races of different levels forced the consciousness of value of their spiritual possession, not always immediately, we witness a re-emergence of their standard with an ever-increasing vigor because of its enrichment through the implicit becoming explicit. Their conceptions became "expanded, ennobled, rectified" most con-

³ Hibbert Lectures. 1893. Chas. B. Upton. Pages 244-245.

⁴ Lessing, Education of the Human Race. Page 11.

⁵ Ibid. Page 23.

spicuously possibly—"in captivity under the wise Persians," when the Israelites conceived their God in connection with the "Being of all Beings"⁶ that the Persian reason had evolved: Jehovah became God.

It has been urged by various writers that the *way* this action of God on the individual spirit manifested itself in the Hebrew conception was defective in that the *means* was an *external* commandment. The standard was conceived as being imposed from without rather than emerging out of the individual consciousness. But as the experience of the Hebrew race became fuller and richer, the *ideal* was awakened or elicited from this experience, was consciously realized as the authority of the Divinity latently present in the very essence and nature of the soul. This did not come until later in their history, and the charge may be true that the concentration of all intense interest on the moral and spiritual relation of each particular soul to the Divine source, led to comparative neglect of the objective cosmos. A greater recognition of this might have lifted the plane of activity to a level nearer the Source.

Mackenzie speaks of the readily traced development from ceremonial law, through the Ten Commandments, to the deep and more inward principles represented by the Psalms and the later prophets, reaching finally the principle of love in Christianity. But in this line of development "the deeper principle is always formulated by the voice of some prophet speaking more or less definitely in the name of the Lord." The idea of divine *law* remains fundamental throughout. Even when the inner principle of Christianity is set against the external rules of the older system, it still appears in the form of a definite enactment—a 'New Commandment.' "It was said by them of old time, * * * But I say unto you." The appeal is still to an authoritative law. Surely no standard of antiquity has proved its vitality so well, or so clearly demonstrates the features of the moral judgment as set forth by Mackenzie.⁷

(1) It develops from customs, through law, to reflective principles.

(2) It develops from the judgment on external acts to the judgment on the inner purpose and character.

⁶ Lessing, Education of the Human Race.

⁷ Mackenzie. Ethics. Page 126.

(3) It develops from ideas peculiar to the circumstances of particular tribes and nations to ideas that have a universal validity.

Greece

Plato's *standard* is evolved in his theory of ideas. The *Idea* is the pattern the mind possesses as a manifestation of the *Logos*. The idea of all ideas is the idea of Good—identified with the *Logos*. This is conceived as the *One* in the Many, the Same in the Other: it is the universal, the World-Soul. The only existence or reality that we can perceive or know is a unity that includes difference, a multiplicity that is nevertheless a unity. These conceptions all express the principle that all existence, the world itself, must be regarded as a combination of an *ideal element*, that element which alone can be truly known or thought, and the *matter* or *formless element* which is necessary to temporal and spatial existence, the presence of which makes it impossible to *know* any concrete thing completely. The many ideas thus conceived in the synthesis of Form or Limit and Unformed or Unlimited, are differentiations of the all-inclusive Idea of Good.

The *Idea* in Greek usage is associated always in some way with unity; as the *idea* of the mind itself—the mind being that which unifies the multiplicity of sense;⁸ as the *idea* in each thing, the essential element by which alone it is possible to compare it, classify it. Without *ideas*, the world lacks coherence. A person without them is borne on the wings of opinion. Such a one is described as a man that may be said "to know and not to know at the same time," or again as "not one at all but rather many and infinite as the changes that take place in him."⁹ But let this person attain to reality through *ideas*, and he will be able to discern the *One* in the Many, the *whole* in the *all*. "The supreme *idea* is the ideal or perfect form of knowledge which would render intelligible the whole of reality."¹⁰ "The greatest and noblest truths have no outward images of themselves visible to men."¹¹ It is by means of this *idea* that man is able to see beyond himself, to discern the common good of all, which as an absolute

⁸ Plato's Psychology in its Bearing on the Will. *Mind*. April, 1908. Page 195.

⁹ *Theaetetus*. 194 B. 199 A.

¹⁰ Plato's Psychology in its Bearing on Will. *Mind*. Page 196.

¹¹ *Politicus*. 285. E.

standard determines the *true* nature of all with which he has to do.¹² Plato shows how this notion of an absolute standard can be attained. Through the study of number the mind is drawn away from the things of sense to the universal and permanent. The constant dialogue of the Mind with itself (dialectic), by which the essence of a thing is comprehended, and consequently its relation to the whole, enables man to get that grasp of reality which alone is self-sufficing and complete. The Idea or Form of the Good is at once the standard of reason, and the aim or end at which every creature aims, for "it is the nature of the soul's activity to grasp the truth, to do everything for the sake of it." It is the motive of conduct, actively seeking realization in act. "There is no more drifting when reason takes the helm."¹³ If the motive be the Idea of the Good, only then will the means be rightly chosen; if not, the separate acts or resolutions have no standard to guide them and the life aiming at no clear end, is the sport of chance.¹⁴ Self-mastery is discussed in the *Laws*, and in the *Charmides*, and seems to be determined by self-knowledge. The attainment to it then must be through a conscious development of mind, brought about by the earnest striving for the truth through reflection. Plato continually emphasizes the necessity of *knowing anything fully*. To understand anything *fully*, it must be known in more than its *material* conditions: they are merely "con-causes." (*Timaeus* 46 D.). It must be known from the point of view of its *end*: the Idea determining particular existence is eventually referable to the all-inclusive *Idea of the Good* (*Republic*) or the *Will of the Creator* (in the *Timaeus*).

"The Creator desired that all things should be as like unto himself as possible. This is, in the truest sense, the origin of becoming and of the universe, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men. * * * And when the Father who begat it perceived the created image of the eternal Gods that it had *motion* and *life* he was well pleased and in his joy bethought him to make it more *nearly like its pattern*. So he bethought him to make a *moving image* of eternity"—becoming

¹² *Republic*. VII. 517 C.

¹³ Plato's Psychology in its Bearing on Will. *Mind*. Page 199.

¹⁴ cf. *Rep.* VII, 519 C., 561 B., Referred to in *Mind*, April, 1908. Page 200. See Chap. I of this present volume.

in Time. Thus the soul is conceived as having more of the *One* and less of the *Many*, than anything else in the Universe. Everything in the world is made after the pattern of ideas : the product in some way determining the process. In none of the Greek philosophers is it so easy to determine the principle that acts as universal standard. This universal standard differentiating, determines the standards of beauty, harmony, order, law.

In the Symposium the supreme principle assumes the guise of beauty. The fusion of the ideas of the good and the beautiful in the Greek theory of Art, would form a treatise in itself. Suffice it to say at this point that it is difficult to determine which is inclusive of the other—as the two seem seldom dissociated. The excellence of human life seemed to demand the identification of the good with the beautiful. The progress of him aspiring to the conception of the beautiful must be through appreciation of concrete forms embodying progressively more of the *one*, and less of the *many*, until when he comes toward the end he will “suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (*and this Socrates is the final cause of all our former toils*), a beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting which without diminution and without increase or any change is imparted to the evergrowing and perishing beauties of all other things. * * * Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty but realities (for he has not hold of an image but of a reality) and bringing forth and *nourishing true virtue* to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may.”

Before leaving the consideration of Plato's standard as the Idea of the Good—there must be noted in him, a desire to give embodiment of his *ideal*, so that the *idea* might have compelling force. The difficulties present themselves in offering a *standard* for most men, and the necessity is conceived in the *Meno* and in the *Republic*, of discovering one who is capable of *educating* statesmen. “If there be such a one he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead: ‘He alone has understanding, but the rest flit as shades, for he in respect of his excellence will be like a *reality* among shadows.’” (*Meno*, 99 B—100 A.) Such was *Socrates* to Plato. It is easy to believe with him, because it is a never-ceasing source of wonder to the heirs of succeeding centuries of wisdom that the potentiality

of man could have been realized to the degree it was in Socrates. He seemed to have divined the truth of coming ages so completely as to become its manifestation. His complete abandonment to the pursuit of what he considered the *Good* of life, made him not only a prophet of the best of coming ages, but the embodiment of his vision. He himself seemed the standard to many of his followers.

Plato, Aristotle,—these names associated for all time with the sources of that stream of thought that for twenty-five centuries has expressed the meaning and destiny of the western world—suggest at once one of the two great channels in which it has flowed. “Sand bars and green island divide, broad shining shallows link together, but the deep currents lie apart, here one limpid with the blue of heaven, yonder one brown with the soil of earth. We call these streams by various names as they flow down between the banks of centuries,—they widen, they narrow, they grow shallower, they deepen. The blue catches more of heaven’s own color, and again it fades pale; the brown waters shimmer under some wind-swept sky like burnished metal. Astonishing change and variety everywhere appear, but no man confuses the two main currents. For these two currents are figures of the two fundamental types of human thought. The one type represents the experience of man with his ideas and ideals, the other his experience with the world of sense.”¹⁵ The *blue* catches heaven’s own color in Plato’s thought. Because at once so deep and wide, broad, shining shallows link the two streams in Aristotle’s time, and the blue fades pale that carried Plato’s thought. Still no one confuses the current: the brown waters from the shallows have still the blue, the men can gaze at the softened tone and wonder whether it is of earth or of heaven. For Aristotle made concrete Plato’s conceptions. There is more of “the soil,” the things of sense, in Aristotle’s philosophy. Aristotle attempted to rationalize the existent order. Plato had tried to interpret the particular by the universal; Aristotle reversed the process. To deal with these particulars, Aristotle constructed a logic which enabled the human mind to pass by means of middle terms from the particular to the more general. Hence back of Aristotle’s logic, is the fact that all that rests on universal truth: “that all knowledge whether ‘deductive’ or ‘inductive’ is arrived at by the indispensable aid

¹⁵ Democracy and Prophetic Idealism. Phi Beta Kappa Address, 1907, Stanford. Edward Lambe Parsons.

of general propositions."¹⁶ Through this reasoning, Aristotle dealt with Greek life as it was. The *goods* are those of Greek life. The ideal he proposes is not an abstract ideal, or one that appears in violent contrast with the customs of his time. "It is an ideal born, so to speak, of what was *actual*, in harmony with Greek life and adapted to its form of government and classes of society."¹⁷ His doctrine of the mean is the essence of concreteness. The whole of morality so called consists in *willing* to observe in all things, the due mean, and in *actually* observing it. The aim of life is neither to keep the gaze directed on some abstract ideal of goodness, "nor to sink into the selfish individualism of the Cynic, but to realize our human nature as *members of society*, in all the ways in which psychological analysis shows it right to be realized."

In working out this idea of *realization*, his general principle of activity is discerned. Everything in the universe is striving for realization. This becoming is the process in which potentiality (*dunamis*) is transformed continually into activity (*energeia*). From the lowest types of inorganic life, through the vegetative and animal world, through the varying degrees of man's potentiality, this force is at work. Its higher manifestation is in man's rational life; its highest in speculative thinking. The teleology of Aristotle regards the end of a thing as realized in full perfection of itself.

This immanent principle, itself static, controls the cosmos; makes it a universe. Into this conception, self-realization as man's end may be thought of as the standard. But Aristotle constantly repeats that the virtuous man is the rule and measure of the Good. In the case of this ideal man it is not opinion (as with "most men") that decides, but right reason realized and living in him. "Being truly man, he is pleased with what ought to please him, he distinguishes clearly the good from the evil, he is *the rule and measure* of things."¹⁸ But Aristotle reasons: We are to measure man by his *characteristic function*, that which is special or dominant in a thing being always the end for which it came into being. Man's characteristic function is ability to draw inferences by the aid of middle terms—to *reason*. Man

¹⁶ Wallace, *Outlines of Aristotle*. Page 10.

¹⁷ Janet, *Problems of Philosophy*. Page 20.

¹⁸ Janet. Page 18ff.

has two ends: the application of practical reason and the application of pure reason. In the first his activity is in the exercise of practical intelligence on things immersed in matter and subject to the incalculable influence of necessity and chance. This activity constitutes "happiness for man." This lower or purely human happiness is the end of conduct or practical life—of morality as he defines it. But in the exercise of pure reason on the data of necessary truth—is perfect happiness, an exceptional state—for the *rare* man, and for him only in *rare* moments. This contemplation transcends our sensible nature, and partakes of the nature of the Divine. Our passions are an obstacle to this state, which lies in intelligence alone. The "*moral virtues*" govern our sensible nature, hence the moral life is the promise and manifestation of the intellectual or divine life. To the extent that *reason* enters into the control of the sensible nature, it is then at once a *manifestation* and a *promise* of absorption or contemplation of divine life, immortality. So in spite of the assertion that the "virtuous man" is the standard, he is the *embodiment* of the standard, that principle of activity whose latent potentiality is further actualized in the rare moments of the rare man in contemplation.

The Stoic "Law of Nature" as Standard

"Socrates sat for the portrait of the Stoic sage; the Stoics strove earnestly to build up their inner man after the pattern of the virtuous wise man, whose lineaments they borrowed from the transfigured and lofty form of Socrates."¹⁹ Regarding themselves as followers of Socrates, in making virtue the highest good, the Stoics nevertheless introduced important modifications into Greek philosophy. Their logic differs from that of Plato and Aristotle in denying the objective reality of Concepts. The view they take is largely that known in the Middle Ages as Nominalism.²⁰ The concept is purely subjective, formed by a process of abstraction. "The individual as such is the only thing which has real existence; the universal concept is a purely subjective product of the process of thought." Genera are merely conceptions of ours and nothing real.²¹ Concepts are deprived of all relation

¹⁹ Noack, *Psyche*, V. 1, 1862, Page 13. Quoted in Ueberweg, I. 187.

²⁰ Ueberweg, Page 193.

²¹ Stockel, *History of Philosophy*, Part I, page 135. Translated by T. A. Finlay.

to the essential being of things, and are thus reduced to mere generalized sensuous perceptions. Only a judgment, never a conception, can have truth. The Stoics occupied themselves with the question of a criterion of truth. This they found in the Apprehension: this is attained when the object is represented with such clearness and force that the truth of the representation cannot be denied.

"The leading power or governing part of the soul is for them not only that which makes perceptions, out of excitation of the individual organs of sensation, but also that which by its assent (in the judgment) transforms excitations of the feelings into activities of the will."²²

The highest purpose of human life is not contemplation but *action*, which is living according to *Nature*. Nature as the Stoic conceived it, is used in a sense to include not only natural law as we know it, but also eternal and divine law. In nature this law manifests itself. *All things in the universe are measured by this law: it is the standard to which human action must conform if man would fulfil the purpose of his existence.* The fundamental law of human conduct may be expressed in the formula: Thou shalt live according to Nature, i. e., according to the Divine Law which manifests itself in Nature."²³ Virtue is its own end, the supreme good of men; it in itself is sufficient for happiness. There must be immanent in man as part of Nature that which can identify itself with the general law of all. "Light is apprehended by the luminous eye, sound by the aëri-form ear, and the nature of the All by the related logos in us."²⁴ This Universal Nature is the creative cosmic power, which permeates the world as an all-pervading breath,—as the soul and reason of the All,—and contains the rational germs of all things. The World Thought is acting according to ends. Man's morality consists in subordination to this law, to eternal necessity. To act according to the "Law of Nature" meant with them the opposite of what it meant in later times. Passion was a term with them that included all the cravings of sense, the appetites and desires. He who did not wait for the affirmation,

²² Windelband, History of Philosophy.

²³ Stockl, I. Page 140.

²⁴ Posidonius. Quoted in Ueberweg Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy. Page 192.

or apprehension, the voice of reason, but acted in accord with passion, was acting contrary to *Nature*, which is most nearly defined as Reason. Emotion is an accompaniment of failure to act according to Nature; Emotionlessness is the goal. "If man cannot hinder fate from preparing for him pleasure and pain, he may nevertheless by esteeming the former as not a good, and the latter as not an evil, keep the proud consciousness of his self-sufficiency."²⁵

The possession of reason prevents him from being the plaything of circumstance. This withdrawal of the individual personality within itself, this discrimination of the moral from the agreeable, is an essential characteristic of the Stoic ideal. Not altogether paradoxical is this part of the Stoic ideal, and the part that regards man as under obligation to lead a social life. "As parts of the same one World-reason, gods and men together form one great rational living structure, every individual a necessary member." A realm of reason embracing *all its* members is an ideal goal. This modification of Greek philosophy was largely the product of their effort to adapt it to the many. To translate into *conduct* the Socratic ideal of virtue, was the main problem for the Stoics. The philosophic formulation became a valued possession of the iron statesmen of republican Rome. "Duty, the feeling of responsibility, strict consciousness of the ought, recognition of a higher order, gives to their doctrine as to their life, backbone and marrow."²⁶

The recognition of no mean between Virtue and Vice by the earlier Stoics changed in later times to the consideration of gradation of *goods* and to the correlative gradation of duties. Improvement is substituted for the absolute opposition between Virtue and Vice.

This school of Stoics formulated probably the best expression of the tendency of the time to the *practical* wisdom of life though "with all the clearness and impressiveness of one-sidedness."²⁷ The fundamental tendency was individual ethics: the right appreciation of the good things of life was its essential object. A sort of social-ethical principle pervaded the times.²⁸ The logic and

²⁵ Windelband, History of Philosophy. Page 168ff.

²⁶ Windelband, History of Philosophy. Page 172.

²⁷ Windelband, History of Philosophy. Page 159.

²⁸ Windelband, History of Philosophy. Page 159.

ethics of Stoicism contain much that enters into the logical and ethical discussions of the present. The social-ethical principle, the brotherhood of man, is taught to-day again from the philosophical standpoint. The Nominalism of the Stoic logic has a curiously familiar aspect, with its emphasis on the reality of the particular; its criterion of truth is the affirmation of the object in the critical judgment; its idea of the concept as mere generalized sensuous perceptions. The moral sayings of Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius are too well known to mention as adding to the feeling of being at home with many of the Stoic doctrines. If one could add to the Stoic conception the critical control of the perceptive judgment secured by modern science, the logic would warrant the substitution of modern individualistic control of facts for the self-sufficiency idea of the Stoic. The modern idea might be interpreted as control by the self, rather than control of the self.

To sum up the Stoic contribution in relation to the standard: it is they, probably, more than any other merely philosophic school of thought that elevated an ideal (their conception of the Law of Nature) as a standard above the will of legislators, whether despotic or popular. The self-containment, or self-reliance of the Stoic, and his universalism are correlative to a high degree. The wise man learned to contain himself and to bow to the universal order of things, "as the disposer of things has disposed them." "Reasoning on such lines as these, from their conception of Nature as one Cosmos, animated by One God, the father of all mankind, the Stoics arrived at the idea of a Law of Nature prescribing the freedom, equality, and brotherhood of mankind, overriding all distinctions of class, and race, and nation, prescribing good faith and mutual obligation, *even when there was no law.*"²⁰ This was an active principle and may be said to determine the policy that Rome pursued with her colonies. The catholic and humane principles of Stoicism made possible that recognition of the right of the conquered to achieve their development along their own lines. The Common law seems a manifestation of the same catholicity of conception: that sifting of the cosmopolitan elements of control from the various conquered peoples. It must be to the lasting fame of Stoicism

²⁰ Hobhouse, II, 204.

that it can claim the following conception of one of the best Emperors: that government "should provide a constitution of equal laws ordered in accordance with equality and equal freedom of speech, and a Kingship honoring above all things the freedom of those who are ruled." That this ideal was not reached, does not invalidate the fact that there must be much in a philosophy that produced such standards. There is a *value*, say what you will, of the "high which proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard." Even the extreme, where man's hypocrisy disregarded what it was expedient not to deny, revolting though this must be, was a hint of better things.

Hobhouse sums up the contributions of Greek philosophy including its later Graeco-Roman development as the following: (1) Moral obligation was founded on the well-being of the individual: virtue was not an emptying but a fulfilment of the personality: it reconciled self-realization or development with the demands of citizenship in a free city and state; and (2) from the Stoics it conceived an ideal standard of conduct applicable to all mankind, not subordinate but superior to state law, an ideal to which social as well as individual custom should be made to conform.

It is evident that these were contributions, because of their subsumption in Christianity and because also we can trace the idea of "a Law of Nature from the 'common reason' of Heraclitus and the 'natural justice' of Aristotle, through the Roman Jurisprudence and the Canon Law to Grotius and Hobbes and from them to Locke and Rousseau."⁸⁰ It is true without doubt that Greek ethical ideas and standards have been very recently revived as correctives of real or fancied failures in modern ideals.

The Contributions of Pagan Philosophy to the Christian Ideal

With these contributions from Greek philosophy subsumed in Christian theology, there was much that was essentially religious. The *abiding essence* of things, the whole system of Plato's reality, was a spiritual conception seen most strongly as a religious one, in the *Timaeus*. The spiritual monotheism of Aristotle was but a development and transmission of the Platonic idealism. There was much in the Stoic conception of the *pneuma*

⁸⁰ Hobhouse, II, 207.

and the *logos*, much in the recognition of a command transcending human desire, that was a fertile substratum for Christian doctrine. So completely had the profound thought of Greek philosophy imbedded itself in the civilization of the time, that permanent satisfaction meant satisfaction of feelings *and* intellect. The "afterglow" of custom-standards that furnished the opposite pole to Greek thought and made its activity possible, had been so transmuted by the marvelous alchemy of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, that man's mental existence henceforth demanded the rational as a necessary mode of its activity. Hence the marvelous development of religious metaphysics that the early Christian era afforded. In Alexandria, the resort of Jewish savant and Greek philosopher, developed the Graeco-Oriental philosophy, which was essentially a philosophy of religion. "It made use of philosophical concepts and principles only for the purpose of giving philosophic form and establishing by philosophic proof, what it rightly or wrongly regarded as primeval religious tradition."³¹

This religion had a practical as well as theoretic aim. Corruption of the grossest kind had undermined the religious and moral life of society. Faith in the old religions was fast disappearing, religious doctrines and ritual were objects of mockery, and frivolity and vice prevailed.³² The efforts of religious philosophers were exerted in gathering the elements of truth found in conflicting philosophies, into a comprehensive system. To make this system life-giving to the decadent civilization, the strain of mysticism formed a considerable part. "To reform religion, man it was believed should be again brought into close communion with God." Mystical asceticism is but a logical emergence of the union of Greek and Oriental philosophy. The Platonic and Aristotelian attitude toward the economic world, the Stoic independence of wants are easily tributary to asceticism. Again in Plato's absorption in the absolute, and in Aristotle's picture of complete happiness in contemplation we have the essence of mysticism. Mystical asceticism could well have been evolved from the Greek alone, but when brought into contact with the mysticism of the East, in an age where many revelled

³¹ Stockl, (Translated by Finlay). *History of Ancient Philosophy* Part I, page 160.

³² Ibid.

in surfeit in the midst of millions deprived of sufficiency, it is easily seen that such a doctrine would flourish, finding eventually its best expression in Philo whose life extended over the last part of the first century B. C. and the first part of the first century A. D. The combination of Greek philosophy with Jewish theology was in operation from the second century B. C. In the last named of the three Jewish sects formed in that century, the Sadducees, the Essenes, and the Therapeutae,⁸³ are found the first beginnings of Graeco-Jewish Philosophy.

A consideration of the evolution of the Christian standard requires an insight into Philo's idea of the Logos.

The world is the work of God, but the world is not God. The world came mediately from God: it was not fitting that He, the supremely Pure, should come in immediate contact with matter. He created it by His Logos (Word).⁸⁴ The sum-total of divine activity in the world is⁸⁵ designated by the Stoic conception of the Logos—Reason as coming forth from the Deity ("uttered Reason"). It might be in keeping here to show the influence of these conceptions on the promulgation of Christ's teachings by this text from the Gospel of St. John: "In the beginning was the Word: and the Word was with God: And the Word was God: the same that was in the beginning with God."

"In man we distinguish between the indwelling reason, which is the active faculty of thought, and the extrinsic word, in which thoughts finds expression." An analogous distinction may be applied to the divine Logos,—the aggregate of all ideas indwelling in the mind of God, and the ectypes, the things created, the outward expression of those ideas.

Again this Logos is the power that gives form to matter, as the architect of the universe, working from within outwards,—the universal cosmical law, the universal World-Reason which pervades and governs all things, which guides and controls the course of the universe. In this last conception of the Logos, we recognize the standard which in Philo's philosophy measures, controls, governs all things. Windelband⁸⁶ sees in Philo's conception at once the immanence and transcendence of God:

⁸³ Stockl. Page 163.

⁸⁴ Stockl. Page 165.

⁸⁵ Windelband. Page 241.

⁸⁶ Windelband. Page 242.

"the Logos as the God within the world is the 'dwelling place' of the God without the world"—unity existing in separate potencies.

With regard to human cognition Philo distinguishes between that which concerns itself with sensible objects, the reasoning faculty (Logos), and the faculty of immediate intellectual contemplation (*νόησις*). The knowledge obtained by the reasoning faculty is uncertain and unstable; perfect certainty is attained only by intellectual contemplation. "God alone can bestow the knowledge of contemplation, and He bestows it when we pray for it through the Logos."⁸⁷ The highest attainment is only possible in mystical ecstasy. It is necessary to notice that Philo recognizes "logical subdivisions of the universal Logos or Reason, regarded in its moral aspect as 'right reason.' The latter is the *all-inclusive rule of virtuous* conduct; the Logoi are the several rules or laws into which it may be resolved, the divine precepts which must have severally their corresponding virtues."⁸⁸

To sum up, the Logos is the Thought of God dwelling subjectively in the infinite Mind, made objective in the universe. "The cosmos is a tissue of rational force, which images the beauty, the power, the goodness of the primeval fountain." The reason of man is this same rational force entering into consciousness. * * * *To follow it is the law of righteous living.* Through reflection, each according to his capacity may divine the Logoi, particular laws, particular rules of conduct from the universal.

The system of Philo covers many diverse notions, so that in the early Christian Era we find borrowings from Philo on opposing sides of the controversies. His allegorical interpretations of parts of Scripture had a lasting effect. His interpretation of the Fall of Man may be cited as an instance. It is because of the influence of Philo on the philosophy of the Patristic Age of Christianity that the above account is given. In a study of Philo, the impression is continually strengthened that the products of his eclecticism are found in many of the philosophical conceptions extending to modern times. In his mysticism is seen the begin-

⁸⁷ Stockl. Page 168.

⁸⁸ Drummond, Philo Judaeus or the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy. II, Page 272.

nings of Neo-Platonism; in his treatment of the Logos, the parallelism with Spinoza.

The Mystical Asceticism of Plotinus

Plotinus conceives the highest good to consist in mystical asceticism, which as we have seen can only be attained by withdrawal of the soul from the things of sense. The source of evil is the body, because it is composed of matter. The soul is individualized in its union with the body. The essence of evil is the assertion of this individuality of the soul, against the universal existence with which it has its being. The essence of good is in the merging of the soul in the universal. *All practice is for the sake of theory*, and "the wise man is blessed in his self-proficiency even if no one should see his blessedness."³⁹

The system of Plotinus is an intricate one—a theory of emanation as distinguished from evolution. This system of emanation is characteristic of the whole school of Neo-Platonism. This doctrine shows the Christian attitude in rejecting all "compromise with sensual self-seeking, and has faith in a reality deeper than phenomenal nature, deeper than civic or natural relations, deeper even than mind." Like Plato's Idea of the Good, it is above existence; like Aristotle's Unity or Primal God, it is above reason, and above the life of the world. The last two principles Bosanquet identifies with Aristotle's "intelligence," and with the Stoic "universal life." These emanate from the Divine mind, and hence are inferior to it. This "adherence to the axiom of subordination, that the derived is below the original, distinguishes Neo-Platonism from a true evolutionary doctrine, such as was latent though not at all obvious in Christianity."⁴⁰ In connection with Plotinus' conception of the highest principle it is consistent to mention his theory of the Beautiful. Beauty to him was a direct expression of reason in sense: "All that symbolizes in sensuous or material form the laws or reasons eternally active in the world has a right to rank as beautiful." He regarded the prevalent idea that symmetry is a necessary category of the beautiful as inadequate. He emphasized the importance of *light*. The portrait painter must aim to catch the look of the eye as the mind reveals itself in it more than

³⁹ Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, P. 112ff.

⁴⁰ Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, P. 112.

in the conformation of the body. "A beautiful material thing is produced by participation in reason issuing from the Divine."⁴¹ The conception of art as perfection of cunning in imitation is changed to one of symbolism. Material beauty is an image emanating from reason, in which the soul recognizes an affinity to itself in participation in reason and form. The theory excludes all desire for the sensuous reality, and in being a direct expression of reason in sense, *is co-ordinate with morality*, not subordinate as in previous theories.

Influence of Philo and Plotinus on Early Christian Philosophy

As has been stated, Philo's complex and varied conceptions concerning the Divine Logos became tributary to the controversies concerning Christ's doctrines in the first and second centuries. The outcome of the controversies was Christian philosophy. Philo's methods, being those of synthesis of two philosophies, lent themselves to the highly synthetic philosophy of early Christianity. The Gnostics, on the one hand, reject Judaism, and on the other, use Philo's method of assuming esoteric teaching, as the authority underlying their philosophy. The Apologists accept much of the doctrine of Philo as part of the foundation of the philosophy of the Logos, as well as some of his theories of revelation.

The Neo-Platonists continued the Hellenic philosophy, endeavoring to oppose Greek theology to the Christian. Though failing in this purpose, Hellenic philosophy became one of the chief means of transmitting the doctrines of Christ. The mystic conception based on Plato's and Aristotle's doctrine of contemplation as the highest end, intensified as it was by influences from the East, and best conceived as an immediate illumination of the individual, by the Deity, found its expression in the idea of Divine Grace and in the ecstasy of prayer. This influence showed itself also in strengthening the conception of Jewish prophetic revelation, inasmuch as the abandonment of all activity in the ecstasy, makes man a direct instrument of revelation, an *inspired* prophet of divine wisdom. The development of the idea that church doctrine is a fulfilment of prophecy gave rise eventually to its highest manifestation in the scholasticism of the Middle

⁴¹ Bosanquet. P. 114.

Ages, while the development of the Neo-Platonic idea of immersion in the Divine essence found full expression in the mysticism of the same period.

The Christian doctrine of free will finds an incipient revelation in Aristotle's idea of capacity in the individual to choose between given possibilities. This conception substituted for the dualism between good and evil the purely internal one of conflict between the Finite and Infinite Will.

In the resultant Christian Philosophy there is an historical teleology added through the well-ordered succession of God's acts of revelation to the Greek idea of nature's teleology. Nature exists for man; history exists for man. The history of the salvation of the human race is *the measure of all finite things*. Man's realization of his relation to the Infinite is the end and aim of creation. "What arises and passes away in space and time has its true significance only in so far as it is taken up into the relation of man to his God."⁴² Being and becoming, beauty, goodness, truth unite with love and faith as Man's conception of means of realizing the end of his existence. Experiences of personalities, controlled by the principle of love, and by faith in the solidarity of the whole, become the essence of world-movements. Not alone Philo and Plotinus, but Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Zeno, Aristotle, and Plato were potent influences in the formation of the philosophy of the Patristic Age.

The Christian Doctrine of the Logos

The central doctrine of the Christian philosophy was inevitably the doctrine of the Divine Logos incarnate. Philo who wrote under the influence of the revelation in the Old Testament made the Logos a kind of personality — extraneous to the Godhead.⁴³ Christian doctrine asserted the personality of the Logos, the Son of God, identical in nature with the Father from all eternity, become incarnate to bring mankind from darkness into light, from death to salvation. For the first time in human history did the active principle of the brotherhood of man become a spring of life to humanity. The Divine came within the comprehension of all men. The Incarnate God had lived, and suffered as men live and suffer. Such a God was real, and what had

⁴² Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, P. 262.

⁴³ Stockl. P. 194.

been a philosophic ideal for the few, became an active principle within all life. This conception of God as spiritual personality was one of tremendous energy. Persons and personal relations were all of Reality. The world had never witnessed the power, or strength of so compelling an idea. The Divine Sonship of Man was a *personal relation* — a living, breathing relationship as children of God, because Christ was man.⁴⁴

The Christian teachers were so deeply imbued with the spirit of Christianity that its expression assumed diverse forms whose unifying force was the tremendous energy of the faith with a love whose essence was communication. The triumphant spread of the Gospel, its purifying effect, and the conspicuous purity of life in the Christian communities in the midst of general corruption were the strongest arguments in favor of Christianity.

But from zeal and necessity both, these earnest teachers called to their aid philosophy. The first of the Apologists was Justin, trained in the various philosophical schools: a Stoic, a Peripatetic, a Pythagorean, a Platonist, successively, then a Christian. It is nothing extraordinary that Justin culled from these philosophies the elements most conducive to the furtherance of Christianity. In the Christian system, he claims, the Divine Logos has manifested Himself in the flesh and therefore in Christianity is the fulness of truth. "But even in pre-Christian times, the Logos was not wholly unrevealed. He was revealed as the omnipresent in works of creation as well as in human reason, which is reason only in so far as it participates in the Divine Logos. This Logos enabled the philosophers and poets of antiquity to attain knowledge of the truth. Whatever truth they possessed and set forth in their writings they owed to the Logos. *The measure of their knowledge was determined by their participation in the Logos*; hence their knowledge of truth was only partial and they were frequently involved in self-contradictions. The fulness of truth was revealed only in the Incarnate Logos."⁴⁵ By this conception, the "truth taught by the philosophers and poets of paganism is essentially Christian." It follows also that those who before the Incarnation lived according to reason, i. e., "according to the Law of the Logos which manifests itself in reason, were Christians, even though they were esteemed atheists by their con-

⁴⁴ Windelband.

⁴⁵ Stockl. P. 215.

temporaries. Such were Socrates, Heraclitus and others among the Greeks, and Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias and others among outer nations.⁴⁶ These were, however, the privileged few: the knowledge of God and of His law was first made general by the Incarnate Logos.

Justin claimed that the Greeks had knowledge of the law of Moses. "The doctrine of free will, Plato borrowed from Moses, and he was furthermore acquainted with the whole of the Old Testament. Moreover, all that the philosophers and poets have taught regarding the immortality of the soul, punishment after death, the contemplation of things divine and kindred subjects, was derived in the first instance from the Jewish prophets; from this one source the seeds of truth have been sent forth in all directions, though at times being wrongly apprehended by men, they have given rise to differences of opinion."⁴⁷

Justin accounts (as do all the orthodox Apologists) for evil as the result of man's deliberate action. Free will is man's prerogative.

The Christian Apologists⁴⁸ unite the Aristotelian conception of God as pure intellect or spirit with the doctrine that God created the world out of shapeless matter. Matter is not an independent principle as the Gnostics suppose in their dualistic notion of God and Matter, hence it is not bad in itself, but good or evil as man's purposiveness directs. This conception voices itself in meeting the problem of understanding the world as the product of spirit. It is a spiritual monism.

Irenaeus strengthens Justin's philosophy (1) in his maintenance of the eternity of the Logos: (2) in his conception of revelation; that God revealed himself on constantly higher levels according to man's ability and need,—to the entire race in rationality, to the people of Israel in the law of Moses, and to all mankind in the law of love and freedom through Jesus, (3) and in his recognition of the source of evil as man's deliberate opposition to Divine will by the surrender to sensual appetites.

Clement of Alexandria about the middle of the second century ascribed a sum of truth to Greek Philosophy as a revelation through reason. Plato was to him the most excellent of philoso-

⁴⁶ Stockl. P. 215.

⁴⁷ *Apol.* I. 44. Quoted in Stockl. P. 215.

⁴⁸ Stockl. P. 222.

phers. So completely did Clement urge the study of philosophy that he regarded the Christian Gnostic in comparison with him who believes without deeper knowledge, as man compared with child.⁴⁹ "Philosophy is essentially a gift of the Divine Logos; the character of a means to the attainment of the Christian Gnosis can and must be accorded to it; in a right view of Christianity it cannot be set aside." But there is a practical requirement also. The man who passes from Faith to Gnosis must overcome desire and appetite and be upon the path of moral improvement. The complete mastery of inclination is the chief characteristic of the Christian Gnostic as in the Stoic Ideal. The following is the description given of the Christian Gnostic, the ideal in Clement's philosophy: The Gnostic is united in perfect and immediate love with Infinite Beauty, and beyond this he desires nothing. He does not do good from any fear of punishment, nor for any hope of reward, but merely for God's sake and for the sake of the good done. Even if assured that he would not be punished for evil deeds, he would not perform such actions, and this for the sole reason that they are against right reason, that they are evil. He is not mastered by any inclination or appetite; only those appetites are admitted in his nature which are indispensable for the support of bodily life, and they are satisfied only as far as the support of life requires. Affections and passions do not disturb his lofty calm of mind; to such influences he is inaccessible. The entire absence from passion of the Gnostic raises him to a certain divine condition for in it he attains to likeness with God. In this state his works are wholly perfect, for they are performed purely for righteousness' sake.⁵⁰

This state is obtained by the chosen few only, but serves as an ideal for all — something to be emulated. Interesting is the account of the Christian boy, Origen. His own education and afterwards his theories of education while instructor, are full of interest, even now. Gregory's devotion as a pupil has furnished an account of his principles of education. The character of a pupil was his special study. He believed in intellectual discipline in the accurate preparation of the instruments of thought. Language was to be carefully used as the means of expressing truths with the nicest accuracy. A study of external Nature was

⁴⁹ Stockl. P. 231.

⁵⁰ Stockl.

destined in the end to show man in his just relation to the world.⁵¹ "A rational feeling for the vast grandeur of the external order, 'the sacred economy of the universe,' was a preparation for moral science." Here ethics was life, not a theory. All study was tributary to character. Gregory says: "There was no subject forbidden to us; nothing hidden or inaccessible. We were allowed to become acquainted with every doctrine, barbarian or Greek, on things spiritual or evil, divine or human, traversing with all freedom, and investigating the whole circuit of knowledge, and satisfying ourselves with the full enjoyment of all the pleasures of the soul."⁵²

The method of Origen as Gregory describes it, is determined by an underlying principle of human nature — a God-implanted striving to know the purpose of creation, as revealed in the ordered creation about us. "This desire, this passion, has without doubt been implanted in us by God. And as the eye seeks the light, as our body craves food, so our mind is impressed with the characteristic and natural desire of knowing the truth of God and the causes of what we observe."⁵³ This gift in its nature anticipates satisfaction. "To every one that hath shall be given," given, Origen would say, in measure to the use of this desire for Truth. Each soul draws and takes to itself the Word of God in proportion to its capacity and faith."⁵⁴ "The creation of finite rational beings by the free act of God involved *the creation of a medium* through which they could give expression to their character."⁵⁵ It is the spirit that moulds the frame through which it is manifested. Everything in life becomes worth while, as a means of realizing the end of human life.

The end of life is with Origen the progressive assimilation of man to God by the voluntary appropriation of his gifts. Pagan philosophers had conceived the idea of assimilation, but Origen vitalized the idea by the living energy of faith. "By the unceasing action of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit toward us, renewed at every stage of our advance, we shall be able with difficulty at some future time to look on the holy and blessed life."⁵⁶

⁵¹ *Paneg.* C. 8.

⁵² *Ibid.* C. 15.

⁵³ *De Principiis*, II, 4.

⁵⁴ *In Cant.* I to III.

⁵⁵ Westcott, *Origen and the Beginnings of Christian Philosophy*, P. 238.

⁵⁶ Westcott, *Religious Thought in the West*, P. 227.

Many seeming incongruities in the world's plan could be reconciled, did man have but breadth of vision. The entire range of being is "one thought" while "we that are not all, as parts can see but parts, now this, now that."⁵⁷

Man's participation is necessary to the fulfilment of the end. "Neither does our own power apart from the knowledge of God, compel us to make progress; nor does the knowledge of God do so unless we ourselves also contribute something to the good result."⁵⁸

Unceasingly man's participation is adding to the sum of moral forces in the world, contributing as a free agent through loving abandonment to God's plan, his measure to the progress of all. "God cares not only for the whole, but beyond the whole in an especial manner for each rational being."⁵⁹ Every gift of God is perfect; God's gift to his rational creatures was not virtue but the *capacity* for virtue.

"Right action is not only a necessity for moulding of the character after the Divine likeness; it is also a necessity for the progressive reception of the Divine Revelation. Morality in the largest sense of the word is bound to Theology as a condition of knowledge."⁶⁰

Much of Origen's idealization of the world of sense was taken up by the school of philosophers following him, best of all probably by Gregory of Nyassa. This seems the idea most frequently associated with Origen's system of Christian doctrine: that the whole world is a manifestation of the goodness and righteousness of God *in every detail*. This conception necessarily idealizes the world of sense, as a continuous law-revealing means of man's development.

With Origen the Logos as the sum-total of the world-thoughts of God is constantly revealing Himself to man in proportion as man is active in seeking. "The Logos is the hypostatical Wisdom of God, and is by the fact the Archetype of all things. Through the Logos, which in archetypal fashion contains all things in Himself, are all things created. By this power the universe exists. He penetrates and permeates the entire creation, giving,

⁵⁷ *De Prin.* II 5; 9. 5.

⁵⁸ *De Prin.* III. 1, 22.

⁵⁹ C. Celsus. IV. 99.

⁶⁰ Westcott. P. 242.

being, and maintaining everything. He is the comprehensive force which embraces and upholds all things. He is the soul of the universe. To Him is every Revelation due. He is the source of reason in man; all knowledge of Truth is in the last analysis attributable to Him."⁶¹

Augustine, "a mind of the first order," has been considered as one of the founders of modern thought.⁶² For that reason he is placed at the beginning of the Mediaeval Philosophy by Windelband and Erdmann in their Histories of Philosophy. Others, Ueberweg, Stöckl, place him at the close of the Patristic period. "Inasmuch as convictions of the philosophers of the early Christian Era are presented in the form of a systematized philosophy," Augustine's philosophy of the Christian Church belongs as summary to the early order or so-called Patristic period. Inasmuch as it served as the medium through which European people inherited Greek learning, it might be considered as initiating the Mediaeval period during which Europe was at school. Augustine's psychology entitles him to the place given him as one of the founders of modern thought. His conception of the highest goal of life is that of Plato and Aristotle.

His devotion to philosophy and his exaltation of it in his theory of knowledge ally him to the ancient world. His recognition of the human soul as a unity, as the living whole of personality which, by its self-consciousness, is certain of its own reality as the surest truth, places him above Aristotle, and the Neo-Platonists.⁶³ This immediate certainty of *inner experience* (which Augustine first expressed⁶⁴ with complete clearness) is the principle upon which all his philosophy rests. *In interiore homine habitas veritas*⁶⁵ is the conception that unifies the component ideas of his system, and at the same time animates their expression. For the skeptic who doubted the external reality of the content of perceptions, he argues that he at least cannot doubt the existence of the sensation.

His initial premise, *Ēgo dubito, ergo sum*, contains the solid ground upon which he builds his psychology. This brings him through Descartes to present-day philosophy. This existence,

⁶¹ Stöckl. P. 237.

⁶² Windelband. P. 276.

⁶³ Windelband. P. 278.

⁶⁴ Windelband. P. 276.

⁶⁵ Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, 39-72.

this power of doubting the evidences of our senses, Augustine argues could not have been given to us *without criteria or standards of truths to measure and examine these perceptions*. For this the *reason* exists — this immediate perception of incorporeal truths. “Under these Augustine understands, not only the logical laws, but the norms of the good and beautiful: in general all those truths not to be attained by sensation, which are necessary to elaborate and judge what is given — the principles of judging. *Such norms of reason* assert themselves as *standards of judgment* in doubt as in all activities of consciousness * * * they are the same for all who think rationally * * * Thus the individual consciousness sees itself attached in its own function to something *universally valid* and far reaching.”⁶⁶

When we reflect upon ourselves, we find in ourselves not only sensations, but also an internal sense which makes of the former its objects (for we have knowledge of our sensations, but the external senses are unable to perceive their own sensations), and finally reason which knows both the internal sense and itself. (*De Lib. Arb.* II, 3 *seq.*) That which judges is always superior to that which is judged; *but that according to which judgment is rendered, is also superior to that which judges*. The human reason perceives that there is something higher than itself, for it is changeable, now knowing, now not knowing, now seeking after knowledge, now not, now correctly, now incorrectly, judging: *but truth itself which is the norm according to which it judges must be unchangeable*. (*De Lib., Arb.* II, 6. *De Vera Rel.*, 54, 57. *De Civ. Dei.*, VIII, 6.) If thou findest thy nature to be changeable, rise above thyself to the Eternal source of the light of reason. Even if thou only knowest that thou doubtest, thou knowest what is true, but nothing is true unless truth exists. (*De Vera Rel.*, 72 *seq.*) Now the unchanging truth is God * * * It is identical with the highest good in virtue of which all inferior goods are good. (*De Trin.*, VIII, 4.) All ideas are in God. He is the eternal ground of all form who imparted to created objects their temporal forms; he is the absolute unity to which all that is finite aspires without ever fully reaching it, *the highest beauty* which is superior to and the condition of all other beauty; *he is absolute wisdom, blessedness,*

⁶⁶ *De Ver. Rel.* 39-72 f.—Also Windelband. P. 278.

justice, the moral law. * * * God is, as was rightly perceived and acknowledged by the Platonists, the principle of being and knowledge and the guiding-star of life. (*Confess.* VII, 16. *De Civ. Dei.*, VIII, 4.)⁶⁷

"If a human teacher states any principle to us, we do not immediately perceive the truth of the principle. We must *have within ourselves a criterion by which we test the truth of the proposition stated. And this criterion can, for the reason already given, be no other than absolute truth itself. The immutable, eternal Word of God is the teacher of the soul.*"⁶⁸ The knowledge of the intelligible world is for Augustine, essentially, illumination, revelation.⁶⁹ The soul will become wise only by participation in the unchangeable wisdom itself, with which it is not identical. This participation in Divine Intelligence is through Divine grace and is granted to man in measure of his moral condition. The whole metaphysical system of Augustine is built up from man's knowledge of himself—upon his self-consciousness. As none of the categories are attributable to God, and man's knowledge of God is altogether beyond definition, the only comprehension of the Divine essence possible to man is after *the analogy of human self-knowledge. This may be justified by considering man to be created in the image of God.* The "permanent existence of spiritual Being is given in the sum-total of the content of consciousness, or reproducible ideas; its movement and living activity consists in the processes of uniting and separating these elements in judgments; and the impelling force is the Will, directed toward the attainment of highest blessedness."⁷⁰ Idea, judgment, and will are *modes of functioning* whose unity is the soul. The central position of the *will* in the inner life is manifest in assuming all perception to be essentially an act of the will, all activity of the inner sense, as well, and finally the activity of the intellect is formed, completed according to the purposes of the will, "for the will must determine the direction and the end according to which the data of outer or inner experience are to be brought under the general truths of rational insight."⁷¹

⁶⁷ Quoted in Erdmann. P. 340.

⁶⁸ Stockl. P. 269.

⁶⁹ Windelband. P. 281.

⁷⁰ Windelband. P. 280.

⁷¹ Windelband. P. 281 ff.

cept of Being.⁷⁶ *From these conceptions in Realism the degree of universality is the standard.*

The Nominalists opposed to this theory of universals, one of the reality of particulars: only individuals have real existence; genera and species are merely subjective combinations of similar elements united by the aid of one and the same concept. Because universals in their logical significance are predicates, they cannot be substances. Extreme Nominalism considered the universal to be the comprehension of many particulars by one *name*. This name is the concept, is the universal that serves as a sign for a multiplicity of substances or their accidents. *Universalia post rem* is the basis of extreme Nominalism.

Modifications of these extreme views occurred in the so-called Indifferentism, a development from Realism, and the doctrine of Abelard, a development from Nominalism. In the former, the stages of universality, with their corresponding worths, were given up, and the idea of real states of one and the same substratum was adopted. There is a close approach to the "identity — in — difference" conception in that the genus is present in the species, the species in its individual examples, *indifferentio* (not different). Abelard teaches that universals can be neither things nor words. The universal is the conceptual predicate, the concept itself, emerging in consciousness,—in judgment. But because of the uniqueness of its existence as predicate, it is not without relations to absolute reality.⁷⁷ There must be something in the nature of things that we apprehend and predicate in these universals, which something is the likeness or similarity of the *essential* characteristics of individual substances. "Not as numerical or substantial identity but as a multiplicity with like qualities, does the universal exist in Nature, and it becomes a unitary concept which makes predication possible, only when it has been apprehended and conceived by human thought." This similarity Abelard traces to the archetypes in the Divine Mind (noys). Abelard thus unites the conflicting theories by conceiving *universalia ante rem* as *conceptus mentis* in God; *universalia in re* as the similarity of the essential characteristics of *individuals*, and *universalia post rem* as concepts and predicates acquired by comparative thought.

⁷⁶ Windelband. P. 290 ff.

⁷⁷ Compare Bradley and Bosanquet.

This whole controversy about universals necessarily threw emphasis upon inner experiences. The Mystics were pre-eminently psychologists with marvelous power of depicting states and movements of feeling. They are followers of Augustine in examining the force of the will in these processes, in conditioning all knowledge in faith, and in regarding final blessedness as mystical contemplation of Divine Love. In the controversy concerning universals as functioning in thought, the keenest analysis of subject states was persistently pursued with an ever-increasing interest in the *development of ideas*. John of Salisbury emphasized the Augustinian conception of the *soul's activity* as *ways of functioning*. "He sees in the sensation, and in a higher degree in perception or imagination, an act of judgment. Emotional states of hope and fear are attendant upon the union of the new sensational data with those that are reproduced by imagination. States of consciousness comprehending these feelings of pleasure and pain with all their diversifications in the changing states of life,⁷⁸ constitute the practical series. In this series the will operates in comparing and adjusting and affirming opinions, knowledge, and rational conviction. A second series of states of consciousness is occupied by strivings for calm wisdom,—the contemplative knowledge of the intellect.

In the first of these series John of Salisbury is the prototype of the English school of associational psychology. He concerns himself with practical concerns, the *active* world. "He has the practical ends of knowledge in his mind, he desires to find his way in the world in which man is to live, and above all in man's actual inner life, and brings with him into philosophy a fineness, and freedom of mind characteristic of the man of the world."⁷⁹ British empiricism seems to be a state of mind resulting from the temperamental qualities of the ethnological elements. Here too we find hedonism in embryo.

Abelard's ethics are based on his psychology. Christian consciousness of sin is the fundamental fact. Good and evil consist not in an outer act, but in *inner motive*. This places morality in the resolve of the will. Fault or error, the inherited predispositions become sin only through the will. *The norm of judg-*

⁷⁸ Windelband. P. 307.

⁷⁹ Windelband.

ment, the standard, lies wholly within the individual. Agreement with conscience constitutes the good morally. The natural moral law is known in varying degree to all men. That it has been obscured by human sin and weakness and had been awakened from its torpor by the Christian religion, Abelard firmly assumes. As a theologian Abelard tends more and more to reduce the content of the moral law to the choice of the divine will. *The ethics of intention* is the recrudescence of the Augustinian principles of internalization and individualism of the will. The ancients, the early Christian philosophers, the mediaeval logicians never isolated this aspect or series of states of consciousness, as sufficient in itself to furnish the criterion of life. In some form, Plato, Aristotle, Origen, Augustine, John of Salisbury, Abelard, all recognize the second series where through contemplation, illumination or enlightenment, the soul derives its sustenance, its grace, from the Divine. With them all, this *divine principle* variously conceived is the *ultimate standard* by which all values are determined.

Thomas Aquinas

In Thomas Aquinas is completed an "adjustment of world-moving thoughts upon the largest and most imposing scale history has seen, and that too, without the creative authority of any properly new philosophical principle as its impulse toward the formation of a system."⁸⁰ In the light of modern inquiry and discussion of the nature of universals which has followed upon the pure delight and intoxication of scientific discovery, this philosophy of Aquinas has much of import.⁸¹

NOTE.—It is significant that interest in the philosophical world is once again concerned with logic and the old problem of the universal and particular? The essence of scientific method is the search for *law* underlying phenomena, a placing of an *event* in a continuous process of which it is intrinsically and functionally a part. The new order to which it is thus assigned as a normal part is constituted by a larger identity, where differences become insignificant. The scientist is thus concerned in giving a biography of the particular event in nature.⁸¹ The pervasive continuous identity, as well as the continuous change within the process, these factors determine the past of the event, and at the same time forecast the future. Just this glimpse into scientific procedure reveals the necessity of dealing with the theory of knowledge that validates the tools of inquiry. The

⁸⁰ Windelband. P. 311.

⁸¹ Dewey, Lectures in Logic.

While the delirium of scientific achievement is subsiding, the need of testing its findings resuscitates the controversy over universals that characterized the Mediaeval period. What is the nature of *general* and what its logical relation to the particular. As a result philosophy is concerning itself with the thought of this epoch.⁸²

In Thomas Aquinas is found a further development of Abelard's theory of the universal. Both of course have their origin in Aristotle. With Aristotle Thomas opposes the latter's interpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas as existing independently (separately), whether in things or in the divine mind.⁸³ If by ideas are understood independently existing generalities, then Aristotle was right in arguing against *these* ideas as meaningless fictions. But (after Augustine) "when the ideas are understood as thoughts immanent in the divine mind and when their action upon the sensible world is conceived as merely indirect,"⁸⁴ Thomas recognizes the theory of ideas as unobjectionable. Plato's conception is traced to the fact that he believed the universal not merely possessed a reality of some sort but that it existed in the same mode in our thought and in external reality. Thomas Aquinas (after Aristotle) shows that just as the senses are able to perceive separately what really is not separate (as color, or shape, in an apple), so the mind can effect the *purely subjective* separation by considering in the individual only the universal.⁸⁵ This subjective abstraction in thought appertains not to our judgment of the true state of the case, but functions in the mind's activity of attention or apprehension. If the universal has no

questions that will arise and will not be downed, are these: Is it something inherent in the nature of things that determines "this biography of an event," or is it caprice, in the mind of the individual? Is there a power of the human mind by which this identity is perceived that brings order out of discontinuity? If this power exists, what is its nature?

⁸² To the investigators of today, who would throw the controversy over universals to the lumber pile of past theories or treat it as a long-outgrown children's disease, so long as they do not know how to state with complete certainty and clearness in what consists the metaphysical reality and efficiency of that which we call a *law of Nature*, we must still cry "mutato nomine de te fabula narrata". Windelband. P. 299.

⁸³ Uebeweg. P. 441.

⁸⁴ Ueberweg. P. 445.

⁸⁵ *De Potentiis Animae*, ch. 6. Quoted in Ueberweg, P. 445.

substantial existence in the objective world, it must possess reality of some sort, "because all science respects the universal, and would be illusory if the universal were without all reality; the truth of knowledge depends upon the reality of the objects of knowledge. The universal exists in reality in the individual, as the one *in* the many, as essence of things or their *quidditas*; the intellect performs only that act of abstraction whereby the universal becomes in the intellect, the one *beside* the many."⁸⁶ In this last it is easy to detect the modification of the Aristotelian by the Platonic notion. According to the Thomist theory, the human soul does not possess innate conceptions, but its thinking rests on the basis of sensuous perceptions and of representative images from which the active intellect abstracts forms. *Universalia in re, universalia post rem, et universalia ante rem*, is the order of development of Thomist idea of the universal.

Thomas bridges the chasm between the sensuous and the supersensuous, the spiritual and material, by an acute transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine of Forms and their relation to matter.⁸⁷ Pure forms are real or actual as active intelligences without any attachment to matter. Forms in the material world realize themselves only in union with matter. The human soul as lowest of the pure intelligences is a pure form (*forma separata*), and at the same time "as entelechy of the body, it is the highest of those Forms which realize themselves in matter. These two sides of its nature are bound together in the only unity that is at once subsistent and inherent. In this way the series of individual beings proceeds from the lowest Forms of material existence, in past plant and animal life, *through the human soul*, with uninterrupted continuity over into the world of pure intelligences—the angels, and finally to the Absolute Form—the Deity."⁸⁸ Thus the Aristotelian ideas of *dunamis* and *energeia* gave rise in the Thomist psychology to the conception of *development* which bridged the separation between the "two worlds" of sense and spirit. "A body is made up of a potential subject called matter connaturally extended in space; and further of an actuating principle of energy called substantial form, which is so united to the potential subject or matter, that the latter thereby

⁸⁶ Ueberweg. P. 445.

⁸⁷ Windelband. P. 324.

⁸⁸ Windelband. P. 324.

becomes an individual body within a definite species, deriving the *power of action* from the substantial form or *principle of energy*.”⁸⁹

Again in the same strain:⁹⁰ “The Divine understanding can comprehend whatever is proper to each in its essence. Thus by understanding its own essence as imitable in the way of life without consciousness, it gathers the form of a *plant*, by understanding the same essence as imitable in the way of consciousness without *intellect*, the proper form of an *animal*, and so the rest. Evidently then *the divine essence inasmuch as it is absolutely perfect may be taken as the proper type of each entity*. * * * and herein also is defensible in some sort the opinion of Plato, who supposes ideas according to which all beings in the material world are formed. The reason why our understanding cannot understand many things together in one act is because in the act of understanding, the mind becomes one with the object understood.” In this recognition of an “*actuating principle of energy*” which is referred to the divine essence there is much of Origen. The idea of an immanent principle as Origen conceived it is relieved of some of the curious accretions from the Gnostic sect, and is viewed in greater simplicity by Aquinas. Still further in similar vein is the conception carried to its implication of a standard. “The standard in every genus is the most perfect instance of the genus. But the divine truth is the standard of all truth. Truth is a perfection of understanding and of its act. The truth of our mind is measured by the object outside the mind: our understanding is called true inasmuch as it is in accordance with that object. And again the truth of the object is measured by its accordance with the divine mind, which is the cause of all things, as the truth of artificial objects is measured by the art of the artificer. *Since through God is the first understanding and the first object of understanding, the truth of every understanding must be measured by His truth, as everything is measured by the first and best of its kind.*” “The things of sense from which human reason takes its beginnings of knowledge, retain in themselves some trace of *imitation of God*, inasmuch as they *are* and are *good*.”⁹¹

⁸⁹ Aquinas. God and His Creatures. Translated by Rickaby, P. 18.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid. Book I, Chap. VIII.

The Thomist conception of *development* is carried over into the sphere of natural and revealed religion. These he regards as different stages of development, and sees in philosophical knowledge a possibility given in man's natural endowment which is brought to full and entire realization only by the grace active in revelation.⁹² "There is a two-fold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason. This truth of things divine I do not call two-fold on the part of God, who is one simple truth, *but on the part of our knowledge*, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine things. To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth, we must proceed by demonstrative reasons, that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reason, but to *refute his reasonings* against the truth, which one may hope to do since natural reasons cannot be contrary to the truth of faith."⁹³ Our knowledge of God must come through an understanding of the effects he produces; "and so it is brought by reasoning to a knowledge of him."⁹⁴ "We are brought to the knowledge of His existence, not by what he is in Himself, but by the effects which he works. * * * God is that wherein all things are known, not as though other things could not be known without his being known first, as happens in the case of self-evident principles, but because through his influence all knowledge is caused in us." The *nature* of the intelligent is therefore to grasp the intelligible. Intelligence is conversant with *natures*, which with *relations* are eternal. These *natures* and *relations* are the universals, which being such are manifestations of the Prime Mover. As sight is the *actuality* of the eye, so is the soul to the body, because by the soul, called also the Intelligence, the body emerges from potentiality to actuality. Thus plainly in Thomas Aquinas the divine principle which animates and gives existence to things is all pervasive. It attains to consciousness of itself in the human soul. *There* the Platonic passion for truth, the discernment of the universal in the midst

⁹² Windelband. P. 321.

⁹³ God and His Creatures. Rickaby's translation. Bk. I, Ch. IX.

⁹⁴ Ibid. Ch. XI.

of the manifold, the intelligence, or reason in its higher manifestations, reveals the dark and half-blind processes by means of which the development itself is taking place. Truth as in Plato is seen to be the unifying principle that "gives form to what was otherwise formless, simplicity to what was complex, wholeness to what was discrete."⁹⁵

But Thomas Aquinas adds, "Wholesome is the arrangement of divine clemency whereby things even that reason can investigate are commanded to be held on faith, so that *all* might easily be partakers of the knowledge of God, and that without doubt or error."

The contest concerning the primacy of the will or intellect brings into prominence the idea of the moral law as entertained by Thomas. It is God's command. This both sides admit. Thomas teaches that God commands the good because it is good and is recognized as good by his wisdom. Thus the *Logos*, the Divine wisdom, is the *ultimate standard* of truth and hence of the good. Eckhart, the great mystic of this period, supports this intellectualism of Thomas that teaches the *rationality of the good*. "Morals is a philosophic discipline whose principles are to be known by the natural light."⁹⁶

Closely connected with this conception of the moral law is Thomas's treatment of law under four heads: the eternal, the natural, the human, the revealed.

Eternal law to which the whole universe is subject and whose end is God, pervades all things in the sense that "through it they are directed to the actions and ends proper to them."⁹⁷ Inanimate things and irrational creatures only participate in it passively — the so-called law of similitude. They are subject to eternal law and blindly follow its bidding. Rational creatures, by the light of reason, discern what is good and evil. This light is the impression of the Divine light within enabling men to be sharers in Divine Providence for by it men are able to provide for themselves and others. This *participation in eternal law* is called *natural law*. *This is recognized by reason, and in conformity with this law rational creatures guide their conduct.*

⁹⁵ Plato's Psychology in its bearing on Will. *Mind*. Apr., 1908. P. 195.

⁹⁶ Windelband. P. 332.

⁹⁷ Sum. I.2.

Natural law is apprehended as general principles belonging to Eternal Law. Man cannot attain to the direct and immediate knowledge of its application to particular cases, and he must ⁹⁸ therefore use his reason to draw from those common and undemonstrable principles, conclusions applicable to particular cases. These are human law.⁹⁹

Besides eternal law, from which human law is derived through natural law, there is divine law, or revealed law — that of Scripture. Thomas recognizes the shifting nature of "human law," adapted as it must necessarily be to varying conditions and periods.

In the administration of law, "the office of the King is to procure for the multitude a good life which must be in harmony with the endeavor to attain to celestial beatitude. He must therefore as far as possible direct the people to do those things which lead to eternal life, and forbid their doing anything opposed to this."¹⁰⁰ The final end of a society appears to be to live virtuously. "For men associate themselves together that all may live well, which would be impossible were each to live alone. But a *good* is a *virtuous* life. Therefore a virtuous life is the end of human society."¹⁰¹ To understand the content of the last quotation, it is necessary to recall Thomas's theory of the will and intellect. God wills what is *good* for man. This is a widely different conception from that of Duns Scotus that because God *wills* it, it is good. And *good* is understood to mean that which satisfies man's needs and desires if these are only sufficiently enlightened. Thomas would say it was possible that man through his reason could arrive at the same conception of *good* as that *revealed* by God.

Mysticism in the Mediaeval Period

The mysticism in Thomas Aquinas was always held in check by the Augustinian conception of Personality. The pantheism always inherent in Neo-Platonism was constantly emerging in the most radical of its adherents. The absorption in the eternal

⁹⁸ Ibid. 91. 3-0.

⁹⁹ Compare this conforming to a *standard* with Hobbes' conception of law as the arbitrary will of a sovereign. See *Economic Review*, 1896, P. 78.

¹⁰⁰ *De Regimine Principum*, I. 15.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. I. 14.

generic reason of the human race was viewed as *temporal* participation. This in the fully developed forms of mysticism tended to destroy the conception of the individual soul as a persistent entity. The admixture of Arabian philosophy in the thirteenth century, with the attendant pantheism of the East brought later German mysticism which found its best expression in Eckhart and Tauler. The inevitable tendency of the Andalusian movement was to regard individual things as more or less transient forms in which the single substance, *ens generalissimum*, becomes realized.

Man's rational knowing is, in this philosophy, an impersonal or supra-personal function: it is the individual's temporal participation in the eternal generic reason.

This Pan-psychism was opposed by both Albert and Thomas because of the menace, as they conceived it, to the metaphysical value of personality. The tenacity with which the Christian philosophers held to the Augustinian doctrine regarding *the experience which the individual has of itself as the highest principle*, diverted the empiricist conceptions of the Arabians from their essential direction, as a study of nature's forces, to the study of active human life. "Real science," however, took a more secular aspect, as the science of the interrelations of human society, and found expression in Occam and Marsilius of Padua, and also in the more "inward" writing of history. The Platonic idea of contemplation as the highest state, the Aristotelian idea of complete happiness, the Neo-Platonic idea of immediate illumination of the individual by the deity, the supra-rational apprehension of truth, found their most intense expression in German mysticism. The mystical elements in Eckhart, curiously a disciple of Thomas and Augustine, are his conception of the highest activity of the reason as immediate intellectual intuition, his denial of the being of all finite things, his demand that the individual self should be given up, and his doctrine of complete union with God as the supreme end of man.¹⁰² "God is in all things as their intelligible principle; but by as much as he is in all things, by so much is he also above them."¹⁰³ God communicates himself to all things in the measure of their capability to receive him. In so far as he is in things, they work divinely

¹⁰² Ueberweg. History of Philosophy. I. P. 483.

¹⁰³ Ueberweg. History of Philosophy. P. 476.

and reveal him. In things God has externalized his innermost essence: hence all things tend to return to God. This return is the end of all motion in created things.¹⁰⁴

Morality — for Eckhart — is this restoration through the soul of all things to God. The condition of this return is "death to self, i. e., the abolition of creatureship: its end is the union of man with God. If thou wilt know God divinely, thy knowledge must be changed to ignorance, to oblivion of thyself and all creatures. This ignorance is synonymous with unlimited capacity for receiving * * * God needs only that man should give him a quiet heart. God will accomplish this himself; let man only follow and not resist. Not the reason alone, but the will also must transcend itself. Man must be silent that God may speak. * * * Give up thine individuality and comprehend thyself in thine unmixed human nature, as thou art in God: thus God enters into thee. * * * Individuality is a mere accident, a nothing: put off this nothing and all things are one. The One that remains is the Son whom the Father begets."¹⁰⁵ The man who has thus annihilated himself, has absolutely no will; he has abandoned himself completely to the will of God. This complete "decease" of self is the condition of the birth of God in the soul. "All moral action is nothing other than this bringing forth of the Son by the Father."¹⁰⁶ "This birth of God in the soul is irreversible."

Virtuous action is purposeless action. * * * As God is free from all finite ends, so also is the righteous man. Desire nothing, thus wilt thou obtain God and in Him all things. Work for the sake of working, love for love's sake. * * * All that is contingent must be laid aside, including therefore virtue, in so far as it is a *particular* mode of action. Virtue must be a condition, *my essential condition*. * * * all virtues should become in me necessities, being performed unconsciously. Morality consists not in *doing*, but in *being*. Works do not sanctify us, we sanctify works. * * * All virtues are one virtue. He who practices one virtue more than another is not moral. Love

¹⁰⁴ A penetration of an *Eastern* idea.

¹⁰⁵ Cit. P. 477.

¹⁰⁶ Cit. P. 478.

is the principle of all virtues. Love strives after the good. It is nothing other than God Himself.”¹⁰⁷

The lowest faculties of the soul must be subordinate to the highest, and the highest to God: the external senses must be subordinated to the internal senses, the latter to the understanding, the understanding to the reason, the reason to the will, and the will to unity, so that the soul may be “deceased” and nothing but God may enter into it.

Thus the universal is the real; it needs the individual, which receives being and permanence from the universal and can only through its immanence in the universal assert itself as real and permanent.¹⁰⁸ This mutual dependence of God and man so daringly spoken by Eckhart is entirely foreign to religious conception in general. It seems the unchecked development of the idea of sacrifice, begun of old, reverently viewed in the suffering of the God-man, and *idealized* in the Love of Christianity. The idea as set forth by Eckhart is more beautifully and temperately expressed in Thomas á Kempis. The Imitation of Christ has preserved for Christendom the best expression of Mysticism.

The mysticism of Thomas á Kempis is relieved of the speculative character of the school of Eckhart. Eckhart was moved by a desire to communicate to his people the inmost truth in a manner that should take hold of every individual who heard. The necessity of putting these truths into popular language naturally stripped them of the logical combinations of fundamental ideas, and of the intricacies of dogma. In place of these came speculation which gave to the theorems of faith the spiritual vitality of one central idea, viz., the unity of the soul in reason and will with God. *Being* and *knowledge* are one. The Son as eternally begotten in that revelation which is coincident with the identity of the soul with God, “involves the ideal totality of things.” In being known by man, the world of sense finds again the true spiritual nature. Man’s highest task is the elimination of multiplicity and plurality. Man should endeavor to control the things of sense by reason, but should never fail to regard as highest, the complete withdrawal of the soul from the outer world. “In the act of knowing it reaches that purpose-

¹⁰⁷ Quoted from Eckhart in Ueberweg, I. P. 478.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted from Eckhart in Ueberweg, I. P. 472.

lessness of action, that action not constrained by an end, that freedom within itself, in which its beauty consists."¹⁰⁹

The excesses of mysticism, in fact the highest manifestations of it, were due to the lack of provision in scholasticism for the emotional element in human beings. The concept of conscience for most of the scholastics was a kind of logical function. Emotion and will were left out of account. The latter executed the decisions of conscience, and while a certain amount of influence is indefinitely ascribed to the emotions, they are described in terms so intellectual as to ally them at once with the rational processes.¹¹⁰ Mysticism seized upon the smothered religious feeling and carried it to the excesses it sometimes assumed.

To sum up the conceptions of the Mediaeval period the following may be considered essentials: Humanity had sinned; Adam being the type of the essence of man. The will was not corrupted, but the cognitive-judging side had suffered. Man's will remained good, but the steersman of the will, *reason*, no longer gave adequate guidance. Man must continue to use his reason, refining it to its utmost possibilities, as is shown by the elaborate logical schemes. But he must recognize that it is not the ultimate criterion of truth. There is no true illumination of the intellect except by grace. Reason itself unaided is incapable of controlling passion. Knowledge is the product of the reason, and of divine revelation of truth. The philosophy of the ancients is revelation under different conditions, but it must be measured by the fundamental truths of God's revelation in Christ. With this conception of knowledge as a revelation of truth, it is possible to will the good. Christian ethics took its tools from Greek ideas which it interpreted according to Christian ideas. The fundamental Greek conceptions that were accepted were that all men *desire*, *will*, the good or happiness, that the attainment of happiness is coincident with perfect knowledge or wisdom. The *idea of good is identified with God*, conceived as a metaphysical reality, *the true being* of everything, hence the only adequate object of *true knowledge*,—*the supreme end of man's endeavor, the Good*. This attainment is dependent upon wisdom, which is ultimately participation in divine nature.

¹⁰⁹ Windelband. P. 336.

¹¹⁰ Wundt, *Ethics*. P. 46. It is impossible not to connect the present status of the psychology of the emotions with this aspect.

Through *grace* God furnishes man with the conditions of regaining what he lost in his Fall, viz., knowledge of God, which knowledge includes all knowledge, since God is the true being of everything.

The dignity of *man* is ensured in the God-man. The Church is the practical working embodiment of grace. The sacraments are outward signs of inward grace, which most directly affect man's conduct. The sacrament of penance through the confessional made the teachings of Christ effective. It was a tremendous force in regulating life. To understand the vitality and energy of this epoch, a few general features of the technique of control may aid:

1. The great gulf between the natural and supernatural was mediated by the Word made flesh.

2. The historic teleology was complete in the seizure upon all the tools of ancient thought that could be transformed into means of furthering the Faith. The idealization of contemplative virtues by Aristotle and Plato was the source of monastic orders, whose asceticism was necessary as an ideal in the civilization of barbarian hordes.

3. The systematic accommodation to different aspects of human nature, to different temperaments, has never been paralleled: For the spiritual-minded was a scheme of ideas beautifully symbolized; for the less spiritual, instrumentalities for keeping track of them. The impossible was never demanded, not even the exceptional, which was nevertheless encouraged in various ways. Man was expected to sin, but there was institutional provision for keeping evil tendencies within limits. The *integral* part of faith was the future life. The meagre beginnings in this life have infinite time in future life for continuation under better conditions.

4. The appeal made was to two motives which might seem contradictory: self-sacrifice, devotion to others; and self-assertion, control of others. The renunciation of the clergy made possible the advance in hierarchial democracy, where grades were not fixed by wealth.

5. The church provided scope and opportunity for play of intelligence. It is difficult to understand the intellectual activity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Intellectual acumen was very great. The Renaissance would be inconceivable if we imag-

ined the preceding period as lacking in intellectual activity. There was not a mere reaction against the church activity, but a carrying over of momentum generated in theological energy to other fields. It might be in keeping to quote a few lines from Newman's tribute to this period:¹¹¹ "In the capitals of Christendom the high cathedral and the perpetual choir still witness to the victory of Faith over the world's power. To see its triumph over the world's wisdom, we must enter those solemn cemeteries in which are stored the relics and monuments of ancient Faith,—our libraries. Look along their shelves, and every name you read there is in one sense or other a trophy set in record of the victories of Faith. How many long lives, what high aims, what single-minded devotion, what intense contemplation, what fervent prayer, what deep erudition, what untiring diligence, what toilsome conflicts has it taken to establish its supremacy." In Dante's *Divine Comedy* the long movement found its highest aesthetic expression. The central interest is the fate of souls, in particular the poet's soul. "Nothing could be more universal, and nothing could be more individual, nothing even more personal. It is the climax of the long movement we have attempted to trace, *in which the individual spirit has deepened into a universe within, because it has widened into oneness with the universe without.* * * * No Hellene, however skilled a spectator in the theatre of this life, has portrayed the beauty and terror of visible and audible things with so true and piercing a touch as the mystic hierophant of another world." His genius is the product of this Mediaevalism. He is regarded as a transition from the Mediaeval spirit to the spirit of the Renaissance. Beyond question his work has marked affiliations with modern spirit,¹¹² while its cosmology and formal doctrine are Mediaeval. It may be probable that the projection of ethical psychology into the physical form allowed of liberty being taken with the conception of the latter. Symbolic art takes these liberties freely. The important thing is the fusion of the ethical and physical, presaging as it did the transfiguration of nature from something to be gotten away from to a manifestation of the divine, having inherent value of its own as an object of study, a content of art, even a guide and model for regulation of life.

¹¹¹ Newman, Oxford University Sermons, P. 315.

¹¹² Bosanquet, History of Aesthetic. Chap. VII. Gives Bosanquet's elaboration of this idea.

SECTION III

EVOLUTION OF DOMINATING IDEAS WHOSE BIRTH IS ASSIGNED
POPULARLY TO THE RENAISSANCE

The interpenetration of the evolutionary idea has done much to remove misconceptions of this period of the Renaissance. The most glaring of these and probably the most persistent is the notion that the Renaissance is the beginning of modern life. "The long struggle for intellectual and political freedom which still gives tone to our aspirations, appears to us to have had its starting point in the revival of Greek learning and the awakening of physical science. * * * But any such view is coming to be less and less approved by the deepest and most sympathetic criticism."¹¹³ Bosanquet traces further and further back into the earlier middle age the intellectual attitude assumed by the Mediaeval Church and its greatest thinkers toward formative art and the sense of beauty. Because beauty is always associated with that which is deemed most worth while and desirable, this association becomes a means of learning the standard vital at the time. Too often the tendency has been to ignore the desire and effort preceding the fruition, and too often to identify in point of time the desire with its realization. "What youth desires, old age abounds in." So the "aesthetic interest was first attracted to the full-blown and later Renaissance both in letters, in painting, and in architecture, and only worked backwards by degrees to Gothic buildings and early Tuscan painters."¹¹⁴ A study extended in French literature reveals the beginnings of that Romanticism so evident in Dante. In architecture, St. Sophia, built in 530 A. D., made possible the thousand years of beautiful buildings culminating in St. Peter's. Thus is justified the reference to the art of the sixth century A. D. as "the sign of a 'true renaissance,' which does not mean a rebirth of 'classical' forms, but rather a rebirth of the human spirit in a vesture entirely new, though woven of the robes it had laid aside."¹¹⁵ Sympathy with nature is ordinarily conceived as something engrafted upon humanity in the sixteenth century. In truth, passages from Gregory of Nyassa, from Origen, from Chrysostom are filled with an appreciation

¹¹³ Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*. P. 120.¹¹⁴ *Cit.* P. 120.¹¹⁵ *Cit.* P. 126.

of nature essentially "modern" in spirit. Art as interpretation finds its tribute in the mastery the Christian painters attained "over the expression of the face, before they could deal adequately with the figure, whereas with the Greek sculptors the order was the reverse of this."¹¹⁶ This truth symbolises the point of emphasis. Thus the profound conception of Plotinus was maintained by the *intellectual* consciousness of Christendom. The underlying thought is that nature and art are beautiful in so far as they "worthily *symbolise* the Divine power and goodness, and do not appeal to sensuous interest or desire. * * * There seems always the conditional admission that material beauty is divine, if rightly and purely seen." This idea was strengthened by the great step taken in the fourth century, whereby evolution was declared by Christian dogma¹¹⁷ to be the one supreme principle by which there is a progressive content which "does not lose anything nor become secondary by the fact of this development." This doctrine took the place of the interpretation of the doctrine of emanation by which the first is best, the second a little less perfect, and so on.

It seemed consistent to the Christian successors of Plotinus to regard nature as God's work, superior to art conceived as man's work, and this dualism persisted in the same age that accepted evolutionary monism as the principle of orthodox theology.¹¹⁸ Erigena following Gregory of Nyassa regarded the ugly as that not perceived in its *true relation to the will of God*, and insisted that it was the order laid down by divine law to know the Creator first "in his unspeakable beauty, and then to regard creation in a significant or spiritual sense, conforming to the inclinations of the intelligence, and to interpret the whole of its beauty whether it exist inwardly in significance or outwardly in sensible forms as showing the praise of the Creator."¹¹⁹ *Universal significance of things* cannot be claimed as a parasitic outgrowth of the religious thought of the sixteenth or eighteenth centuries. Symbolism is a mode of interpretation and communication, that has at least the advantage of absolute universality.¹²⁰ That beauty is the *revelation of reason* in sensuous shape, that

¹¹⁶ Cit. P. 130.

¹¹⁷ Cit. P. 132.

¹¹⁸ Cit. P. 132.

¹¹⁹ Cit. P. 142.

¹²⁰ Cit. P. 143.

its fascination consists in its affinity with mind, and that consequently the entire sensible universe as a symbol of Divine reason, must be beautiful to the eye that can see it in relation to its Creator, all this had sunk deep into Christian sentiment and is familiar to us both in profound and in shallow readings of the argument from design. Unquestionably, the middle age, throughout its long development, was inspired by this conviction unconscious in its art which was an achievement, but conscious in its theory which was a postulate."¹²¹

Bosanquet's recognition of the import of the time characterised often as the Dark Ages is in itself a seeing of relations on a widening scale. "To make the first sketch-plan of a new life, and teach its use to illiterate peoples" was a work that in its immensity must lose sight of details that, nevertheless, as undercurrents were gathering force and revealing their existence in the intervals of peace that allowed of their emergence. In the throes where a new civilization was in making "neither the philosophy of the great Greek classics, nor the wide survey of methodic natural science would have met fairly and squarely the problems that pressed upon Augustine, Erigena, or Dante."¹²² When it is urged against this period that philosophy was made subservient to theology, it might be urged in defence that it was a "subordination of science to a formulated conception of human welfare, with a strictly mundane *if also a transcendental side.*" The most frequently expressed criticism of the metaphysics of this period is that it is mere verbalism or theoretical subtlety at best. This attitude is what naturally follows the practical turn of mind that is in the ascendancy in present civilization. Bosanquet urges that it might be worth while "to raise the question of whether the weakness of mediaeval science and philosophy was not connected rather with excess of practice than with excess of theory. The question is not unimportant for it indicates that the essence of scholasticism is present, not wherever there is metaphysics, but wherever the spirit of truth is subordinated to any preconceived practical intent, whether mundane or extra-mundane."¹²³ To-day the subtleties of philosophy and of logic are applied to subordinate the instinctive spiritual truths so necessary

¹²¹ Cit. P. 149.

¹²² Cit. P. 141.

¹²³ Cit. P. 146.

to the life of numbers of humanity to the essentially mundane goods so in the foreground of industrialism.¹²⁴ Scholarly research is revealing in the lives of the great thinkers of the scholastic period, active, devoted public service, the content of which reveals the vitality of their writings. The names of great Franciscans and Dominicans foremost, among whom are St. Francis of Assisi and St. Thomas Aquinas, are convincing examples.

Renaissance Ideas Tending to Modify the Standard

In Nicolaus Cusanus is found this purposeful unfolding according to law, the ultimate significance of which is conception of man as a microcosm. All substances are present in every thing, yet each has its special principle of life and activity.¹²⁵ God transcends all knowledge, but is accessible in ecstatic vision. God the Father is pure thought; the Son, the Logos, is the matter side; the Holy Spirit is the union of these, pure motion.

This idea of *motion* was carried over into cosmology. Nature was an unfolding of a single principle of movement. The universe itself was conceived as boundless in space and time. The world becomes under this conception a soul-possessing and articulate whole.¹²⁶ Everything if comprehended mirrors forth in its place the universe. Every being preserves its existence by virtue of its community with all others. Man should love each thing in its *relation to the whole*. "God is the absolute maximum, the world the unfolded maximum, the image of God's perfection." By his anticipation of the Copernican theory of the universe, man's *relation* to that universe is reconceived. The doctrine of man as a microcosm brought with it the duty of harmonious development, which found expression in the various theories of *self-realization*. The theory concerning the *unity of contradictories*¹²⁷ reaches its fullest expression in the reconciliation of the finite and infinite in the God-man. Notwithstanding that Cusanus is the forerunner of much of modern thought in his attitude toward knowledge, his theology remains that of the church, with an emphasis on mysticism.

Pomponazzi (1462-1525) took immortality from philosophy, because it was made a motive, instead of love of beauty and

¹²⁴ This point will be elaborated in a succeeding chapter.

¹²⁵ Windelband, *Cit.* P. 371.

¹²⁶ Ueberweg, *Modern Philosophy* P. 24.

¹²⁷ Reappearing in Hegel.

goodness for their own sakes. Motives of morality must be found in the present life.

The separation of the natural and supernatural was conceived as a barrier to realization; therefore the idea that God is *in* life, in nature, became more and more emphasized. The pantheistic view flourishes whenever there is an attempt to get away from hard and fast regulations that limit the sphere of human activity. The natural outcome is the teaching of the immanence of the divine in nature and humanity, which justifies the increased value and significance placed upon the goods of this life. Then easily followed the belief that Nature did repay human study, because of the principles of universals, which were manifest to those who sought them. The presence of order or design was evidence of the indwelling deity. We reach Giordano Bruno's idea of a "God-informed, God-governed universe, a universe embodying power, wisdom, and love, a universe essentially accessible to the human conscience partially now and progressively with the progress of that conscience."

The deduction from the various philosophers of this period was that there was something in nature that was worth while, which would help man rather than hinder him. The result of this was to place value on *earthly* possessions and ends as opposed to those of a future life. Then the relation of morals to efficiency was urged as a problem. Machiavelli called attention to this by his repudiation of any moral restraint in realizing an end. Exceptional men, he held, may use any means to an end. He advises careful consideration of the end: then knowing what is involved, to plunge. The step once taken there is no retreat. The use of any means intelligence and force place at command is commended. *Success justifies anything; Success is the standard.* The technique of exploitation is worked out in the case of an ambitious man, in Machiavelli's "The Prince." The forcefulness of the presentation brings into strong light the practical advantages and disadvantages of moral law. The government is to be the authority to keep men's appetites in check. Höffding says of Machiavelli that like so many realists,¹²⁸ he lost reality because he sought it in the surface of events. Idealistic ends are the source of contempt,

¹²⁸ Realists in the new sense—the direct opposite of the type heretofore termed realist. The change in the use of the term indicates the transfer of the focus of attention.

as also the Church because it taught submission. It is impracticable to have an end unless you have the means to realize it. Any means are allowable toward the accomplishment of an end. "Men know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly good." It is well to *seem* to have virtues, which if really possessed would be a disadvantage or a hindrance to success. The result of such a *standard* (*Success*), is ably pictured by Sumner in his account of the Renaissance period. Disintegration was inevitable.

The revival of learning in the north had a different ethical effect. Renewed knowledge of Scripture and of the early Church Fathers' doctrines was an effort to give ethical interpretation to existing ecclesiastical and institutional rites and ordinances. Erasmus was the exponent of this within the Church. He saw in *general education* the chief instrument of moral reform, and consequently a fundamental method of social control. The sixteenth century witnessed the revolt of Protestantism, and the transfer of control from the clergy to the civic authorities. The right of private judgment, the inwardness of faith as the sole way to eternal life, the total corruption of human nature, the universal and absolute imperativeness of Christian duties, the repudiation of the doctrine of supererogation are the changes most saliently urged. Ethically considered "these changes, however profoundly important, were either negative or quite general, relating to the tone or attitude of mind in which all duty should be done. As regards all positive matter of duty or virtue, and most of the prohibitive code for ordinary men, the tradition of Christian teaching was carried on substantially unchanged in the discourses and writings of the Reformed churches."¹²⁹

SECTION IV

EFFECT OF THE PROTESTANT REVOLT ON THE CONCEPTION OF THE STANDARD

In Luther's method there is much that suggests Descartes. Descartes used doubt to unload and then took back discarded beliefs, introducing *difference of method*. Luther virtually did the same. The principle of subjective individuality as conceived by Luther and his immediate followers required a philosophical

¹²⁹ Sidgwick. History of Ethics. P. 152.

basis. The demand for such was met at first by a denial of Aristotelian principles, but subsequently by a resumption of these.

The minimizing of good works was a theoretical inference from the belief in the transformation of natural man to spiritual man through an act of faith alone. It was clearly attitude *versus* accomplishment. The significant question became: Where is the standard of morality to be found? Can motive and consequence be isolated in respective spheres? In the doctrine of sanctification, which is to be interpreted as freedom from external law, there is lurking an anti-social element.

The private interpretation of Scripture left ample scope for casuistry. It became difficult to extract from so many sects an ethical code that would meet with a sufficiently general acceptance to serve as a foundation for society. The effect of making Scripture the sole, unerring guide, containing inherent evidence of its truth, has been suicidal to Protestantism. Biblical criticism has attacked this foundation and weakened it to such an extent that many have come to distrust the validity of the standards that have been and are still the vital principles of our present civilization. These results were not immediately felt, but have been the more remote consequences of the earlier attitude. The more immediate effects are only recently being revealed and appreciated. The more subtle, vital, and permanent influences have been obscured by the grosser manifestations of the intense feeling attendant upon the movement. The intoxication of the feeling of freedom from living sanction or authority in one sphere, spread into others. That the full significance of their attitude was not grasped by the Reformers is evidenced in Luther's treatment of the Peasant's Revolt in Germany. The idea was not recognized in another sphere.

The interpretation of individuality as the right to assign values rather than to ascertain them in experience led from a *distrust* of institutions to their repudiation as evidenced theoretically in Rousseau and actually in the French Revolution. The Peasant's Revolt in Germany and the French Revolution embodied the same idea. The one succeeded, the other did not, in establishing, temporarily at least, the worth of the idea. It remains for succeeding generations to discern the inherent truth in the idea in its *relations* to other truths.

Beginning of the Isolation of Experimental Method

Bacon, followed by Hobbes, brought about a great change in intellectual attitude. Bacon's belief that the mind has power to correctly interpret accumulated facts, with Hobbes' needed curb to this extreme inductive view in the conception of mathematical control, and more especially his substitution of the idea of generation for transformation, together made *experimentation* the basis of control.

Hobbes' psychology is materialistic. Reality is a material process. Pleasure and pain are essentially forms of *motion*, the one "helping vital action," the other "retarding it." Materialism intrinsically regards all impulse as directed toward preservation of the material organism. Hobbes' main contention as to the complete selfishness of man is the logical outcome of materialism. With Epicurean reasoning the so-called altruistic or social impulses are all traced ultimately to self-seeking. Hobbes' contribution to Epicurean philosophy is, that rules of social behavior limited as they must be to furthering indirectly man's preservation or pleasure, must be secured in the only way to make them universally coercive, by the intervention of government. For the authority of the Church, Hobbes substitutes that of the State, and that State a despotism. This viewpoint is claimed by some to be the necessary reaction to the anarchy among warring sects, the result of the so-called liberty of conscience,—the main thesis of the Protestant Revolt. Hobbism with uncompromising egoism as its standard and necessary positive law for particular moral rules was a sufficiently coherent theory to furnish a point of departure for schools of ethicists.

Reaction to Hobbism

Cudworth of the Cambridge Platonists claimed the objective reality of the essential and eternal distinctions of good and evil. He emphasizes the inconsistency of Hobbes in presupposing an objective physical world cognizable to the intellect, and in denying a similar exercise of the intellect in an objective world of duty. *Cumberland* claims man's essential sociality, and lays down the rule "that all rationals should aim at the common good of all" as the supreme rule of morality or "Law of Nature." To support the fact of its being a law of nature, he provides sanctions referred

to the law-giver, God. These sanctions compel obedience to the law by determining the agent's happiness.

It is evident from the reaction to Hobbes that Empiricism had not yet won the supremacy in English philosophy. Scholasticism had been confined to narrower limits and Skepticism flourished apace.

Is there here in theme and sequence a miniature cycle of succeeding thought? Are the fundamental ideas of Kant, Darwin, and Spencer, anticipated respectively by Bacon's discussion of efficient causes, Hobbes' substitution of generation for transformation, and Cumberland's assertion of the common good as the supreme rule of morality?

SECTION V

METHOD OF DESCARTES IN DETERMINING THE STANDARD

Descartes determined to do away with all presuppositions and by completely ridding himself of all such preconceived ideas, to deliberately establish a philosophy, every point of which was absolutely verifiable. His first postulate, *Cogito Sum*, seems, in its import the same as that of Augustine, *Dubito Sum*. Augustine valued the self-certainty of the soul as the surest *experience* from which as a point of departure he built up a psychology of the will, and gave to his successors the idealized conception of *personality*. Descartes in a slightly different way viewed the *Cogito Sum* as the first fundamental rational truth, and builds his system of philosophy on the maxim: *Everything must be true* that is as *clear and distinct as self-consciousness*. In this statement is concentrated the essence of the Cartesian system, viz., its point of departure as *Cogito Sum*, and its method of quantitative determinations. "*As clear and distinct as self-consciousness*" is mathematical in statement. Descartes recognizes the sensuous apprehension of the qualitative as "imagination" while the apprehension of that which can be *mathematically* constructed he terms "intellectual" knowledge. "To that which I know clearly and distinctly I may assent, for that clear and distinct knowledge must be true follows from God's veracity."¹⁰⁰ He thus assumes that only clear and distinct presentations have the compelling power on the mind that forces recognition. Error results in the

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, II 2:50.

will's affirming or denying *arbitrarily* when confused presentations are the data. "The cause of all error arises from the fact that my power of willing reaches further than my understanding and that I do not confine the exertion of the former within the limits demanded by the latter, but that instead of withholding my judgment I presume to judge also of that which I do not understand." This idea is the basis of Descartes' ethics. Right willing and action follow clear rational knowledge: sin and error follow the abuse of freedom in willing and acting from the obscure and confused impulses of the sensibility alone.

The ethical ideal is the Socratic-Stoic ideal of the rule of reason over the sensibility. The Stoicism of Cartesianism, with infusion of Christian ideas, is evident in the following: "The true object of our love being perfection, when we lift our minds to consider God as He is, we feel ourselves naturally so strongly disposed to love Him that we derive joy even from our afflictions, remembering *that in all that happens to us His will is fulfilled.*"¹⁸¹ Life's external order may be disturbed, but not the inner harmony of the soul. Accidents are necessary and are a part of God's purpose, hence man can do nothing but desire them. To make our will and our understanding one with the will of God,—in this lies the whole of morality. The Supreme Good is good will which alone depends on man's self. To know is to will rightly; hence wisdom should be our ideal. In striving for wisdom, man finds happiness.¹⁸²

Psychological Basis of Cartesian Principles

The psychology on which Descartes bases his principle of certitude is that of a "reasoned realist."¹⁸³ Man is able to distinguish the idea of a thing from the idea of a mere mental fancy. The mind, being a *res cogitans*, must be conscious of its acts; man is conscious of having formed an idea (*idea a me ipso facta*), and is equally conscious of the non-interference of the will when an idea comes from the outside (*idea adventitia*). He knows in the last case that whether he wills it or no, the idea represents something controlled from outside the mind. Descartes finds a sanction for this certitude in God's veracity.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 13th June, 1645.

¹⁸² Janet, *Problems of Philosophy*, II. P. 56.

¹⁸³ Turner, *History of Philosophy*, P. 454.

¹⁸⁴ Descartes in a measure reasons in a circle, because he has already established God's existence on the reliableness of the cognitive powers.

Metaphysical Basis

The principle which underlies the reasoning of Descartes is that *to be conscious of a limit is to transcend it*. Consciousness of our existence as individuals — self-consciousness — is impossible without the consciousness of something not ourselves, and necessarily of a unity in which both self and not self are included. Descartes reasons that all ideas of the finite are a *limitation of the idea* of the infinite; that to be conscious of the various *limitations* conveys with it as part of the essence of this consciousness the idea of the infinite — the Idea of God. *This idea is not one of many ideas, but is the pervasive idea in all ideas, by which alone they have existence.* “I ought never to suppose that my conception of the infinite is a negative idea, got by negation of the finite, just as I conceive repose to be merely negation of movement, and darkness merely the negation of light. On the contrary, I see manifestly there is more reality in the infinite than in the finite substance, and that therefore I have within me the notion of the infinite, *even in some sense prior to the finite*, or in other words that the notion of myself *in some sense* presupposes the notion of God; for how could I doubt or desire, how could I be conscious of anything as a want, how could I know I am not altogether perfect, if I had not in me the idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison with whom I recognize the defects of my own existence?”¹⁸⁵ To think a series of *approximations* implies as an intrinsic part of the thought, a *standard* which Descartes unhesitatingly pronounces *consciousness of the infinite*.

Descartes sees nothing in this conception of the infinite to exclude the existence of finite things. “What would become of the power of that imaginary infinite if it could create nothing? Perceiving in ourselves the power of thinking we can easily conceive that there should be a greater intelligence elsewhere. And even if we should suppose that intelligence increased *ad infinitum* we need not fear that our own would be lessened. And the same is true of all other attributes which we ascribe to God, even of his power, provided only that we do not suppose that the power in us is not subjected to God’s will. In all points, therefore, He is infinite without an exclusion of created things.”¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ *Meditatio tertia*, P. 21.

¹⁸⁶ *Respon. ad sec. object.*, P. 75.

It seems strange that Descartes while anticipating many modern theories of motion,¹⁸⁷ and at the same time recognizing the secondary qualities, taste, color, etc., of material things as modes of consciousness, should have failed to grasp the comprehensive idea of the organic relation of mind and matter as necessary moments of one process of experiencing. In the subjectivism mentioned concerning the secondary qualities, he paved the way for the idealism of subsequent philosophers. But the absolute antithesis between mind and matter made the union of soul and body merely a mechanical one, and created that chasm to bridge which has exhausted the energies of philosophers since that time.

To Descartes may be traced the unnecessary antagonism between those who believe in the spirituality of the human soul and those who insist on the value of experimental method in the study of psychic phenomena.

The most noteworthy contribution of Cartesian philosophy is the essentially *deductive* or mathematical method as opposed to the so-called Baconian method. By a strange "irony of fate"¹⁸⁸ again, physical science owes more to Descartes than to Bacon. In answer to the inevitable question, Are the antagonisms just cited, real or imaginary in the last case, the result of emphasis merely? the conviction is forced that in a reinterpretation of Descartes there is to be found light on modern problems.

Spinoza's Pantheistic Conception the Logical Result of the Theory of Occasionalism

The pantheism of Spinoza is the unchecked development of the Occasionalism present in germ in Descartes and developed by Geulincx and Malebranche. The theory of "Occasional Causes" or "Divine Assistance" is the result of the presupposition that body and soul are independently complete substances. Descartes claimed that the influence of the soul upon the body was not real. Malebranche develops the idea more fully: there can be no relation between things so different. The will is powerless to influence bodily movements; but it can determine the will of God, who thereupon produces the effect.¹⁸⁹ "God is the sole immediate and direct cause of all my movements. His activity is exerted

¹⁸⁷ See Turner, *loc. cit.* P. 456.

¹⁸⁸ "Irony of fate" indicates a lurking truth as yet unrecognized.

¹⁸⁹ Driscoll, Discussion in Christian Philosophy, 1898. P. 170.

upon the *occasion* of ideas or of resolves in my mind. . . . The act of the body is the occasion, not the cause." To this doctrine Leibnitz opposed, later, his theory of "Pre-established Harmony." He reproached Descartes for degrading the Divinity by comparing God to a watchmaker who having made a clock is still obliged to turn the hands. But Leibnitz still holds to the independence of soul and body: the acts of the soul form a progressive series, and the acts of the body another series; but God in the beginning foresaw what the actions would be and established a harmony between one and the other. Thus the soul and the body can be compared to two watches which were regulated and wound up. "In both, the minute and hour hands point to the same identical place; but one watch goes entirely independently of the other; the spring which gives motion to one is not the same as that which gives motion to the other."

The doctrine, as Spinoza received it from the immediate successors of Descartes, was that God by Divine decree has ordained that material things should be the occasions of effects which He alone produces. This is pantheism held in check by faith in Christian revelation. Spinoza at this point substitutes the pantheism of Giordano Bruno. With Geulincx and Malebranche, God is the Creator; with Spinoza, He is universal essence or nature of things: not God *in* the world but God *as* the world.

Spinoza's Identification of Knowledge with Will

Closely associated with this idea is that of universal necessity or determinism. According to this the moral sanction is not founded on responsibility, but is a consequence of the necessary fixed order of things. "Every event is justified by the very fact of its occurrence, which is in immediate connection with the supreme necessity."¹⁴⁰ Man's endeavor should be to understand and to love this immutable order. *The knowledge of truth thus becomes the noblest good.* The possibility of this is seen only after a comprehension of Spinoza's theory of parallelism.

Through a parallelism of thought and extension of the two attributes of the One Substance, the psychical is substantially identical with the extended which is perceived as material and follows the laws of mechanics. All particular thoughts have God

¹⁴⁰ Janet, Problems of Philosophy, II. P. 62.

as a thinking being, just as all particular bodies have God as an extended being, for their cause; ideas are not caused by perceived things, and things are not caused by thoughts. But the things of which we have ideas follow in the same way and with the same necessity from their attribute as do our ideas from the attribute of thought; the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; for the attributes from which the former and the latter respectively follow express the essence of one substance.¹⁴¹

"He who knows anything knows also by the very fact that he knows it. The mind knows itself only in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body. . . . All ideas are true so far as they are referable to God, for all ideas which are in God agree perfectly with their objects. Every idea which is in us as an absolute or adequate idea is true, for every such idea is in God, *in so far as the latter constitutes the essence of the human mind.*"

The mind is more capable of forming adequate ideas, the more its body has in common with other bodies. These *notiones communes*, or adequate ideas of the peculiarities of things, belong to the kind of cognition called reason. The truth of such an idea is apprehended as such by him who entertains it. The will to affirm or deny ideas is not a causeless arbitrary act; it is the necessary consequence of the ideas. *The will in Spinoza is identical with the intellect.*¹⁴² *To discover the true order of ideas that parallels the order and connection of things, i.e., to know the truth, becomes man's moral endeavor.*

Spinoza's Doctrine of Self-Realization

Added to this conception is the self-realizing impulse through the three stages of knowledge. In the plane of confused knowledge, the mind is *conscious of the effort to extend its being* by breaking through the "modes" that hem it in. This consciousness is emotion and indicates whether the modes affecting it through the body are diminishing or increasing the power of thought. "Where a mode of the body, as the sight of a rose, increases the mind's activity, there results the emotion of pleasure or joy; where a mode of the body, as having bad news, diminishes the mind's activity, there results the emotion of sadness. Love

¹⁴¹ Ethics, Prop. 7.

¹⁴² Ethics, 2-49.

is the idea of an external thing which is a cause of joy, and hatred the idea of a thing which is the cause of sadness."¹⁴³ In this last idea, the influence of Hobbes on Descartes' conceptions is evident.

Spinoza's conception of self-preservation finds coincidence, almost with Hobbes's theory of governmental control, as the most efficient and certain means for the satisfaction of egoism. This virtually denies the possibility of an individual *standard* of right and wrong in the practical sphere.

The illusion of the finite—sense, imagination, passion—is viewed as the source of all error. The exaltation of the present moment into a standard of measuring the universe is the result of first raising the individual life to such a unit. The highest good is to live the universal life of reason, to view all things from their center in God, to be moved only by the intellectual love of God. To love things that perish is to love that which can never satisfy, and the pursuit of such perishable things brings a train of evils—envy, jealousy, etc. The only felicity is to love an object which is infinite and eternal. But our love rests upon our knowledge.

It is difficult to conceive of a manipulation of logic to justify in a sense an almost Machiavellian ethics of self-realization, to confirm a governmental sanction and authority with Hobbes, and to affirm with Malebranche the only perfect satisfaction is to be found in the "love of God." Like Malebranche, Spinoza says, "We needs must love the highest when we see it." To be able to do this man must rise from the domination of opinion. Under such sway, things are viewed in an arrested moment of inter-relationing, as complete in themselves. The imagination pictures as complete what it is impossible for thought to conceive as such. The range of possibility narrows to the degree the understanding and not the imagination has sway. To perfected knowledge possibility becomes necessity; absolute unity is the goal: all nature is as one individual "whose parts vary through an infinite number of modes without change of the whole individual." "And as to the human mind, I think of it also as a part of nature, for I think of nature as having in it an infinite power of thinking which as infinite contains in itself the idea of all nature and whose thoughts run parallel with all existence."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Quoted in Turner's *History of Philosophy*, P. 430.

¹⁴⁴ Fifteenth letter.

The idea of absolute unity is involved in the idea of each particular thing. It is man's blindness to this idea that makes him a slave to confusion and disaster. Man is free only in so far as "ideas either immediately are, or can be made, adequate." Our idea of God or of Absolute Unity is adequate; our ideas of the afflictions of the body are inadequate and can be made adequate only by referring them to the idea of God. "The idea of God is as it were the touchstone which distinguishes the gold from dross."¹⁴⁵

Spinoza's idea of abstract affirmation as deity, and his accompanying idea of the negative as nothing, leaves no place for asceticism in his ethical theory. The morality he advances is Machiavellian in its self-assertion or self-seeking. The negative element is never admitted. Man's affirmation of his natural self which Spinoza conceives as having much in common with animals and all beings, is affirmation apparently not different in kind from that highest affirmation which is identification with God's love. Spinoza confesses in the following statement his own inability to comprehend this all-leveling logic of pantheism: "I confess I cannot understand how spirits express God more than the other creatures, for I know that between the finite and the infinite there is no proportion. . . ."

Effect of This Exaggerated Spiritualism

That the exaggeration of the concept of spirituality culminating in Spinoza's pantheism should bring a protest in the form of an exaggerated materialism is only another instance of the rhythmic alteration of opposite emphases. A movement initiated by a desire to free the spiritual from its threatened materialization, resulted in the materialistic philosophy which spread and prevailed in France during the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, the theory of Spinoza became one of the centers of German idealism. Reinterpreted in the light of interaction of mind and matter, spirit and sense, it may be said to be the basis or source of the double-aspect theory, finding its closest relationship in the logic of Hegel.

The most manifest inconsistency in Spinoza's logic is the attempt to save enough of the idea of personality or individuality

¹⁴⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, Ninth Edition, V, P. 158. Article, Cartesianism.

to afford a semblance of a basis for morality. Consciousness of this inconsistency is inevitable; at first, it is forced by the fact that the conception of freedom is rescued from the logic only in the so-called ethical field of the control by the reason of the senses and passions. It becomes more and more evident in the elaboration of the last idea. Something is the matter with the logic as soon as it is applied to the practical sphere of conduct. Spinoza himself was conscious of this.

Cartesianism is regarded as the first movement of modern philosophy. The intelligible world emerges into greater importance, the result of what has been shown to be a cumulative interest in material philosophy. This interest popularly ascribed to the Renaissance period, has been shown to have had its origin in remoter periods, and to have progressively evolved as the control of civilization asserted itself through the medium of the world's new religion. The nature of man had been progressively freed for higher activities by control of the elemental forces of that nature.¹⁴⁶ The mind of the scholar had been sharpened by the dialectic of scholasticism: the world of men had been at school.

In Descartes, then, *matter* was emphasized as limitation. It was raised by Spinoza to be the equal of mind, and by a curious inconsistency viewed as negation. The inconsistency is the result of the attempt to bridge the duality between mind and matter, an attempt to formulate the idea of unity which he felt existed between the intelligible world and the mind of man. His logic defeats his purpose of dignifying matter. As a complement to this absorption of all things under the form of eternity, the schools of Locke and Leibnitz asserted the equally one-sided view of individuality and difference. The English school forced consideration of *experience* viewed under the form of time. With what method and what results, will now be considered.

SECTION VI

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD OF DETERMINING THE STANDARD

With much of the spirit of Descartes, Locke undertook to lay a basis for measuring objective truth. His method was one of measuring the powers of the intellect, and by estimation of these

¹⁴⁶ It is here that Monasticism has fulfilled its mission.

to provide against their being applied to problems beyond their scope.

Assuming the objective reality of extension, he accounts for certain ideas as *copies* of such real qualities as bulk, number, figure, situation, motion, or rest. In dealing with color, sound, smell, and taste to which he likewise ascribes the term *qualities*, secondary qualities, he finds it necessary to admit that they are not copies in any sense, but are *of the mind*. He is unable to give any explanation of the transmutation of sensations into such ideas.¹⁴⁷

Locke seems to be uncertain as to just where the principle of control lies. Real qualities in objects place it "without the mind." "Secondary qualities" cannot be explained otherwise than "of the mind." He seems more concerned with the attitude toward knowledge-getting, than with framing any philosophical system. He urges repeatedly the control by knowledge; at one time regretting that men do not think for themselves, at another urging them to widen the range of experience in order to escape the consequences of limitation of experience. Emphasizing always *experience* as the source of knowledge, and showing at the same time that knowledge is necessary for right conduct, he regards this active use of our faculties as the chief means of honoring the Deity.

The emphasis placed upon experience carries with it the hedonistic interpretation of good and evil found in Hobbes. But Locke opposes alike Hobbes' political intervention as moral obli-

¹⁴⁷ The difficulty of Locke's undertaking is manifest. How can powers of mind be measured except by the very powers themselves? The fallacy lies in the abstraction of one element in the idea of knowledge and idealizing it as a standard by which all other elements are subordinated, or condemned.

The difficulty is not transcended: the standard has not been determined, and cannot be adequately determined by using the powers to be measured as standards, or by the abstraction of one of them to degrade the others. The interconnection of the powers is so complete that it is impossible to abstract one without destroying the identity of all, or rather their *true nature*. "To see around our knowledge and find its boundary, we must stand outside of it, and where is such standing ground to be found?" This is not a denial of the possibility of criticising parts of our knowledge. It is sound judgment to criticise an idea because of failure to consider in its formation factors whose omission destroy its relation to the whole, or *ipso facto*, its truth. Of course in so doing the implication is inherent that there is a consciousness of truth which in being thus used serves as standard.

What is denied is the possibility of completely validating the tools of knowledge, or of criticising adequately the idea of knowledge itself.

gation, and that shifting of a moral standard determined by society's praise and blame. There is anticipation of Shaftesbury in the idea of universal benevolence. But with Locke this inherent harmony of individual, and orderly, organized, social life is referred to conformity with Divine Will. Locke's belief in the permanence and universality of moral truths is shown in the following: "The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are and upon which we depend, and the idea of ourselves as understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration, wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestible as those in mathematics, *the measures of right and wrong might be made out.*"

In place of the pantheism found often in the continental schools, the English conception has been that of God, the lawgiver, the ruler, with nature as his dominion. This Stoic-Scholastic idea is strongly supported by Locke's younger contemporary, Newton. Laws to him were the expression of infinite goodness and power. Lesser laws classified under greater laws suggested a pyramid — with the apex one law, the expression or manifestation of one lawgiver. Kepler's classic saying that in the discovery of laws of nature, we think the thoughts of God after Him, is a summary of Newton's view.

Berkeley's Principle of Universal Mind

Berkeley, following Descartes and Locke, interprets the idea of matter according to a new principle. All existence necessarily implies *mind*: the so-called laws of nature are ideas of the Universal mind,—the so-called external objects, "things as they are," are the signs and symbols by which these ideas are communicable to man's mind. The "sense ideas" are man's consciousness of participation in the ideas of God. "Instead therefore of fate or necessity, or matter, or the unknown, a living, active mind is looked upon *as the center and spring of the universe.*" Man's struggle then in all experience is *to bring his human conceptions into harmony with the Divine Archetypes.*

With such a conception it is hard to understand a segregation of any part of experience as ethical, and it may be that Berkeley's deductions of so-called moral rules from the intention of God to promote the general happiness, may be translating his general standard into terms of the contemporary moral theorists.

The synthesis of subject and object as conceived by Berkeley under the idea that no object can exist apart from mind, is thought by some to be an English empiricism forerunning the German Kantian school.

Reaction to Hobbes' Theory of Complete Egoism

The influence of Hobbes' theory of egoism was indirectly the source of the attempt of Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson, and others to identify private and public good. Shaftesbury made *intelligent* self-regard identical with social good. The personal sanction, which he termed the "moral sense," was criticised and developed by Butler into *conscience* which became at once a rival standard to self-love. Butler attempted to recognize the imperativeness of *conscience* independent of religious proof. He showed that man's primary impulses cannot all be egoistic, some of these being as obviously social as others are self-regarding, and also that man cannot be *consistently* egoistic without being self-regulative. If the impulses are thus regulated, the natural claim of conscience to be supreme ruler must be conceded.

Hutcheson, while sustaining Butler's idea of the governing power of the "moral sense," maintains Shaftesbury's harmony of private and public good, but *emphasises* the *disinterestedness* of benevolent affections. He denies, with clear argument, the presence of the motive of "intrinsic reward" in the actions of the benevolent man. He points to the universal admiration mankind has evinced for self-sacrifice as testimony to its being something different from "refined self-seeking." In the practical working out of his system into control of outward acts, Hutcheson used the scholastic distinction between "material" and "formal" goodness. "An action is *materially* good when in fact it tends to the interest of the system, so far as we can judge of its tendency, or to the good of some part consistent with that of the system, whatever were the affections of the agent. An action is *formally* good when it flowed from 'good affection in a just proportion.'"

Hume's Denial of a Unifying Principle

Hume in continuing the Lockian analysis of the limits of our knowledge transformed the latter into a philosophy of skepticism. *There is no unifying principle by which experiences are interpreted.* The only synthesis Hume concedes is that ascribed to habit. A recurrence of associated phenomena leads us through memory of these to feel the necessity of one on the appearance of the other. The description is the purely psychological one of the Associational School. It is difficult to conceive of Hume's analysis as an explanation. It is essentially descriptive, and that only of routine rather than of reflection. Hume's description of the synthesis necessary to all cognition as merely the accidental result of external relations discoverable as *impressions* in our conscious experience, leaves all consideration of a standard out of the question. That Hume was conscious at once of the need of a synthesising principle and of the impossibility of a logical conception of such a principle in his theory is shown by the following:

"If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connexion or determination of the thought or pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, and when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other.

"However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise us. Modern philosophers seem inclined to think that personal identity *arises* from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy therefore has a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought to consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head. . . .

"In short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz., *that all* our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct

existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion between them, there would be no difficulty in the case."¹⁴⁸

Hume has herein stated the *crux* in the theory known as Empiricism. It is conceded that his is the consistent exposition of the fundamental presupposition of that theory—that the theory of knowledge is identical with the problems of Associational Psychology. It is conceded too that there has been no advance from Hume's position even in John Stuart Mill's "Logic." In Hume's closing sentence above he seems to rest his case: that with his theory he can not consistently offer an explanation of cognition. The value of Hume's analysis is only increased by the confession of its insufficiency. As is true always of masterful, scholarly work, it is a contribution to the world's knowledge even though its results are negative in the particular direction which the author has given them. It clears the field for further inquiry and provokes and stimulates like critical work in others. That this is especially true of Hume we know from Kant's own words.¹⁴⁹ In reading Hume, the stimuli to Kant's "Critique" are readily to be detected. Hume's attempt to account for any synthesising mode of experiencing is couched repeatedly in the words, "manner of conceiving." In the recurrence of this phrase, Kant's categories are implied. The last statement in the quotation from Hume suggests the scheme to frame the theory of knowledge that Kant actually took.

Hume's ethical theory is a necessary deduction from his theory of knowledge. It is an analysis of distinct cases that excite approbation or disapprobation in a disinterested spectator of an action. Adam Smith's test is that of Hume: so act that a disinterested spectator will approve of your action. In his later treatise Hume recognizes no obligation to virtue except the agent's interest or happiness. In his earlier treatise he states that in some cases by "association of ideas" the rule by which we praise or blame is extended beyond the principle of utility from which it arises, but in his later treatise, "Inquiry into the Principles of Morals," he returns to the more strictly utilitarian view.

¹⁴⁸ Appendix to the Treatise on Human Nature, II, P. 551.

¹⁴⁹ It was Hume who awoke me, etc.

Reactionary Schools

In the extremes represented by Hume and Shaftesbury, there is a manifest attempt to dissolve ethics in psychological hypotheses. Shaftesbury's theory views the "moral sense," which is the efficient cause of action in his theory, as varying in different individuals. Hume's theory acknowledges no standard for action except the evanescent one of the approbation or disapprobation of a changing public. Both alike produce a disintegrating effect upon society. This is evident in the two reactionary schools that follow inevitably such crises: the one devoted to the strengthening of standards commonly accepted by "most men"; the other devoted to the repudiation of these and to the development of the strongest common element in the new theory into an ultimate end or standard. The former was the still existent Intuitional School represented by Price, Reid, Stewart, and others; the latter developed into Utilitarianism represented at first by Paley and Bentham, and afterwards by Mill.

SECTION VII

KANTIAN ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE: RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE
OF THIS CONCEPTION AND THE MORAL STANDARD

Kant makes thought the *prius* of experience, and so of all existences that are objects of knowledge. Thought not only *constitutes* finite experience, but reaches beyond it, in that it is conscious of its own limitations.¹⁵⁰ *This consciousness of the insufficiency of experience is the teleis* that is manifested in experience by man's continual *striving* to reach an ideal.

Kant concedes Hume's position that evidence is lacking in the actual objects of experience of the unity or identity that thought demands. "Combination," says Kant, "is not in things and cannot be derived from them by perception, for example, and thence first transferred to the understanding; it is the work of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing more than the faculty of a priori combination, the faculty by which the variety of given representations is brought under the unity of apperception. *This principle is the highest of human knowledge.* Since now all possible perception depends on the synthesis of appre-

¹⁵⁰ This recalls Descartes.

hension and since this empirical synthesis again depends upon the transcendental synthesis, and hence on the categories, it follows that all possible perceptions, and hence everything that can exist in the empirical consciousness, i.e., all phenomena of nature, are subject in what respects their combination, to the categories which are the *original ground* of the necessary conformity of nature (considered simply as such) to law."¹⁸¹

The categories then are the conditions of thought upon which all experience depends. The categories belong exclusively to the subject which by these modes of synthesising shapes the sensations and so generates phenomena which become ideas. These ideas in turn become means of control. Hume's interpretation as "manner of conceiving" becomes Kant's "mode of experiencing." Kant's selection of a definite number of these modes of synthesising and designating them as *the* categories cannot fail to impress us as arbitrary or dogmatic. *The essential truth of Kant's analysis is that unity of consciousness and its identity with itself are the necessary conditions for the combining of a given content into any conceivable form of experience.*

The only world we can *know* is the world determined by mind. The world of experience is therefore transcendently *ideal*. It is only empirically real; its reality is only phenomenal. Kant has sometimes been wrongly interpreted as supporting an idealism which would involve the "negation of things in themselves beyond phenomena, or the identification of the objects of experience with these things." Kant is concerned with the *world we know*, the world of experience, the only reality we can know, though not the *absolute* reality, ding-an-sich.

It is difficult to follow him in the *Dialectic* where he has to account for the fact that the conscious subject is able to so far transcend his experience as to contrast (as in the last statement) the objects of his experience as phenomenal, with things in themselves. He shows that the expression of the subject through the categories is not the pure expression of its real nature, but only the product of the relationing of that identity with the forms of time and space. On the other hand, the affections of the sensible subject can tell us nothing of the unknown thing-in-itself that causes the affections. Thus experiencing on both sides is phenomenal — both in relation to the noumenal subject and noumenal

¹⁸¹ Ueberweg, P. 170. See criticism in note same page.

object. These "lurk behind the veil and send forth into experience on the one side affections which become objects through their determination by the unity of thoughts, and on the other side an identity of thought which becomes self-conscious in relation to the objects so determined by itself."¹⁵² If the phenomena are regarded as *unreal*, there must be an idea of reality by which they are so judged. In other words, they are not condemned because they are ideal but because they are *imperfectly* ideal. The noumenon is substituted for the thing-in-itself in the dialectic, and is defined by Kant as the object as it exists for an intuitive or perceptive understanding, i.e., for an understanding that does not synthetically combine the given matter of sense into objects by means of categories, but whose thought is one with the existence of the objects it knows.¹⁵³

This idea of the pure identity of knowing and being is *self-originated by thought and leads us to regard our "empirical knowledge as imperfect*, and its objects as not, in an absolute sense real objects. The noumena are not therefore the unknown causes by whose action and reaction conscious experience is produced; they represent a unity of thought with itself to which it finds experience inadequate." This higher unity of thought with itself Kant calls *reason*. In his identification of reason with the faculty of syllogizing, there is an echo of Aristotle's discussion of the characteristic function of man.

In the three fields, psychology, cosmology, and theology, Kant finds the empirical process of knowledge guided and stimulated by an idea it is unable to realize or verify. In psychology it is the identity of the self, in cosmology, the idea of totality—the world as a completed infinite whole, and in theology, the unity of identity and totality—"the unity of all things with each other and with the mind that knows them." These ideas do not exist independently of the mind that conceives them, but they exist in their function of keeping "open a vacant place beyond experience. . . . They are like dark lanterns which cast light upon the empirical world and show what are its boundaries, but leave their own nature in obscurity."

Interpreted in the field of conduct, Kant's "idea of an *intelligible world is a point of view beyond the phenomenal which*

¹⁵² Edward Caird's Criticism of Kant.

¹⁵³ Compare Thomas Aquinas.

the reason sees itself compelled to take up, in order to think of itself as practical." Beings *morally free*, that is, self-determined, presuppose an idea of causality which with other ideas begins to fill the blank space beyond the phenomenal. The moral law presupposes freedom. Man in the sphere of conduct must recognize himself as the "denizen of a spiritual world where nothing is determined for him from without which is not simply the expression of his own self-determination from within." "Thus," says Kant, "we have found what Aristotle could not find, a fixed point on which Reason can set its lever, not in any present or future world, but in its own inner idea of freedom — a point fixed for it by the immovable moral law, as a secure basis from which it can move the human will, even against the opposition of all the powers of nature."

The universal law, the "categorical imperative," finds content in the two formulae: "Act so that the maxim of thy action may serve as a general rule," and "So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person, or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." In this conception of a "kingdom of ends," the principle of personality finds one of the highest forms of expression in history. In such a "kingdom" there is necessarily implied an organic unity toward the realization of which each contributes by virtue of his individuality, his unique share.

There is thus a threefold development of the moral consciousness:

1. Act as if the motive were to become a universal one.
2. Treat personality as an end in itself.
3. Further an organization of a kingdom of ends.

Virtue, which is the satisfaction of reason, is the supreme good. Happiness is the satisfaction of man's sense nature. Happiness and virtue tend to approach each other. The union of the two becomes a moral necessity, an ideal. The moral consciousness authorizes the use of the idea of organic unity to interpret the phenomenal world; in other words, to serve as an ideal to give meaning to all experience. The consciousness of the beautiful and sublime represented by Kant's "Critique of Judgment" as disinterested, free, immediate, suggests essential harmony between the understanding and sense. In Kant's philosophy of religion, the idea of God is evolved from the moral consciousness,

and becomes the means of reconciling the two worlds of sense and intelligence. The God of Rationalism is invoked instead of the God of Revelation.

Thus as soon as Kant applies his theory to the field of conduct, the duality disappears. When he directs that ideas evolved in the realm of reason be used as standards for the world of experience, he virtually recognizes an identity in difference in the two worlds. How otherwise could the ideas be used to measure or synthesize or interpret experience, if these ideas were absolutely incommensurable with that experience?

Hegel's Conception of a Self-differentiating Unity

In Hegel's development of Kant's philosophy is the beginning of the modern tendency to identify morality with sociality. Hegel develops the positive character of the will as interpreted by Kant, to the conception that will is not will until it is objectified. By giving this idea historical breadth, the Hegelian conception of social institutions as the objectified general will or morality of the race is reached. The external world is regarded as the necessary manifestation of spirit through which it realizes itself. Mind, or Spirit as Hegel calls it, is a self-differentiating unity. The Absolute in its self-alienation in the finite constitutes what is termed Nature. The Idea as Being, is Nature. The return of its own *alterity* to itself, is Spirit. Spirit is the being-with-self of the Absolute Idea after its existence in its own otherness in Nature. The gradual advance to the final reconciliation is its becoming in time, its development towards freedom. Freedom arises from the ashes of the *old activity*, and is identical with the truth of the new activity. Hegel gives content to this conception in his interpretation of history in all its aspects. His whole philosophy is one of the evolution from lower to higher manifestations of the all-pervading Idea. These progressive manifestations are the momenta in the return of the self-differentiating Idea to itself. The goal is absence of self-determination. This cessation of determination of the Idea into Being is Absolute Freedom. The unity of willing and thinking is the activity of this force of self-determining freedom working toward its goal. The ethical is the recognition of ends of universal, rational scope, and the active furthering of these ends.

Thus the ideal is the reconciliation of differentiation with its essence, *unity*. The standard of all activity is this conception of the return of the Idea to itself, the reconciliation of nature and spirit; the necessary relation of all things to one another and to the mind that knows them, the identity in difference of all existence, the universal principle of nature and humanity, whose essence is Spirit—an active self-determining principle. The principle is not an abstract one, but one that both within and without is necessarily realizing itself. It is the consciousness of this identity of the *necessity* that pre-conditions our activity with the *manifestation* within us of the spirit that makes us free, that constitutes morality in the Hegelian sense.

SECTION VIII

A RE-SURVEY OF THE EFFECT OF GERMAN IDEALISM ON THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF THE STANDARD

Whether formulated as in ancient times by Democritus¹⁵⁴ and later by Lucretius, or present as a tendency more or less pronounced in the English school of Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, and Hume the main principles of materialism can be summed up as follows: "the eternity and indestructibility of atoms,—nothing produces nothing: the eternity of motion, and the infinite possibility of its combination, the iron sway of necessary laws throughout the universe: the rejection of final causes: the principles of spontaneous generation, and of natural selection at least in germ."

German idealism from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel had opposed to this the conception that all the truths of science are but the phenomenal form of an *inner determining* principle: that consequently none of the particulars can be comprehended except as determined in their significance to a purposeful connected whole of life. "The dutifully bound seeming universe of our experience will obey the law of the inner life whose thought it is." The German school therefore in its beginnings was essentially critical. Kant's motive was an attempt to synthesize the two prevailing modes of thought, dogmatism and skepticism.

¹⁵⁴ Tyndall in his Belfast address suggests as a final conclusion of modern thought, the doctrines of Democritus.

The skeptic accused the dogmatist of employing ideas as means of arriving at general truth without adequate test of the means. He consequently denied both the possibility of truth, and the value of the tools. Mutual accusations resulted in fruitless affirmation and denial. The *critiques* of Kant were intended to validate the tools by a systematic investigation of the method of arriving at results.

A re-survey reveals the fact that the exaggerated spiritualism of the Cartesians gave birth to the empiricism of Locke: this to the skepticism of Hume; to confute Hume, Kant wrote his "Critique of Pure Reason," to counteract the inherent disintegrating influences of the extreme individualism of the last mentioned, his "Critique of Practical Reason": the transcendentalism there developed, Fichte translated into Subjective Idealism in which "life was a dream and he himself the dream of a dream," until the idea became with Hegel, a conception requiring a new logic, involving the denial of the principle of contradiction, and the substitution of the movement of negation and absorption of the premises.¹⁵⁵

The logic of Hegel regards the operations of the understanding alone as impotent to achieve any real synthesis, and tending to degenerate into dogmatism, religious and scientific. The first work of the reason termed dialectic, he considers as centrifugal and radical, and when combined with an attitude toward the products of the understanding as ultimate or final, producing the attitude known as skepticism. The third stage, the inclusion of negatives, the total grasp of the speculative notion, comprehends in its "identity in difference" both skepticism and dogmatism.

Thus by carrying this conception into the history of philosophy, opposing systems of philosophy previously considered as mutually destructive of each other become the necessary stages or elements of a conscious unity embracing both.

Reactionary Influence of the Nineteenth Century Thought

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a reaction to the high tension of that speculative philosophy that found its most comprehensive expression in Hegel, closed the philosophic era. The exaltation of matter, beginning with Descartes, with each

¹⁵⁵ The Logic of Hegel. Prolog. Chap. XIII.

returning wave in the rhythm of spiritual and material emphasis gathered force and became a purely mechanical conception of the universe. The nineteenth century becomes thereby seemingly the beginning of a new cycle of thought. The old cycle beginning with the animistic conception of the universe had given way at length to the new cycle with its correspondingly initial conception of world's forces. Science occupied the center of world interests, and acting with the individualistic tendency of the Protestant Revolt supplanted interest in universals. The discovery of the world's forces stimulated unprecedented progress in the economic and industrial control of these. The *Weltgeist* of the time was busy with concrete reality, concrete having come to stand for matter, reality being another name for the material thing. The simplicity of the appeal that is made by science, to the perception and imagination, has a certain clearness and definiteness apparently verifiable¹⁵⁶ in experience. Hypotheses become theories, theories become principles when they are verifiable in experience. The goal is the mathematical formulation of experience.

Romanticism was another influence. Aside from the effect it exerted upon the systems of philosophy in Germany, making possible the highly speculative character of these, the emphasis it gave *nature* was one influence in paving the way for the recognition of *the natural as a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or experience*. The interpretation of the natural was wholly materialistic.

Paralleling this tendency to reduce all this experience to a mathematical calculus, has been the increasing divergence of science and religion. Science has come to mean the store of knowledge gained through sense experience alone. The most comprehensive hypothesis explaining the facts of science has been the modern conception of evolution. It may be defined as "a natural history of the cosmos including organic being expressed in physical terms as a mechanical process."

Herbert Spencer's Theory

Herbert Spencer has done more than any one else towards the formation of a philosophy of evolution on a scientific basis. His celebrated formula that "Evolution is an integration of matter

¹⁵⁶ The possibility of this is challenged.

and a concomitant dissipation of motion, during which matter passes from a relatively coherent heterogeneity: and during which the contained motion undergoes a parallel transformation"—this formula while implying an ascending process gives no hint of the nature of any inherent determination in favor of variation in the higher direction. Darwin found no better epithet for the variation through which transformations are wrought than "fortuitous" and his staunchest disciples assert that if such variations be *predetermined toward certain results*, there is an end of Darwinism. It seems difficult to understand this *ignoring of an initial force* so characteristic of many enthusiastic followers of Darwin. These ¹⁵⁷ too often recklessly claim what Darwin most humbly disclaims. "He implies that my views explain the universe, but it is a most monstrous exaggeration. The more one thinks the more one feels the hopeless immensity of man's ignorance. If we consider the whole universe, the mind refuses to look at it as the outcome of chance. The whole question seems to be insoluble." ¹⁵⁸

Spencer's optimistic belief in the eventual complete adjustment or adaptation of man to the condition of his environment furnishes a principle of conduct: man should so act as to further progress toward that ideal. Morality consists of an observance of laws of life, both individual and collective. There is a strong tincture in Spencer's optimism of the eighteenth century idea of beneficent nature,—of nature as a great law-abiding force: a vice-regent of God that effects the happiness of those that conform to its beneficent laws. Spencer's conception of an earthly goal of "the greatest length, breadth, and completeness of life" when conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow men" where every voluntary act would be conducive to the harmony of all—such a conception is not only Utopian but destructive as well to the fundamental principle upon which his philosophy rests—evolution. The process has transcended the condition of its existence, the need of adaptation of the individual to the environment.

¹⁵⁷ Haeckel quoting Kant's statement: "It is absurd for a man even to conceive the idea that some day a Newton will arise who can explain the origin of a single blade of grass by natural laws uncontrolled by design," makes the statement that the impossible Newton appeared in the person of Chas. Darwin.

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in "The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer," Gerard, P. 150.

The subjective standard of pleasurable feeling, involving the calculus of pleasure and pain, in its ultimate analysis is open to all the criticism of the Utilitarian standard of happiness. This is most plainly seen in comparing Mill's statement that if life had any value at all, happiness was its one end—"the test of all conduct"—with the subsequent statement that this end was to be attained "by fixing the mind on some object other than one's own happiness, on the happiness of others, the improvement of mankind." Instead of happiness for a standard there results a standard for happiness. By substituting "common good" for "general happiness," the standard is not defined: it is not differentiated from pleasure in the manifold. This principle of valuation as analyzed by its most famous advocate, J. S. Mill, results in an antithesis to the premises, viz., that the highest virtue that can be found in man is the *sacrifice* of his happiness.

If social happiness is to be a test of morals, it must postulate a personal happiness of some hitherto unexplained kind. The negative condition of happiness—the ideal of social health—conditions allowing each to act as he desires, interpreted means only that by state or other mutually recognized power conditions should be fixed so that individuals may proceed by agreement to express and secure their own activities. May it not be that such a foundation guarantees individual license, that such a pedestal supports "either an Athene or a Priapus"?

Thus in the synthetic philosophy of Spencer, there is no clue to the nature of the implied ascending tendency in transformism. Progress remains unexplained. At the same time the distinctively mechanical interpretation is not unreservedly admitted. An unknowable reality, according to Spencer, manifests itself alike in the material and mental domain. This suppositious unknowable is sometimes termed force, the term itself revealing the materialistic nature of the conception. There is no adequate metaphysical interpretation of the principle of control, *no standard recognized as determining values*. There is an essentially dualistic basis, however, evident throughout the system.

These conclusions are forced on the reader in attempting to discover any full explanation of inorganic evolution. The conflict of integrating and disintegrating forces is not a solution, but a description of an imaginary process. There is confessedly no attempt to account for the first appearance of life, or later on of mental life, no reason is found for the manifestation of the

unknowable in time, nor for its manifestation in a material world before it appears as mind or consciousness. Nor does the theory that innate intuitions are a racial inheritance explain their presence in the most remote antecedent. The *a priori* element in mental activity is not thereby accounted for.

Finally, his principle applied in the ethical field is contradictory in its two standards: the subjective one of a calculus of pleasurable feelings, and the objective one of fullness of life for all. The contribution to previous Utilitarianism of this biological thesis that development has brought about harmony between pleasure and progress, not only fails to solve the Utilitarian difficulty of reconciling individual interests and social good, but the thesis is itself challenged by other evolutionists, notably Huxley. Its failure to solve the difficulty is in the fact that the necessary conditions of progress imply a lack of the asserted harmony. On the other hand, Huxley denies vigorously the harmony of the cosmic and ethical process. The principle of the survival of the fittest does not at all imply the survival of the ethically best. Huxley would find the ethical standard in the moral ideals of men, "Its principle is not that of survival of the fittest but that of fitting as many as possible to survive. The duty of man is not to conform to the cosmic process, but to combat it."

Thomas H. Green's Theory — Neo-Hegelian

One of the strongest opponents of the conception of the universe as a purely mechanical process, is T. H. Green. He might be termed a Neo-Hegelian in his fundamental assumption, which identifies the self—"the single, active, self-conscious principle with the universal or divine self-consciousness, the one eternal, divine subject to which the universe is relative. Hence consciousness has a double character, unity and manifold: as a unity it is eternal, all-conditioning, an end realizing itself in and through the manifold; as manifold it is subject to change, conditioned, and is a means to an end. The eternal consciousness is manifested in the individual in the forecasting idea." "In virtue of this definite principle in him, man has definite capabilities the realization of which, since in it alone can he satisfy himself, forms his true good."¹⁵⁹ The idea of a possible better state of himself,

¹⁵⁹ Green, *Prolegomena of Ethics*.

consisting in a further realization of his capabilities, has been the moralizing agent in human life: it has yielded *our moral standards*, loyalty to which, itself a product of the same idea, is the condition of goodness in the individual."¹⁰⁰

The application of the principle to the interpretation of natural phenomena is explained as the "consciousness of possibilities in ourselves unrealized but constantly in process of realization that alone enables us to read the idea of development into what we observe of natural life and to conceive that there must be such a thing as a plan of the world." Although viewing the ultimate standard of worth as personal worth, in which all other values are relative to value *for*, *of*, or *in* a person, the common or social good is conceived as altogether in harmony. "Society could not exist without this recognition of each individual as an end in himself: Persons are interested in each other as persons in so far as each, being aware that another presents his own self-satisfaction to himself as an object, finds satisfaction for himself in procuring or witnessing the self-satisfaction of the other."

This consciousness of a possible better state of himself as absolutely desirable, will yield a recognition of rules requiring something to be done regardless of inclination. "It is a consciousness of the possibility of an action in which no desire shall be gratified but the desire excited by the idea of the act itself, as of something absolutely desirable in the sense that in it the man does *the best that is in him to do*."

The resemblance of Green's principle to the Categorical Imperative is readily seen. The particular duties which it enjoins will include at least those that in the hitherto experience of men have made for progress in the fulfilment of men's capabilities.

But Green denies emphatically the contention of contemporaneous evolutionary theorists, that this principle even as manifested in the lower level of civilization is evolved from or is a product of feeling of animal origin. "Unless the fragmentary indications obtainable of a primitive humanity can be interpreted as expressing a consciousness in germ or principle the same as ours, we have no clue to their significance at all."¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, Compare Royce, *Philosophy of Loyalty*, 1908.

¹⁰¹ Green, *Prolegomena of Ethics*, Page 211. Green's exposition is given in his own words as far as the limits of the paper allow.

At the same time Green concedes without question the interdependence in manifestations of his principle, of the idea and the purely animal feelings. As an example of this is cited man's provision for the wants of his family. This must have rested upon the projection of himself in thought into the future, as the subject of a possibly permanent satisfaction to be formed in the satisfaction of the wants of the family with which he identifies himself. "This power of coming to be what he is not through a society in which he lives a permanent life, is in promise and potency an interest in the bettering of mankind, in the realization of its capabilities or the fulfilment of its vocation conceived as an absolutely desirable end." The idea of the good according to this view is an idea that gradually creates its own filling:¹⁶² *the idea* must have place before the authority of the law or custom can have any meaning for the individual.

The gradual spiritualization of the idea of true good exhibits itself in the accepted standards of virtue and in the duties which the candid conscience recognizes.

The real value of virtue according to this theory arises from a clear conception of the end to which it is directed as a *character* not a good fortune, as a fulfilment of human capabilities from within, as a *function* not a possession. "Thus both the practice of virtue and the current standard of virtue, which on the one hand presupposes the practice and on the other hand reacts and sustains it, have a history corresponding to the gradual development and determination of the idea of what social good consists in."

Shortcomings arise from the impossibility of envisaging or of exhaustively defining the good which it presupposes, inseparable from the very nature of morality, as an effort not an attainment, a progressive construction of what should be, not an enjoyment of what is, governed not by *sight* but by *faith*.

¹⁶² Ibid. Page 259.

CHAPTER IV

SECTION I

THE STANDARD FUNCTIONING IN NATIONAL CRISES: INFLUENCE UPON EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

The Chinese cycle of development bridges the crises on which other civilizations wrecked, by a titanic grasp of its social tendencies. This wresting from all its preceding civilization of elements making for social stability, and conserving them in a national classic, was an unique instance in history. The decision that this selected content was to remain intact was forced as final, and a system of education was devised that would make deviation from this standard impossible. Social progress was sacrificed to social stability. Four thousand years of continued existence as a nation where all values were determined by an unchanging standard has revealed to modern students the adequacy of an educational system for the perpetuation of a definitely conceived plan of national life.

It also affords a study of the influence of a purely secular standard. Confucianism contains no reference to a deity or to a future life. It is an idealization of those forces which man's experience through centuries of trial had found contributing to social welfare. As such it bears close study in the light of modern effort to isolate and conserve those tendencies conceived by social engineers as the product of society's best expression. China affords an example of a fixed standard which, through an ordered system of examination excluding all possibility of re-interpretation or adaptation of that standard, has absolutely controlled the destinies of a many-million-souled nation for thousands of years.¹

India

In strikingly contrasted manner India through another cycle of development testifies to the same fact — a nation's tacit recognition of defeat to express itself on progressively higher levels. The crisis must have been reached after centuries of striving

¹ Recent developments in China are prophetic of general upheaval.

when final recourse was made to the peace suggested by a philosophy of annihilation—of the individual's ultimate absorption into the one all-pervading principle of the universe.

Both the Chinese and the Hindoo conceptions produce the inevitable result, complete suppression of the individual. In the Chinese conception this is accomplished by completely ignoring the religious or spiritual in the universe, and in the Indian conception, by regarding man as but the transient mode of the Universal Spirit. Consistently with his moral aim of absorption, extinction, endless felicity, the Hindoo educated for this end. His education began and ended with his philosophy of Quietism. This Quietism has effectively resisted all efforts of Europeans to arouse any endeavor for economic or social progress.

In these oldest of civilizations, modern man may see partial manifestations at least of two plainly discernible tendencies of present-day civilization: one the minimizing almost to complete neglect of the spiritual needs of man by the modern sociologist; the other the adoption of various forms of Eastern mysticism by those whose spiritual needs are demanding expression. This last carries with it disregard of scientific measures for the improvement of man's worldly condition.

Greece

The crisis in the Greek cycle of development led to the recognition of the individual's natural disposition, the constitution of his impulses, the so-called law of Nature, as the *supreme law of action*. This standard, deification of man's own powers, measured all values in the Sophist's scheme of education. This spirit of Greek thought has its counterpart in the modern pragmatic school. "Protagoras again" is a criticism of this philosophy. Enough of the theory of Protagoras has been preserved to us to afford a distinct parallel. To offset the intrinsic individualism of the theory, Protagoras recognizes primary ethical feelings which impel men toward the formation of permanent unions for mutual preservation. Likewise in the modern theory man's essentially social nature is regarded as the basis for solidarity. The relativity of truth in both systems gives that flux of values that both to the conservative and to the idealistic reformer seem so disastrous to that social stability that is necessary to any permanent progress.

While the great theorists were endeavoring to put what had been custom morality upon a scientific basis, to give a *rational* sanction to what had been received unquestionably, Greece fell because her people had no standard but personal gratification. *The Sophist teaching which had been supposed by certain writers to have hastened the downfall of Greece, was nothing but the expression of the conditions of the times—a response to the demand of the age.* It seems incontrovertible that the theories of these self-constituted teachers of the Athenian youth challenged the genius of the Greek philosophers. It was only by accepting the thesis “man is the measure of all things” and pursuing it into all its implications, that Socrates was able theoretically to restore authority to the law, legal and ethical.²

The Stoic conception of *law* so firmly gripped the iron statesmen of Republican Rome, that they were never able to give the sanction of public endorsement to a system of education. *Greek teachers imbued with the ideas of the Sophist, so out of harmony with the Roman reverence for law, made education under them sufficiently undesirable as to preclude any National System of Education.* From the vigorous protest of Cato to the well-known meditation of Marcus Aurelius, Roman history reveals the *clash of underlying principles.* The practical-minded Roman seemed to lack power to generate a national culture of his own to form the content of an educational system. His awe of the towering genius of Greece made him accept Greek ideas, and content himself with providing a mode for the transference of these ideas. These modes or institutions are the channels through which Greek civilization reached succeeding ages, but the exotic ideas were never themselves naturalized. The conviction is forced that Roman genius should have developed its own mode of experiencing life. The Stoic recognition of a law-abiding universe, and of man's potentiality to ascertain these laws should have led naturally to the search for these laws. In its stead, the genius of the Roman wasted itself, so far as its schools were concerned, in reducing Greek letters to *law*.

² For further development of this idea, see Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, P. 77.

Early Christian Era

The Christian Apologists reversed the attitude of the Roman, and seizing every available channel of communication in the form of existing philosophies and other institutions, used them for the transmission of the Christian ideal. This is most clearly seen in the Alexandrian Schools. Justin, Clement, and Origen illustrate it best. "We are permitted when we go out of Egypt to carry with us the riches of the Egyptians to adorn the tabernacles." *All the learning of the Greek, all the eloquence of the Roman were brought into the service of Christian instruction.*

That all pagan religions and philosophies of themselves were powerless to effect any moral improvement in the masses, had been abundantly demonstrated. That Aristotle was aware of this limitation is evident in the following: "Now if arguments and theories were able to make people good they would be entitled to receive high and great awards, and it is with theories that we would have to provide ourselves. But the truth apparently is that though they are strong enough to encourage and stimulate young men of liberal minds, though they are able to inspire with goodness a character that is naturally noble and sincerely loves the beautiful, they are incapable of converting the mass of men to goodness and beauty of character."

The limitation of all philosophical attempts to furnish a moral sanction was that the conception reached could be grasped only by those innately noble. All such conceptions furnished no moral standard for the masses. Plato's theory necessitated a succession of sages who by power of intellect were fitted to determine the relations of the individual and society.

It was the contribution of Christianity *that a standard was furnished to all alike.* The idea of love and charity, latent in all men, was called into active existence by the conception of a God-made man who had suffered death for the redemption of all mankind. His life and His teachings as embodied in that earthly life furnished a standard intelligible to all the redeemed.³ Its acceptance as the guide of life depended upon that *free-will* and its steersman the intellect the possession of which was man's likeness to God. Through the doctrine of the soul endowed with understanding and free-will, the humblest grasped the essence of

³ The theme of Browning's *Saul* is a most exalted expression of this thought.

the idea reached by the Stoic philosopher: that man possessed within him a part of the divine that enabled him, if so he willed, to be in harmony with the eternal order of the universe.⁴

The Christian idea of grace prevented the deification of self that characterized the later Stoics. Man is free to act as he pleases — with or without the desire to put himself in harmony with the Divine Will. He is a free agent in any event. The Divine Will remains unchanged. On the one hand he may repudiate all need of help: on the other he may humbly seek Divine Grace to enlighten the intellect and to impel or reinforce the will. To the Christian there is no evil except that wrought by the alienation of the individual will from the Divine. The Creator has supplied, by means of revealed law, what He has left imperfect in the means of discovering truth through unaided reason. Not that the ultimate impossibility of arriving at truth through reason is implied, but taking the bulk of mankind, there seems sufficient grounds for believing that without revelation they have not a sufficiently easy, sure, and universally available means of keeping constantly in mind how they stand related to life, death, and after death. Reason points to the likelihood of a revelation. Christ came to *fulfil* the law, hence the law of Moses contains potentially what the Sermon on the Mount reveals and interprets and transfigures by Divine Love. *Go ye and teach all nations*. There is no question of *what* to teach. History furnishes no parallel of the unbounded zeal of those possessed with the spirit to fulfil the Will of the Master. No motive has ever equalled the loftiness of this. It inspired the pinnacle of human achievement in art. It belongs to the future to transcend it.

SECTION II

SUPPLEMENTARY CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION

"All that we *know* through experimentation and from observation of the earliest material cell and the life that animates it is, not that they are one and the same thing, but that they are concomitants; all that can be said, through experience or observation, of the advanced material organisms and an advanced state of

* * * in order that man, himself created as we are told in the image of his Creator, might in a lesser degree, through the power working within him, become a creator also, might link his individuality with the Father individuality behind all things." *North American Review*, V. CXCVIII. P. 817.

life is, not that they are one and the same thing, but that they, too, are concomitants; and all that can be said of man, from any standpoint of experience or observation, is that, with him, his physical and soul life are concomitants. But whether the concomitancy of the material cell with the life that animates it, and the concomitancy of the physical body of man with the soul that inhabits it, are due to life having its origin in the cell, and the soul having its origin in the physical body, or whether life and soul are, in the last analysis, entities separate from the cell and body,—the real entities of the universe, utilizing these material forms as instruments only, as we utilize the telephone transmitter and receiver as instruments only, are, at most, deductions only, not facts scientifically established — *deductions that any school of belief may either accept or reject without rejecting any part of the array of facts that actual observation and experience have established.*"⁵

Criticism and interpretation of the preceding chapters purposes to find in all the systems of philosophy the tacit recognition of a determining principle, a controlling essence. This recognition of the presence of such a principle is comparable to the developing consciousness of self in the individual. That which makes the individual what he is, is this self which may have acted for a space of years without having become conscious of its existence. Vague consciousness of the presence of a personality has accompanied the use of *I, me, my, mine*, from infancy, but the realization of this personality as a controlling factor in all activity comes much later, and then with varying degrees of clearness in different individuals. This consciousness of self as a thinking, willing, acting self is parallel to the recognition in humanity's span of existence of a controlling essence — that which shapes the destinies of the universe. The process becoming conscious of itself proves that there is that within it that transcends it. This immanent and transcendent essence is what we have viewed in the preceding chapters as the *standard*.

The standard thus conceived is intelligible to man through the modes of its workings. Viewed through history there is discernible through all the confusion of man's striving, a principle of reality, unfolding itself on constantly higher levels, in pro-

⁵ A Layman's View. Peter S. Grosscup. *North American Review*, 1908. P. 814.

portion as man is active in seeking. The revealed Law of the Hebrew has within it implicit, what is progressively made explicit. The Divine essence of this revelation is manifest to succeeding generations in that *it contained nothing that procrastinated the progress of the people to whom it was given.*

It may be claimed that this statement is an interpretation of pragmatism; if so, it but confirms the position taken that the core of reality in man's historic experience has in embryo the truth necessary to man's continuous development.

This conception of the standard is latent in Aristotle's theory that everything in the universe is striving for realization. This *becoming* is the process in which potentiality is transformed continually into activity. From the lowest types of inorganic life through the vegetative and animal world, through the varying degrees of man's potentiality, this force is at work. Its highest manifestation is in man's rational life, its highest in speculative thinking. To the extent that reason enters into the control of sensible nature is there at once a manifestation and a promise of absorption or contemplation of Divine Life, immortality. The world of sense thereby becomes a law-revealing means of man's development.

Thus in Jewish conceptions the standard is objectified by Revelation as Divine Law; in Plato it is the Idea of the Good, which in its differentiations or modes of functioning, *forms* the universe; in Aristotle it is the *Nature* of all existences that is the *telos*.

The Stoic interpretation of the Laws of Nature as the manifestation of the World-thought, together with the recognition of man, the microcosmos, as having within him the means of putting himself into harmony with the world order, needs no further elucidation to show its essential identity with the conceptions already advanced. As interpreted by Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, its kinship is undisputed.

The eclectic nature of the Alexandrian philosophy makes it easy to recognize in the different systems current during the Patristic age, the constant factors. In the philosophy of Justin, Clement, Irenaeus, and Origen, is most clearly seen that consciousness of a standard that has determined as truth the knowledge of the ancients. This as viewed by them is the Divine Logos. Revelation is the activity of the Logos, discernible as rationality in the entire race, as the Law of Moses among the Jewish people, and as the law of love and freedom through the Logos Incarnate.

Things created are the ectypes, the outward expression of the ideas constituting the Divine Logos. The relation of this thought to Spinoza's theory is evident. The power that gives form to matter, that guides and controls the course of the universe is a manifestation of the Logos. As thus viewed, the Logos, as the God within the world, is the dwelling place of the God without the world. Add to this conception that of Plotinus that all that symbolizes in sensuous or material form the laws or reasons eternally active in the world has a right to rank as beautiful, and there results in essence a theory of the universe.

In the philosophy of the patristic period, there is a strong infusion of Eastern philosophy that tends to give that pantheistic conception of the universe so destructive, when consistently developed, to human endeavor.

Through Abelard's ethics of intention following upon John of Salisbury's desire to "find his way in the world in which man has to live," there is a meeting ground of Augustinian principles and of the essential principles of the English School of philosophers or psychologists. However, as has been stated, this identification of the content of the moral law with the choice of Divine Will, requires alike in Plato, Aristotle, Origen, Augustine, John of Salisbury, and Abelard, sustenance from the Divine. This sustenance is essentially the same whether viewed as grace, illumination, revelation, or enlightenment. This Divine Principle variously conceived, is the ultimate standard.

Reasons for the resuscitation of the controversy over universals need not be restated.⁶ Nor need there any longer be that attitude toward Mediaeval philosophy that has waved it aside as a thing of the past. The least attempt like a careful reading of these philosophers, forces a realization at once of the worth and soundness of many of the ideas advanced. There seems validity in the contention that conceding at once that "the soul" does not possess innate conceptions, and that its thinking rests in a basis of sensuous perceptions and of representative images, still the intellect has the unique function of abstracting *forms* from these representative images. Not altogether in the Platonic sense, but in a sense that does not challenge so severely

⁶ See p. 57, Chap. III.

our acceptance, does *the one* in this theory, exist *beside* the *many*. In the elaboration of this theory, there seems to be at once a summary of the persistent factors in previous theories, and at the same time an anticipation of emerging factors in succeeding theories.⁷ The essence of the theory as it is directly related to the subject under discussion in this paper, is: The *Nature* of the intelligent is to grasp the intelligible. Intelligence is conversant with *natures* which with *relations* are eternal. Because of the theory that God commands the Good because it is *good*, the ultimate standard of truth is at the same time the ultimate standard of the good. This theory conceives various ways of functioning of the Ultimate Standard of Divine Wisdom by which men are aided to the "progressive assimilation to God by the voluntary appropriation of his gifts." This is the purpose of life: this is man's *Good*. Good is understood therefore to mean that which satisfies man's needs and desires if these are only sufficiently enlightened. Though a medium is provided through the modes of functioning of the Logos, by which man can attain to his end, it is not assumed that man cannot through his reason arrive at the same conception as that revealed by God. The way of God in history would include all those spiritual possessions of the race, preserved because owing to the degree of universality in them, consequently the degree of truth, they have accelerated the progress of mankind. Here would be included *idea, will, judgment, conscience*, in the individual; and *codes of conduct, commandments, authority, institutions, idealized types of men, laws of nature, the permanent works of art*.

It is in place to point out the inclusive nature of this theory. The teleology of Jewish revelation, the theory of the *one beside the many*, as a modification of Plato, the conception of development bridging the worlds of sense and spirit as Aristotelian, the recognition of an actuating principle of energy referred to the Divine essence paralleling Origen, the anticipation of Kant in the following: The reason why our understanding cannot understand many things together in one act is because in the act of understanding, the mind becomes one with the object understood;

⁷ See pp. 57 ff, Chap. III.

and of Hegel in the progressive assimilation of man to God by the voluntary appropriation of his gifts, all are instances of the comprehensive nature of this philosophy.

The Standard as a Way in History

In this historical survey of what has constituted the controlling principle of man's activity, the attempt has been to give a sympathetic interpretation. This controlling principle, or standard determining values, has been variously conceived in the different ages. The study at hand has warranted the deduction that there have been constant factors or elements in the conceptions. These persistent constituents of the principle appear to be the result of the operation of *selection*. They seem to be man's seal of approval upon what has furthered his progress. Viewed in this light the question forces itself, *Should not an individual, before he presumes to set his own standard, at least investigate those that have stood the test of ages?*

It is evident that social activities have been shaped by the ends or ideals dominating society. From the account given of these ideals or standards it remains to abstract those ideals that have been appropriated by succeeding civilization and have, by shaping the conduct of the invading barbarian tribes, survived into modern times. There seems to be insufficient warrant for the supposition that the life of these tribes before they encountered the ancient civilization had developed ideals that controlled to an appreciable extent their life from that time on. "They furnished the practical strength with which to appropriate the contributions which the other peoples had exhausted themselves in making."⁸ These contributions of antiquity had passed into the custody of the church. They were the spiritual possessions of most worth from the Israelitish, Greek, and Roman social life.

Contribution from Israel

The prophetic movement through Isaiah and Jeremiah had shown the possibility of worship of Jehovah freed from the limitations of special time, place, and form. This conception was necessary to hold the people together during their exile or dispersion. The ethical impulse was freed. While the prophets

⁸ Forrest, Development of Western Civilization, 1908. P. 2.

emphasized the right disposition and stated the idea of One God in its essence, while the ethical impulse was freed by conceiving it to be the spring to all action, it failed to provide means for the expression of the universal principle thus set forth. It gave no working formula for the guidance of life.⁹ This had to be entrusted to the priestly class. These finding it necessary to embody the ideal of the prophets, so transformed the old religious habits that the priests became associated with the maintenance of peculiar relations with God. "Till then no one had dreamed of a fellowship of faith dis-associated from all national forms." "It was the first step in the emancipation of spiritual religion from the forms of political life." It was thus only that a *single unified principle was asserted — the unity of all life in relation with God — in harmony with his will.*

But, although much of the old ceremonial was thus eliminated, still the conception remained that God manifested Himself in a particular way to the chosen people. This was evidently felt as a contradiction as there seems to have been held by their leaders a conviction that it was incumbent upon them to preserve the real values Israel had attained by the embodying ceremonial, until such a time as God should more fully manifest Himself. This last idea was satisfied in the prophecies of the Messiah. In Christ's teaching were reconciled the contribution of the prophets and that of the priests. "On the prophetic side Jesus held that the obedience to God was a state of the will and did not consist in external acts. If the moral life was not only within, but consisted in a *willingness* of the soul rather than an *understanding*, every individual could realize it. On the priestly side Jesus developed the conception of the Kingdom of Heaven, the community within which the right attitude, faith, could find expression. The truth underlying the priestly movement was that the moral motive must find expression. It was the social principle — *the consciousness of the necessity of organic, institutional expression of the moral impulse* — for which the priestly movement had stood; while the prophetic movement had stood for the principle of individuality. Jesus made the disposition in and through a universal society reciprocally necessary and thus gave an ultimate ethical statement."¹⁰

⁹ Forrest. *Ibid.* P. 18.

¹⁰ Dewey, unpublished lectures on the Evolution of Morality, quoted in the Development of Western Civilization. Forrest. P. 21.

The Contribution from Greece

The highly imaginative Greeks in an early stage of their own life as a people appropriated the technical skill of the advanced civilizations with which they came in contact. The freeing of the technique from the cumbrous customs of the older civilizations was due to the fact that the sacredness of these latter had no meaning to the foreigner. Thus the progress of a people was "short-cutted" by adapting technical processes which were the product of ages of selection and elimination in the older civilizations, to the expression of highly idealized concepts. "They formed the habit of *separating* meaning from *existence* and of *finding reality in the meaning* rather than *the existence*. With them every experience came to have an eternal value, a value *lasting after the experience had gone*." This ability to see reality in the meaning resulted in the portrayal or execution of types as expressions of this meaning. It was thus that the Greeks chiseled *ideals*, and not particular existences.

This presence of universality made the products of their skill, art. *This tendency to objectify types is the basis of Plato's theory of ideas, which are really archetypes* as they were called by later philosophers.

Aristotle worked out from these conceptions of Plato a system of intellectual categories, which were used by later society as standards to measure life values. The adoption of the Aristotelian system by the church as an intellectual mode, is easily accounted for, when it is seen that through this method of Hellenic genius, Aristotle reached *the idea of a soul of the universe — a rational logos*. As Hebrew monotheism was ethical, the Greek monotheism was intellectual, and supplied the lack in the former. Their coalescence formed the Christian doctrine.

Thus the contribution of the Greek was one of intellect. "By generalizing experience and giving the generalization typical form, the Greeks made possible the conception of standards by which experience could be judged."¹¹ That which was abstracted in Greek thought *was the end of all particular ends*. They reached a conception of an absolute good — the idea of the good — that society as a whole was pursuing. Together with this idea was the parallel conception of a free reason, capable of knowing the

¹¹ Forrest, Development of Western Civilization. P. 52.

end and realizing it. This abstraction of social values from the conditions that produced them, gave the world standards appropriated in turn by the Roman Empire, and Christian religion.

The Contribution from Rome

Rome tried to objectify the Greek conceptions of society in institutions. The ideal of a society all serving common ends, the Romans tried to realize. The greatest achievement was the universal law, which as a framework of the institutional life of society became a pattern for the nations of Europe.

The church became the administrator of these great contributions from antiquity. The Hebrews had been able to free the *ethical impulses* from the old social habits, and the Greeks had freed the idea of the *end* of life from the particular life activities. Rome's attempt to realize Greek ideals furnished the legal machinery by which society was held together until the freed ethical impulse could form into new habits having higher social ends.¹² It was not until the disintegration of the Roman Empire that its contribution of institutional machinery passed as an inheritance into the estate of the past already in possession of the church.

Viewed in perspective the accumulated intrinsic worth of the inheritance assumes proportions unrealized by preceding centuries. The task of administering so valuable an inheritance, assumes also more and more its just proportions. The realization of the worth of the inheritance and of the magnitude of the task of conceiving and using means by which barbarian hordes could appreciate and appropriate its values and technique, brings the modern student into sympathetic relations with those who assumed the responsibility. *It is the reflective consciousness of the race turning upon its past, and discovering in its only partially conscious previous action the essence of its progressive development.* The claim of inspiration is weighed in the light of the seemingly *supernatural selection* of means, that has secured the progressive appropriation of the inheritance and at the same time has allowed the timely manifestation of latent individual initiative.

The misinterpretation of this work of the church is largely due to the fact that the modes of interpreting some aspect of the

¹² See Justin's exposition of this idea. Ch. III.

one all-ruling idea of God, are taken for the reality — the creed for the idea that transcends the limitations of any attempt to commensurately express it. The growth of the idea of God, which we may call the revelation of God, is continuous and commensurate with human progress.¹⁸

To enter sympathetically into the life of the Christian Church is to view an attempt to make a sketch plan of life or human welfare for those who were to inherit with the lands of Western Europe, all the spiritual possessions, ethical, intellectual, and aesthetic of the dominant races of antiquity. To a degree hard at present to appreciate, every portion of experience was controlled by the idea of God. The cathedrals are symbols of the nature of the control of this idea. Dante's *Divine Comedy* testifies to its inspiration. The travail of the "spirit bred cities instead of speech."

Simply to tell men what is virtue and to extol its beauty is insufficient. Something more than theory is necessary if the characters of nations are to be moulded, and inveterate vices eradicated. "The infirmity of human nature requires visible signs in which to rest." Herein the symbolisation and ritual of the Christian religion find their place.

The different modes through which the Will of the Creator, the controlling Intelligence of the Universe, has manifested itself to man's comprehension or understanding, may be termed the Way of God in history. These different modes form a sort of hierarchy of standards,—tangible criterions for the measurement of all conduct. Misconception has often arisen from mistaking one of the "standards" or modes of experiencing for the life-giving source of these, the ultimate standard of all values. Authority, sanction, law, institutions, all forms of spiritual culture are ways by which the controlling essence of all becomes a means of measuring life values.

The last centuries have been possessed almost to exclusion of all else by the idea of man's control of nature's forces. Man in endeavoring to control meets evidence of a controlling principle in the universe.

¹⁸ Forrest, *Development of Western Civilization*. P. 66.

The Standard as the Way of Nature

Undoubtedly the reign of law in nature is uninterrupted, but in that law purpose is interwoven as the controlling element; just as the hand of every printer that sets up type for a new edition of the Iliad is governed by the mind of Homer. "To say that Purpose rules every detail in the making or development of the universe, does not by any means signify that it interferes at every step with the laws of Nature. Rather *these laws are the expression of Purpose*, its machinery to secure its designed result." This assumption does not preclude such theories as those of Huxley's cosmic nebula — so constituted that the actual world was destined to issue from it as an oak from an acorn. While it seems inconceivable that such a piece of mechanism should originate without an intelligence to design it, it is in line with reason to suppose that the intelligence might have exhibited itself once for all at the first beginning. Tyndall,¹⁴ Huxley, a long line of scientists can be cited who testify to the inevitableness of the assumption of a determining force or purpose, in the universe. Lord Kelvin¹⁵ says, "I cannot say with regard to the origin or life, science neither affirms nor denies creative power. Science positively affirms creating and directive power, which she compels us to accept as an article of belief."

While science has discovered *relations* in nature, to which has been given the name of laws, there has been no real explanation of their existence. They are expressions of what man calls Mind or Intelligence; Man knows as efficient cause his own intelligence and will; hence he views as cause of the ordered relations of nature Intelligence and Will. It is the highest and noblest conception within his reach. Being man he can speak only in human terms of what is superhuman. Limited as he is by the conditions of his nature he can find no mode of expression except such as is based upon sensible experience. Hence while he can convince himself by rational inference of the existence and to some extent the character of what is beyond sense, he can frame no description of it except so far as he is able to draw upon the phenomena of the external world. It seems perfectly consistent to attribute in the highest degree, viz., infinity, *all possible excel-*

¹⁴ Belfast Address.

¹⁵ Nineteenth Century, June 1903.

lence to the source of all. To repeat, this acceptance of a Supreme Intelligence can alone satisfy our intellectual need of causation; while on the other hand, "the nature of this Being as necessarily beyond the scope of our senses, can be known to us only indirectly through the effects of which He is the cause."

"Of this Supreme Being, in a word, of God, to whom all infinitude is seen to belong, man has thus conceived an idea, which though indirect is sound, and which necessarily follows from what he observes. In the same manner, he has formed another idea, equally solid, namely of the boundless power of this Being, suggested by the consideration of his works. The will of God is everywhere expressed, by the laws of nature, since these laws originate from Him."

Thus the laws of nature are the means through which the Author of nature provides for all that is to be operated by the forces He has instituted.

In the psychical world as in the physical, the real *nature* of the ego, must be learned through its effects. In this sense, all investigations of the psycho-physical order, all endeavor to record exactly the responses to stimuli, are of real worth. It is through the affections of the body that the nature of the *person* reveals itself. Modern writings show in some cases a tendency to confound the *ego* with states of the *ego*. Such theories picture the *ego* as a result. One who watches an infant is forced by his observations to regard him from birth as a person, before there is any opportunity for a coördination of elements to take place and constitute a distinct personality. From all that can be definitely known, through experiment and observation, the *ego* is a cause not a result. It seems strange after reading and weighing explanations of the self to see to what extremes theory goes, in order to avoid admitting the existence of a knowing, willing self.

There is less challenge to reason in this presupposition than in any other. *This knowing, feeling, willing self is a spiritual reality* in that it has a permanent life distinguishable from the changes in the physical organism with which it is (in whatever way) connected. The acts of the individual are due to the nature or character of the self—a comparing, distinguishing self. For any conception of morality, this presupposition is a necessity. "The general principle of the unity and expansion of the self must be presupposed as in inductive inference general principles

of organic interconnection in parts of living things are presupposed.”¹⁸

The presence of a controlling principle in the universe, which man interprets as Supreme Intelligence we have just seen. This belief in the existence of an Eternal Consciousness, a mind whose thoughts are the standard of truth not only in morality but in all other existences as well, is a necessary postulate not only in ethics but in all knowledge. The idea of morality of which conscience is the source, is unintelligible in isolation from the knowledge of the existence of a knowing, feeling, willing self; other knowing, feeling, willing selves; of a world by which these selves are enabled to realize their potentialities, and which they can partially control to that end.

These Concepts Viewed in Relation to Pragmatism

There is no inherent contradiction between the two statements that the element of reality which constitutes the standard must involve the elements of universality and permanence—and the statement of the pragmatist that the content of consciousness is real so long as the act resulting from it is adequate in adaptation to other contents. The pragmatist, in the analysis of the total activity of judgment, confines his investigations to the process. The question of *reality per se* does not enter into this consideration, but simply *reality as entering* into the reflective situation. This involves a *change* in something, of something no matter how much permanence is involved in *something*. Reality is concerned with the eternal *relations* and natures of things. A relation between certain contents of consciousness may bring adequate results in one case and be termed real because of the adequacy. The same *apparent* relation between these contents of consciousness may cause action that results disastrously and be termed therefore unreal. Well and good — but this very adequacy in one situation and inadequacy in another is a report of a new element which has entered into the conditions of the problem. The relation termed real may be *essentially* so, hence permanently so, and in further analysis of the inadequate situation this fact becomes one of the data. The inadequacy, if successfully apprehended, becomes a means of discovering new relations which comprehend the *real* of the old situation.

¹⁸ Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, P. 300.

It is man's faith in the permanence and universality of natures and relations that ensures his constant endeavor to fathom these truths. The continual search for the real is also a recognition of the potentiality of him who seeks. It is just this power of identifying himself with that which is wider and higher than his individual being that makes morality possible to man. Herein lies the truth of pragmatism: it is eternally true that all search for truth is a practical activity with an ethical purpose.¹⁷ "The facts of the world are what they are: the real universe exposes our errors and makes them errors." There is in this striving of man an appeal to a conspectus of experience in which his is included. The real world is a world whose stuff is of the nature of experience, whose structure meets, validates, and gives warrant to our active deeds and whose whole nature is such that it can be interpreted in terms of ideas, propositions, and conscious meanings while in turn it gives to our fragmentary ideas and to our conscious life whatever connected meaning they possess. "My loyal search for truth insures the fact that I am in significant unity with the world's conscious life."

The part of pragmatism out of harmony with our conception of the standard is that it "lives by selling its goods for present cash in the temple of its cause." Loyalty to the standard conceived in its aspect of harmonious relations, exacts a service in a cause possibly just now lost—"lost because the mere now is too poor a vehicle for the presentation of that ideal unity of life of which every form of loyalty is in quest. Humanity's most precious spiritual treasures are the result of loyalty that includes suffering." Man's tribute at all times in all ages to this sacrifice of self in service to a cause is itself one of the constant factors that indicate the truth of the ideal.

"Loyalty as a devotion to a cause which unifies many human lives is profoundly religious in its spirit. For man viewed merely as natural phenomena are many and mutually conflicting creatures. Loyalty aims at their unity and such unity is always something that has a supernatural meaning. To worship a divine power in a *genuinely ethical spirit* is always to serve a cause which is always in the human sense social—the cause of the state, or of the church or of humanity; which loyalty to serve causes is to aim to give human life a supernatural, an essentially divine meaning."

¹⁷ Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, P. 327 ff.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The Import of Self-activity

In the preceding chapters the idea that the life of knowledge is in self-consciousness has been repeatedly given. To understand the world at all, it is necessary to conceive a self-active mind. Before proceeding to discuss explicitly the educational implications of the preceding chapters, the import of self-activity will be discussed in such a way as to suggest the underlying principles of the educational process.

The Aristotelian conception of a *nature* realizing its end, may be paraphrased into "Mind is the way in which the unity of an organism displays itself." Aristotle's conception that the characteristic function of an organism is the end of its existence emphasises the means of reaching that end. It supports too the fundamental thesis that all judgments are necessarily moral judgments. "The ultimate good of all judgment is the determination of a course of conduct looking toward an end."¹ Further "the whole of consciousness in as far as it is the consciousness of a single world that shares the *reality of our waking self* may be regarded as a *continuous judgment* which qualifies our present feelings and surroundings by the knowledge of what is more remote in time and space."² Accordingly "the treatment of a content by abstraction as a spatial or numerical whole may be reabsorbed in a more concrete treatment of it as an organic, aesthetic, or moral whole."³ To further develop this idea of the *essential nature* of this self-activity, it is necessary to view it as constantly moving toward the establishing of relationships.

The individuality in capacity is a microcosm constantly "moulding itself like a process of crystallization according to its own affinities and cohesions."⁴ In theological language the soul is

¹ Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*. P. 241.

² and ³ Bosanquet, *Theory of Logic*. P. 91.

⁴ Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*.

the image of God, and as such is an activity⁵ constantly submitting itself to the *will* of the Creator. Ignoring any difference that may be read into the two statements, the point in question is the *identity* in the significance of both for the purpose in hand. This process of self-realization is not one requiring little if any effort. On the contrary, man in his immaturity is deprived biologically of the means that would make survival too easy. The means of survival become almost necessarily means of progress. Both are dependent on the discovery of relationships either in the environment or between himself and the environment. Man's "characteristic function" or nature is the capacity to discover these. Man's limitation, the impossibility of thinking anything in isolation is thereby a means of his progress. In association, in judgment, the meeting point of differences furnishes the true guide to the intellectual process.

The test of these discovered relationships is that of all reality, viz., the resistance of all efforts to destroy. The test the scientist applies in his laboratory is in essence one with that of the Mediaeval philosopher in his metaphysical research. Thus the law of the conservation of energy when once discovered challenges all efforts to destroy its manifestations: the *true nature* of the idea, e.g., *the circle*, or more profoundly the *self*, resists all efforts to destroy it. It seems impossible to think without establishing a perceived relation or testing its validity by means of those already established.

This perpetual establishing of relationship tends to give solidarity to the group grasping the relationship. The group are "motivated around the identical idea." The idea present in each is the identity in the different individuals that makes the group one in that particular. Each idea fully possessed by the individual is thus the motif or essence of solidarity. From this point of view each individual has the potentiality of a universal. To the degree that the individual really possesses ideas, does he possess means of identifying himself with his fellows. Each idea thus possessed is an energy in interaction with a like energy produced by the same idea in others. The sum-total of these inter-

⁵ A convincing modern treatment of this idea is found in an article entitled God, Man, and Immortality, written for the *N. A. Review* by Peter S. Grosscup, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals. *N. A. Review*, 1908. P. 811.

acting energies motived by the same idea form the institutions of society. An institution is a social habit, a purposeful activity.

A cross-section view of civilization reveals a web of these interrelated activities. Such a view must necessarily be bewildering. Here too lies the danger that the sociologist, in his eagerness to *do*, take the cross-section view, and thereby be forced to use an individualistic psychology, or a mechanical interpretation and ignore the sifted experience of the race in interpreting the present complexity. Civilization is a progressive elimination of waste — a freeing for higher activities. It is "the degree of physical freedom man has attained through his arts, inventions, and industries."⁶ When it is remembered that this attainment has been secured by substituting intellectual life for physical life, that this summarised achievement is the record of correspondence between the mind of man and the course of nature, it becomes necessary to consider in the light of its development, its *significance*. This significance is more nearly ascertained in its highest stage, but to see it all adequately its manifestation must be grasped as a stage of a *process realizing an end*. Such effort to determine the significance of human endeavor should reveal a core of reality — an identity through changing conditions that persists and challenges all effort to destroy it. There seems to be constantly emerging, established relationships which are reabsorbed to serve as means of testing the value of new judgments. This sifted experience of the race constitutes the social inheritance. Its nature is essentially spiritual as civilization in its essence is the substitution of intelligence for physical effort.

Nature of the Social Inheritance: Its Transmission

Viewed from one of its aspects, this social inheritance constitutes both the control by which social stability is made possible, and the appreciation of values which form the ideals that give direction to social activity. Interpreted in terms of what this dissertation has termed more or less exactly the standard, this social inheritance is the summary of all its manifestations in both history and nature so-called. The idea of this determining principle progressively giving meaning or significance to man's effort as he showed himself capable and worthy has formed the content

⁶ Tompkins, *The Psychology of Teaching*, P. 57.

of this study. Its way in history reveals all that constitutes both man's control and appreciation of his experience. It functions as law, authority, institutions, all forms of spiritual culture, knowledge, literature, art.

The transmission of this social inheritance is the work of education. As stated before the individual tends to be mastered by the complexity of the interrelated activities constituting society. Institutions or ways of transmitting the control and appreciation of these activities are part of the inheritance. The home, the school, the vocation, the state, the church, are among the great educational institutions by which this control and appreciation of life activity are furnished. None of these by the great law that everything should be viewed in its relation to the whole, can be satisfactorily considered in isolation. It is this seeing of things in proportion, that is urged upon modern thinkers. At the same time there is need of realizing the uniqueness of each of these institutions as a means of education or of social control. That this is variously conceived and poorly defined is seen in the tendency of each of these to encroach upon what has been regarded as the special field of activity of the other. This tendency indicates the need of some readjustment in the traditional activities conceived as the special function of each of these.⁷

Some attempt has been made to show that the policy of making the system of education termed the school a means of conserving the social order is almost as old as society itself. "The school as a form of institutional life is the special instrument devised by society for maintaining the *existing standard of civilization* by conferring upon the individual its spiritual possessions and thereby enabling him to become a bearer of the social purpose."⁸ It is a miniature community in which the individual is enabled to face society step by step and consequently tends to master it. It reduces complexity and diversity, selects more typical enduring values, omitting irrelevancies, and presents typical phases of highest community life. It becomes necessary for the school to generalize, or present a comprehensive social environment. By reflecting the upper levels of society the school should become

⁷ It is in this statement that the biological analogy of an institution as an organ is seen to be incorrect. Interchange and transfer of function is not possible for organs.

⁸ MacVannel, Dr. John A., *The College Course in the Principles of Education*, P. 36.

a mode of accelerating social progress. By "reflecting the ideal toward which the wider social life is struggling,"⁹ it becomes an instrument of social betterment.

To reflect the ideal it is necessary that those who are to translate the social inheritance into the experience of the child, should themselves embody in the highest degree possible that inheritance. It must be experience that is translated. The mere transference by means of language from mind to mind is not translation of experience. "The life of knowledge is in self-consciousness which systematically understands and you cannot have it cheaper. We know not as much as in our memory, but as much as we understand. . . . Knowledge differs from opinion in the degree in which as a living mind it has understood and organized its experience."¹⁰

Environment should be such that the self-activity of a child encounters crises that call for that interpretation of his experience, that will furnish at once control of the present, and also values for future emergencies. The alertness of the teacher should assist in bringing about such crises and at the critical moment introduce that part of race experience that can be assimilated best at that time. The rediscovery on the part of the child of these relations should revive that exhilaration that first accompanied the discovery in the past. This *attitude* should be a stimulus to further endeavor in the same line. If in reality there is a *sharing of experience*, there is an ever-growing feeling of freedom as something won in the process. It is in miniature that freeing for higher activities that the race has secured as compensation for all effort. Each experience so shared becomes, as we have shown, a means of solidarity in the school community. Thus an ideal society realizing the means of its solidarity is possible in the school as a social unit. A selected environment renders possible a study of the technique of social control. The fact that the environment is isolated must be constantly borne in mind. This consciousness of the relation of the school to other institutions, to society, will impel those in charge to make the connections wherever possible. *This borderland region of activity should be a constant medium of exchange of influences.*

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Bosanquet, *Essays and Addresses*. P. 196-197.

Interchange of Influences between Institutions for Educational Purposes

Several aspects of this feature must suggest themselves. It is here that the spirit and work of Pestalozzi should have its influence. To connect with life, seemed his main endeavor. If in endeavoring to do this, he and more especially his followers lost themselves in the way of doing this, it but illustrates our thesis that to prevent dissipating of energy there must be constantly some means of relating activities to some central motif or principle. The school as the supplement to the home was Pestalozzi's conception. While this may not be entirely correct, there is great need at present to define the specific function of each, and at the same time to point out the meeting point of their difference. There must be a constant stream of influence between the two: the direction will depend upon the relative levels.

The connection too with life *work* was another of Pestalozzi's ideas that he strove to work out. The relation of the school to the vocations is a burning question to-day. The greatest danger lies in viewing this relation in isolation from interrelated ends. It is necessary to see this movement in relation to the national ideal.

The connection of the school with the state is forcibly brought to mind by the industrial trend in educational lines. The almost general consensus of opinion that there should be a Minister of Education, that the present bureau should be made a department with an accompanying enlarged scope of activities, requires but the slightest direction to make it an actuality. There is much discussion in certain circles of a combined Ministry of Education, Labor and Health. Others are considering an independent Department of Labor, with a combined Department of Education and Health. The relation of the proposed Children's Bureau to these is another factor. Here again the historical phase is valuable for study. The advantages and defects of the Guilds of the later middle ages and their schools in their interrelations and in their relation to the municipality are aspects worthy of study. A comparative study of the administrative systems of Germany and France with a full appreciation of the conditions in each country would still reveal meeting points of difference that would afford valuable data for the control of school affairs. State intervention

in the control of the school as an instrument of social progress has never been more spectacular than at present. Emperor William has demonstrated that the relation is a vital one in politico-economic welfare, even when the stress is on the economic. In our own country it is forced on us that there should be an interchange of influences throughout the whole country by means of the centre. Such interrelating is the very life of the organization.

It remains to consider for a moment the connection of the school with the church. If compelled to state the most vital issue in current world educational thought, one would be forced to consider the relation of school to church as probably the one involving most thought. England is in the throes of a struggle to settle it. Germany has secured apparently at least a temporary adjustment. France has laid violent hands on the relation and severed all bonds at least legally. Our own country is wondering what adjustment to make to secure the ethical impulse it is missing in its life. Then, too, men's spiritual or intellectual energies have been subsumed in the Western development of physical freedom and just now there is a release of these in some places, and in others a rebound from prolonged tension. Men are craving again that expression of these released spiritual energies.

In somewhat contradictory ways and from unexpected channels does this movement manifest itself. Anglo-Saxon particularism has spent its force or at least has reached its zenith. However, the race has not lost its power of comprehensive thinking. There is a manifest revival of philosophy in English-speaking countries. There seems to be gathering a mighty force of the smothered convictions of millions of souls, that will free man's essential nature from the tyranny of facts based on sense impression only. There is a tendency to seize the established relationships of natural forces stored in laboratories — these vast accumulations of fact — and to transform them by means of working hypotheses or comprehensive theories into universal modes of control of life-activity. Life is being interpreted as something more than absorption in securing physical freedom. This diverting of man's intelligence into economic channels only, has in reality been elevating a means to the dignity of an end. The cry has been control of nature's forces: it is now control of social forces. New values at once present themselves. There is need in control of forces to know the *direction*. Control of social forces for what? The answer

comes in various interpretations of the aim of life. This at once brings philosophic discussion. The standard to measure life's values is strongly in men's minds. The end, general welfare, common good, is interpreted so far to mean conditions of social health. The possibility of redistribution of *direction* of energy is being realized, and with it the full import of *direction*. Equal freedom is an ideal urged as giving direction to energy. Freedom for what? With the tentative answer self-realization, the whole personality is at once suggested. The law of equality ceases to have its economic import alone, and in place of setting over one particular activity against another particular activity, the *whole personality* of one is set over against the *whole personality* of the other.

The ethical import of self-realization is in the air we breathe to-day. Cults of various kinds are growing up in our midst where possibility of self-growth is so all-engrossing an idea as to completely remove the devotee from all participation in the life about him. Estrangement from family and friends is a result suggesting the influence of Eastern mysticism. Absorption in a new Nirvana, or even a return to the Eastern conception itself, is the result of the force of the rebound from pent-up energies together with the freeing of those heretofore engrossed in securing means of gratification of physical wants.

It may be in keeping to justify this digression from the consideration of the question, the connection of the school and the church. The church is the institution affording opportunity for man's expression of his relation to God. The conviction is forced that the best expression for man's *essential nature* will be found in established institutions which have their roots in civilization. Where worship is not purely formal there is that satisfaction of the human spirit that finds a parallel only in the aesthetic. Its presence in the individual is easily recognised and is termed the *spirituelle*. There is an apprehension by feeling or sensation of that attribute which when manifested in intellectual knowledge is termed truth. The same idea is expressed when one says "there is a flash of the infinite that possesses one," or when another says "Art is eternal."¹¹ It is probably this thrill that has made every primitive race find some expression in a religious

¹¹ See development of this idea in Judge Grosscup's article in *N. A. Review*, 1908. P. 811.

way. All common things are transfigured by "this light that never was on sea or land." A joyousness, a buoyancy, seems almost to destroy what we term the material existence.

"Now have these homely things been made
Sacred, and a glory on them laid.

* * * * *

Now is the holy not afar
In temples lighted by a star
But where the loves and labors are:
Now that the King has gone this way
Great are the things of every day."¹²

The church is the institution in which men have found expression for the spiritual part of their nature. This expression is what men are seeking to-day as is evidenced by the number of cults that have arisen within the past few years. That this expression is necessary for man's fullest self-realization all history witnesses.

Even more fundamental is another contribution of the church. Where religion is an experience and not a mere form, there is a continual *freeing of the ethical impulse*. When the question of moral education impinges so manifestly on present educational thought, this ethical impulse is sought in vain apart from religion. Bosanquet says here, "If we think that the will to be good grows up as a matter of course in every man and maintains itself without help from a greater power than his, then we are in a fool's paradise and have still much to learn from the Catholic Church."¹³

Just how this connection can be made by which education in ethical lines is vivified by the religious principle, no one seems to be prepared to say. Congresses are being held for discussion of this. This problem shares with the industrial problem the interest of our leaders in educational thought. Until some means is provided it is fitting to suggest that there be avenues of influence sympathetically and tolerantly maintained. In connection with a number of our State Universities and other institutions of higher learning, there are societies being formed, affiliated with various denominations. The Newman Club and The St. George's Club representing respectively the Roman Catholic and Episcopal

¹² Edwin Markham.

¹³ Bosanquet, *Civilization of Christendom*. P. 118.

churches may be cited. Students professing these different beliefs organize and provide means of coming into their inheritance in this as well as in the lines of secular knowledge. The interchange of influences would seem to be of benefit to all concerned. It was only through such broadly tolerant geniuses as Frederick the Great that Germany succeeded in making any adjustment. The present Emperor in like spirit recognises the function of religion in asking the schools to prepare God-fearing, patriotic, and intelligent men and women.

Another medium through which something of that which uplifts can be given to the immature in our schools is the personality of a teacher whose experience in that, as well as all lines, is radiated without one word of what is ordinarily termed religion. Still another is provided in the increased efficiency of our Sunday Schools. The school when viewed in its external relations and internal relations is at once a means of self-realization, and a means of "assimilating the members to the social purpose." When education is localized instead of centralized — as in the case in America — there is missing too often the ideals. There is a failure of those in the work, teacher and pupil and administrator alike, to see the relation of his particular work to that of the whole. Much of the time given to "method," in the preparation of teachers should be given to enabling the prospective teacher to see the relation of the school to society, both as it is and as it should be, and then to ascertain means of bridging the gap. The interrelations of the school and other institutions should be studied and the possibility of securing reciprocal reinforcement of all these institutions should be worked out as far as possible. If the *significance* of the work of the school is grasped, and the significance of his share in the whole is realized, the work of the teacher becomes that of the artist, and ceases to be that of a drudge.

Summary

Self-activity has been made the basis of this discussion. Aristotle's conception of the characteristic function of man has been interpreted to show that this activity is the means of survival and at the same time of progress. This progressive adaptation of the individual through intelligence and will, is the essence of the self. In the process of this self-realization, man's limitation

of not being able to think any thing in isolation is again the means of his progress. The discovery of the meeting point of differences, or of relationships, is at once the means and end of the endeavor — the seeing *all* in One. This perpetual establishing of relationships mediates towards unity by giving solidarity to the group motivated around the identical idea. The social good is thereby furthered by means of the individual good. Effort to determine the *significance* of activities and attainment current in civilization reveals these as the sifted experience of the race. This social inheritance is the core of reality in human experience, the way of God in history. The translation of this social inheritance into the experience of the child makes him the bearer of the social purpose. This work of translation is the work of different institutions: the home, the school, the vocation, the state, the church.

The work of the school can be rendered better by defining the unique fitness of each of these institutions and by providing avenues by which the influences of each can reciprocally reinforce one another. The work of the school should be a *sharing* of experience. The various so-called subjects of study become under this interpretation different modes of experiencing life, "method" fundamentally the "mode of the individual's behavior in the realization of some phase of his environment." This mode of behavior should give rise to attitudes that become stimuli to continued endeavor. The school can be made a selected environment in which the technique of school control tends to be mastered. In connection with this aspect, there should be a borderland of activities by which there is a constant interchange of influences with the life without.

The direction of these influences when the school is in connection with the home is determined by the relative levels of each. The connection of the school with the vocations brings out the industrial school problem so urgent to-day. The connection of the school with the state forces the consideration of a Department of Education. The connection of the school with the church brings us in touch with the problem of moral education. Some channel must be provided that allows the ethical impulse freed or called forth by religion to enter with the life of the school and to give direction to the conduct of its members.

By thus viewing the school in its external relations to society and at the same time in its internal relations as a miniature community, its possibilities as a means of social control and of self-realization is revealed to those in charge. Thereby the *significance* of the whole and of each one's share in the whole is grasped. Realization of the significance of one's work makes the work *art* instead of *drudgery*.

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